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Résumé
Mots clés: Théorie des Jeux Évolutionnaires, Processus de Décision Markovien, Sys-
tèmes Dynamiques, Contrôle et Optimisation
La théorie des jeux évolutionnaires (EGT) constitue un cadre simple pour étudier le
comportement de populations larges dont les membres sont engagés en interactions
stratégiques. L’origine de l’EGT est due à Maynard Smith (Maynard Smith, 1972),
qui utilise les concepts de base de la Théorie des Jeux (GT) classique pour étudier
l’évolution des espèces en biologie. Tandis que la GT considère des agents rationnels
qui choisissent leurs actions pour maximiser leur propre utilité, dans l’EGT, au départ,
les joueurs sont censés être les membres d’une espèce, pour lesquels l’hypothèse de
rationalité ne peut pas être considérée. Les actions sont interprétées comme des traits
héréditaires et l’utilité correspond au fitness darwinien (ou succès reproductif). Après
la diffusion de l’EGT en biologie, les économistes comprennent que l’approche évolu-
tionnaire peut être très utile pour l’ étude des équilibres de la GT et que ses modèles
peuvent représenter des problèmes dans autres contextes que la biologie. De plus, les
modèles évolutionnaires ont l’avantage de ne pas nécessiter d’ hypothèse de rational-
ité, étant un concept très difficile à définir et caractériser (Weibull, 1998). Déjà Nash,
dans sa thèse, avait suggéré que son concept d’équilibre (l’équilibre de Nash) peut avoir
deux interprétations, une rationaliste et une autre qu’il appelle «action demasse»(Nash,
1950). L’EGT est désormais considérée comme un enrichissement important de la GT
et s’applique à un vaste éventail de problèmes dans des contextes différents, comme
l’économie, l’informatique, les télécommunications, les sciences sociales. En étant une
théorie assez récente, des nombreuses applications restent encore à identifier, ainsi que
plusieurs aspects théoriques à approfondir.
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Dans les jeux évolutionnaires standards, les individus d’une grande population sont
sélectionnés aléatoirement de façon répétitive pour jouer un jeu symétrique entre deux
joueurs. Le fitness d’un joueur est défini comme une fonction de son action ainsi que de
la distribution des actions au sein de la population. Les actions donnant un fitness plus
élevé, se diffusent dans la population. Le concept d’équilibre est la stratégie évolution-
airement stable (SES ou ESS), introduite par Maynard Smith et Price (Maynard Smith
and Price, 1973). Il s’agit d’une stratégie telle que, si elle est adoptée par l’ensemble de
la population, ne peut être envahie par une stratégie différente, et est donc stable par
rapport à la déviation d’une (petite) fraction de la population à une stratégie différente
(mutante). D’un point de vue biologique, l’ESS peut être vue comme une généralisation
du concept darwinien de «survie du plus apte», alors que d’un point de vue des jeux,
il s’agit d’un raffinement conceptuel de l’équilibre de Nash.
Tandis que l’ESS est un concept statique qui vise à expliquer les processus de mutation,
Taylor et Jonker (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) définissent des dynamiques qui permettent
de comprendre comment une population atteint une situation stable, la dynamique
du réplicateur, en mettant l’accent sur le processus de sélection. Ils formalisent ces
dynamiques à travers un système d’équations différentielles et montrent le lien entre les
points stationnaires de ce système et les équilibres du jeu. Dans les jeux évolutionnaires
standards le joueur est l’individu qui choisit ses actions pour maximiser son propre
fitness. Dans cette thèse nous proposons une nouvelle approche pour la modélisation
de l’ évolution, où le joueur est formé par un ensemble d’individus. Nous considérons
toujours des interactions entre individus mais nous supposons qu’ils maximisent le
fitness du group auquel ils appartiennent.
Une direction importante pour le développement de l’ EGT est celle des jeux stochas-
tiques. La notion de hasard est implicite dans la notion d’ ESS, en étant une stratégie
stable face à des mutations aléatoires. Même la dynamique du réplicateur peut être
vue comme l’approximation déterministe d’un processus stochastique, oú le hasard
disparaît quand la population est suffisamment large. Dans la deuxième partie de ce
manuscrit, nous introduisons une classe particulière de jeux évolutionnaires stochas-
tiques, les Jeux Evolutionnaires Markoviens (MDEG), défini par Altman et Hayel (Alt-
man and Hayel, 2010). Dans ce contexte, chaque joueur est associé à un état indi-
viduel qui évolue dans le temps selon un Processus de Décision Markovien (MDP).
Un joueur interagit à répétition avec d’autres joueurs, et il change d’ états. L’action
choisie détermine son fitness et aussi la probabilité de transition à l’état suivant. En
considérant des politiques stationnaires, Altman et Hayel montrent que, si la distri-
bution sur les états est stationnaire par rapport à la politique choisie, il est possible
de transformer le jeu MDEG dans un jeu évolutionnaire standard et calculer ses ESSs.
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Motivés par l’importance de comprendre les dynamiques qui amènent à une situation
stable, nous présentons ici une nouvelle approche dynamique des MDEG. À différence
de l’approche statique adopté par Altman et Hayel, en ce travail nous considérons les
dynamiques des états individuels et couplée avec les politiques et nous les décrivons à
travers des équations différentielles interdépendantes.
Dans la troisième partie du manuscrit, nous poursuivons l’étude des jeux stochastiques
dynamiques dans un contexte différent, la théorie du contrôle. Nous définissions un
système stochastique dynamique contrôlé simultanément par deux joueurs engagés
dans un jeu à somme non nulle (et non constante) et nous montrons que le problème
stochastique peut être approximé à travers un jeu dynamique déterministe.
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Introduction
”The word “model” sounds more scientific than “fable” or “fairy tale”
although I do not see much difference between them. [. . . ] The author of a
fable draws a parallel to a situation in real life. He has some moral he
wishes to impart to the reader. The fable is an imaginary situation that is
somewhere between fantasy and reality. Any fable can be dismissed as
being unrealistic or simplistic, but this is also the fable’s advantage. Being
something between fantasy and reality, a fable is free of extraneous details
and annoying diversions. In this unencumbered state, we can clearly
discern what cannot always be seen in the real world. On our return to
reality, we are in possession of some sound advice or a relevant argument
that can be used in the real world. We do exactly the same thing in
economic theory.”
Ariel Rubinstein, Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist, 2006
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) constitutes a simple framework to study the behav-
ior of large populations whose individuals are repeatedly engaged in pairwise strategic
interactions. The birth of EGT is marked by the pioneering work of Maynard Smith
(Maynard Smith, 1972), who uses classical Game Theory (GT) as a tool to explain and
to predict quantitative and qualitative aspects of biological evolution of species. While
GT considers rational agents choosing their actions in order to maximize their utility
function, originally in EGT the players are supposed to be the members of an animal
species, for which rationality can’t be assumed. Actions are interpreted as inheritable
traits and the utility corresponds to the Darwinian fitness (or reproductive success).
After the spread of EGT in biology, economists understand that the evolutionary ap-
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proach is useful to investigate the foundations of game theoretic solution concept (Fried-
man, 1991) and it can be adopted in social science contexts, to predict human behavior
with no need of rationality assumption, which may be complex to define and to inter-
pret (Weibull, 1998). It’s worth to mention that in his thesis, Nash already notes that
his solution concept (the Nash equilibrium) could have two interpretations, one ratio-
nalistic and one that he called the “mass action interpretation”: “We shall now take the
"mass-action" interpretation of equilibrium points. In this interpretation solutions have no
great significance. It is unnecessary to assume that the participants have full knowledge of the
total structure of the game, or the ability and inclination to go through any complex reasoning
processes. But the participants are supposed to cumulate empirical information on the relative
advantages of the various pure strategies at their disposal.” (Nash, 1950).
EGT is nowadays considered as an important enrichment of GT and it’s applied in a
wide variety of fields, spanning from economics to computer science. Evolutionary
models allow, for example, to explain and predict different aspects of human behavior,
as the evolution of language (Nowak et al., 1999), the spread of culture (Enquist and
Ghirlanda, 2007) andmoral behavior (Harmsand and Skyrms, 2008), as well as to study
telecommunication networks dynamic problems, as the evolution of Internet Transport
Protocols (Altman et al., 2009), the formation of wireless networks (Shakkottai et al.,
2006), (Altman et al., 2008b), (Altman and Hayel, 2008) (Bonneau et al., 2005) and con-
gestion control problems (Menasche et al., 2005), (Zheng and Feng, 2001b), (Zheng and
Feng, 2001a). Being a relatively young mathematical theory, there still remain many
possible applications yet to be identified, and many interesting theoretical issues to be
addressed or deeper explored.
In standard evolutionary games, individuals in a large population are repeatedly and
randomly selected to play a symmetric two-person game. The fitness is defined as a
function of both the behavior of the individual as well as of the distribution of behav-
iors among the whole population. Actions with higher fitness are supposed to spread
within the population. The main solution concept, first introduced by Maynard Smith
and Price (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973), is the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS),
which is such that, if a population adopt it, it is uninvadable by any other strategy, which
means that it is robust against deviations of a (possibly small) fraction of the popula-
tion to a different strategy (mutations). From a biological point of view it can be seen
as a generalization of Darwin’s idea of survival of the fittest, while from a game theo-
retical perspective it constitutes a refinement of the Nash Equilibrium. Maynard Smith
equilibrium concept has been enriched with an explicit dynamic foundation by Taylor
and Jonker (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). In order to explain how a population reaches a
stable situation, they introduce the replicator dynamics, which highlights the role of se-
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lection. It is formalized by a system of ordinary differential equations and it establishes
that an action spreads if its fitness is larger than the averaged fitness in the population.
While in standard EGT, the interacting individual is the player, choosing the actions to
play in order to maximize its own fitness, in the first part of this dissertation we pro-
pose a new approach to model evolution, where the player is supposed to be a whole
group. We still consider pairwise interactions among individuals but we assume that
they maximize the fitness of the group they belong to, which is thus the actual player
of the game.
An interesting direction for future developments of EGT is towards stochastic games.
The notion of randomness is somehow implicitly carried in the concept of evolutionary
stability, as the mutations in the population are random events. The replicator equation
can also be derived as the deterministic approximation of a stochastic process, where
all randomness is averaged away when the population size is sufficiently large. Sand-
holm (Sandholm, 2010) defines the notion of revision protocol, which specifies the general
rule followed by players updating their actions in time, generating a continuous time
Markov process over the finite set of actions’ distributions (states of the system). He
rigorously proves that, when the population is sufficiently large, the stochastic process
converges in a finite-horizon to the deterministicmean dynamics, defined as the expected
motion. We present, in the second part of the manuscript, a particular class of stochastic
evolutionary games, that ofMarkov Decision Evolutionary Games (MDEG), introduced by
Altman and Hayel (Altman and Hayel, 2010). In this framework, each player is asso-
ciated with an individual state which evolves in time according to a Markov Decision
Process (MDP). During his finite life time a player repeatedly meets other users in ran-
dom pairwise interactions and it may move among different states; the actions played
by an individual determines his immediate fitness and the transition probabilities to
the next state. Restricting (without loss of generality) to stationary policies, Altman and
Hayel prove that, if the distribution over the individual states is assumed to be station-
ary with respect to the currently used policy, it is possible to transform the MDEG into
a standard evolutionary game and to compute its ESSs. Motivated by the importance
of understanding the dynamics leading to a stable situation, we present in this disser-
tation, our new dynamical approach to MDEG. In contrast with the static approach
adopted by Altman and Hayel, we study here the local dynamics of individual states
and the dynamics intrinsically related to the distribution of policies in the population,
describing them by interdependent differential equations.
In the third part of the manuscript we pursue the study of stochastic dynamics in a
different context, that of control theory. We define a hybrid stochastic dynamical system
jointly controlled by two players involved in a non-zero sum game and we prove that
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the problem can be approximated by an averaged deterministic differential game.
The manuscript is organized as follows.
Part I: Deterministic Evolutionary Games and Groups of Players
In Part I, we first briefly introduce Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), pointing out the
main notions that will be used and developed in this work. After a hint of the history
of EGT, we provide the main equivalent definitions of the ESS. We then illustrate the
dynamic aspect of EGT through the replicator dynamics and the relation between the
rest points of the replicator equation and the equilibria of the game. We then describe
one of the most studied examples in evolutionary games, that of the Hawk-Dove.
In Chapter 2 we present our new approach to evolutionary games, in which the con-
cept of the player as a single individual is replaced by that of a player as a whole group.
Even if we still consider pairwise interactions among individuals, we suppose that in-
dividuals maximize the fitness of the group they belong to. In order to provide simple
but meaningful results, we analyze the Hawk-Dove game in this framework, consider-
ing the case of an infinite and that of a finite population of individuals. We obtain, in
both cases, a concave game. This allows us to prove the existence and the uniqueness
of a symmetric Nash equilibrium through Rosen’s results (Rosen, 1965). We explicitly
compute the equilibria as a function of the number of groups. We then define a gradi-
ent based dynamics as a counterpart of the replicator equation. We obtain that the fact
of teaming together makes individuals less aggressive at equilibrium. We deepen the
study of group-players in Chapter 3, where we consider groups with different relative
sizes andwe introduce a new concept of equilibrium, theGroup Fitness Evolutionarily
Stable Strategy (GFESS). The stability required by the GFESS is related to a notion of
deviation within a group, and thus of a fraction of the player (instead of a fraction of the
whole population). We first define the GFESS in a general case and we then character-
ize it for two-actions games. We illustrate our results through three classical examples,
the Hawk-Dove game, the Stag Hunt game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We then gen-
eralize the definition of group fitness in order to study an application in multiple access
control in slotted Aloha.
Part II: Individual State and policyDynamics inMarkovDecision EvolutionaryGames
We begin the second part of the dissertation presenting MDEG as defined by Altman
and Hayel (Altman and Hayel, 2010), combining MDP and EGT. In Chapter 5 we
present our new dynamical approach to MDEG, in which players are associated with
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an individual state evolving according to a continuous time MDP. We first introduce
the concept of interdependent dynamics of states and policies in a general case, and we
then define the State Policy coupled Dynamics (SPcD) system in a particularly simple
scenario, with two states and two actions. We establish the relation between the equi-
libria of the defined system and the equilibria of the game, and we then find the closed-
form solutions of the system. The system is solved by assuming that the processes of
states and policies move with different velocities, which allows us to apply two differ-
ent approximation techniques: the singular perturbation method, and a matrix approx-
imation technique. In Chapter 6 we define a dynamic model for the Hawk-Dove game
in a MDEG type of framework, in order to study the impact of the aggressive behavior
of adults on the evolution of young individuals. As in MDEG models, players are as-
sociated with a MDP, but transitions probabilities here do not depend on the player’s
action but on the action of its opponent. By considering the stationary distribution over
the states, we transform the game into an equivalent standard evolutionary game, and
we compute the equilibria. We then combine the notion of group-players presented in
Chapter 2 and MDEG, studying the dynamic Hawk-Dove game for the case of group
players.
Part III: Stochastic Hybrid Dynamics
In the last part of the manuscript, we extend the theory of control for an hybrid stochas-
tic dynamical system to the case of two players non-zero sum games. The system
evolves in continuous time and it is subjected to abrupt changes of the parameters,
determined by two (discrete time) Markov decision processes, each of which is con-
trolled by a player that aims at minimizing its objective function. As we did in Chapter
5, we assume a two time scales behavior of the system: the lengths of the time intervals
between the “jumps" of the parameters are assumed to be small, which means that pa-
rameters evolve faster than the state of the system. This allows us to approximate the
hybrid game with a deterministic averaged dynamic game. We prove that an asymp-
totic Nash equilibrium of such hybrid game can be constructed on the basis of a Nash
equilibrium of a deterministic averaged dynamic game. We conclude the dissertation
with a last chapter resuming our main contributions and providing the possible future
developments of our work.
"Maybe needless to say, the discussion is limited by idiosyncratic limitations to my memory,
knowledge and understanding. I apologize for omissions and misrepresentations.", (Weibull,
1998).
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Notations
Lowercase letters are mostly used for real numbers, vectors of real numbers and func-
tions, while capital letters indicate matrices and sets. Bold lowercase letters are usually
used for vectors, non-bold one for real numbers. We will use the term ”action” and
”policy”, avoiding the term ”strategy” which may be misleading. In fact, in evolution-
ary game theory literature it is often used to refer to actions (pure or mixed), while in
Stochastic Games the same term refers to policy.
x˙(t) indicates the derivative dx(t)/dt;
A: set of pure actions, with |A| = M;
∆(A) = {p ∈ RK|
M
∑
i=1
pi = 1}: set of mixed actions;
S : set of individual states, with |S| = K;
U : set of general policies;
UM: set of Markov policies;
US: set of stationary policies;
UD: set of deterministic (stationary) policies;
F(·, ·): fitness function of an individual;
F¯(·): average fitness in the population;
Γi(·, ·): fitness function of a group player Gi;
αi: normalized size of a group i;
Q: set of transition probabilities;
Qs(s′, a) (homogeneous time) transition probability from state s′ ∈ S to state s ∈ S given action
a ∈ A;
R set of transition rates;
Rs(s′, a) transition rate from state s′ ∈ S to state s ∈ S given action a ∈ A;
Ts(u): average time that an individual playing deterministic policy u ∈ UD spends in state
s ∈ S ;
H: set of all observable state-action histories ht = {sl , al , l = 0, . . . , t}, t = 0, 1, 2, . . .;
W =
⋃
us∈US
ω(us): set of all vectors of steady state probabilities of state action pairs.
ANE: Asymptotic Nash Equilibrium
CT-MDP: Continuous Time Markov Decision Process
EGT: Evolutionary Game Theory
ESS: Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
GFESS: Group Fitness Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
GT: Game Theory
MAC: Multiple Access Control
MDP: Markov Decision Process
NE: Nash Equilibrium
SPcD: State Policy couple Dynamics
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Part I
Deterministic Evolutionary Games
and Group of Players
1
Chapter 1
An Introduction to Evolutionary
Game Theory
”The relation between species, or among the whole assemblage of an
ecology, may be immensely complex; and at Dr. Cavalli’s invitation I
propose to suggest that one way of making this intricate system intelligible
to the human mind is by the analogy of games of skill, or to speak
somewhat more pretentiously, of the Theory of Games.”
R. Fisher, Polimorphism and Natural Selection, 1958
Summary
This chapter gives a brief introduction to evolutionary game theory, pointing out
the main notions that will be used and developed in this work. After a hint of
the history of EGT, we provide the main equivalent definitions of the equilibrium
concept, the ESS. We then study the dynamic aspect of EGT through the replicator
dynamics and we establish the relation between the rest points of the replicator
equation and the equilibria of the game. We conclude the chapter presenting one
of the most studied examples in evolutionary games, that of the Hawk-Dove.
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1.1. Origins of Evolutionary Game Theory and its Developments
1.1 Origins of EvolutionaryGameTheory and its Developments
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) has originally developed to formally describe and
predict quantitative and qualitative aspects of biological evolution by using the mathe-
matical theory of games.
Before the birth of Game Theory (GT), Fisher (Fisher, 1930) analyzes the dynamics of
the sex ratio in a species as a competition between individuals. In order to explain the
stable sex ratio observed in most of mammal species, he supposes that each individual
maximizes its own fitness, defined as the expected number of grandchildren, depending
on the relative frequency of males and females in the population. Even if the formalism
he adopts is not the same, Fisher’s approach is conceptually very close to game theory.
The first explicit attempt to apply GT formalism in evolutionary biology is by Lewon-
tin (Lewontin, 1961), who describes the evolution of the genetic mechanism as a game
played between nature and a species, where the latter seek actions that minimize the
probability of extinction. The equilibrium is represented by amaxmin action, the species
doing the best against the worst of the nature; similar ideas have been developed a few
years later by Slobodkin and Rapoport (Slobodkin and Rapoport, 1974).
Hamilton (Hamilton, 1967) uses game theory terminology to study the sex ratio of
species, in situations where certain underlying assumptions of Fisher’s argument do
not hold. He models the choice of the sexes of offspring of an individual as the choice
of an action in a game and defines the concept of unbeatable strategy, which is very close
to the notion of evolutionarily stable strategy, the key equilibrium concept introduced
byMaynard Smith and Price, (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973) which marks the official
birth of EGT. The authors study animals’ conflicts as games, where actions are behav-
ioral phenotypes and the payoff represents the fitness, i.e. the number of offspring of an
individual. With his treatise Evolution and the Theory of Games (Maynard Smith, 1982),
Maynard Smith brings EGT into widespread circulation.
While Maynard Smith’s notion of ESS captures the mutation mechanism through a static
definition, Taylor and Jonker (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) focus on the selection mechanism
and model the dynamic process by which the distribution of actions in a population
evolves to a stable situation as a system of ordinary equations; Schuster and Sigmund
(Schuster and Sigmund, 1983) call this model the replicator dynamics.
Since the late 1980s, there is a growing interest in EGT by economists, who see the
value of the evolutionary approach to game theory in contexts other than biology, both
as a method of providing foundations for the equilibrium concepts of traditional game
theory, and as a tool for selecting among equilibria. Furthermore the evolutionary ap-
proach do not need the rationality assumption required by standard games. EGT mod-
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els start to be applied to study the behavior of populations of active decision makers
(Friedman, 1991), (Mailath, 1992), (Nachbar, 1990), (Selten, 1991). Even if the majority
of work in EGT has been undertaken by biologists and economists, closely relatedmod-
els have been applied in a wide range of disciplines, including sociology (Zhang, 2004),
(Bisin and Verdier, 2001), (Kuran and Sandholm, 2008), (Sandholm, 2005), computer sci-
ence (Shakkottai et al., 2006), (Zheng and Feng, 2001a), (Sandholm, 2001), (Sandholm,
2005), and transportation science (Sandholm, 2001).
1.2 A Static Approach to EGT
1.2.1 Normal Form Games
We briefly introduce here two players normal form symmetric games, which will be
considered to model pairwise interactions involved in EGT models. Suppose that each
of the two players disposes of a finite set of pure actions,A, with |A| = M. Let ∆(A) =
{p ∈ RM+ | ∑
i∈A
pi = 1} be the set of mixed actions, that are probability measures over
the action space. Note that a pure action i ∈ A can be represented through the unit
vector ei = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ∆(A) with all elements equals to zero except for
the element in position i, which equals 1. The payoff can be described by a matrix
A = (aij) ∈ RM ×RM, where the entry aij corresponds to the payoff that a player gets
using pure action i ∈ A in an interaction with a player using j ∈ A. If mixed actions are
considered, the expected payoff of an individual playing p against an opponent using
q, with p,q ∈ ∆(A), is given by:
pTAq = ∑
i∈A
∑
j∈A
piaijqj (1.1)
An action q∗ ∈ ∆(A) is a (symmetric)Nash equilibrium of the two players-symmetric
normal form game if:
q∗TAq∗ ≥ pTAq∗ ∀p ∈ ∆(A). (1.2)
If (1.2) holds with strict inequality, q∗ is a strict Nash equilibrium.
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1.2.2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS)
Consider a large population of players, where individuals are repeatedly matched at
random in a two-players normal form game, as described in the previous section.
Maynard Smith’s ESS is defined as an action that, if adopted by the whole population,
is robust against invasions by a small group of individuals playing a different (mutant)
action. Suppose that the whole population is programmed to play an (incumbent) action
q ∈ ∆(A) , and that a fraction ǫ of mutants deviate to an action p ∈ ∆(A).
Definition 1. The mixed action q is an ESS if ∀p 6= q, there exists some ǫp > 0 such that:
∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫp) qTA(ǫp+ (1− ǫ)q) > pTA(ǫp+ (1− ǫ)q). (1.3)
Equation 1.3 requires that, if the size of the invading group is sufficiently small, the in-
cumbent’s expected payoff from a random match in the post-entry population exceeds
that of any mutant.
The stable population is said to be monomorphic if all individuals are assumed to adopt
the same action, polymorphic if it individuals are allowed to take different actions (May-
nard Smith, 1982).
It can be easily proved (see e.g. (Weibull, 1995)) that the following conditions are equiv-
alent to Definition 1.
Proposition 1. q ∈ ∆(A) is an ESS if and only if it satisfy:
• Nash Condition:
qTAq ≥ pAq ∀p ∈ ∆(A), (1.4)
• Stability Condition:
qTAq = pAq⇒ qAp ≥ pAp ∀p ∈ ∆(A),p 6= q. (1.5)
The inequality 1.4 corresponds to the definition of the Nash equilibrium, while the
second condition requires that, if the mutant action p is an alternative best reply to the
incumbent action q, then the payoff of the incumbent action against the mutant one is
higher then the one of themutant action against itself. This definition can be interpreted
from a biologic perspective: q is an ESS if an arbitrary rare mutant p does no better than
q in its most frequent contests against q. If it does as well in these, then it does worse
than q in its rare contests against another mutant. It immediately follows from (1.4)
that a symmetric strict Nash equilibrium is an ESS (while the converse is not true).
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Another equivalent definition of the ESS which is often used, is due to Hofbauer and
Sigmund.
Theorem 1. [Theorem 6.4.1 (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998)] The action q ∈ ∆(A) is an ESS
if and only if
qTAp > pTAp
for all p 6= q in some neighbourhood of q in ∆(A).
Other equivalent definitions of ESS can be found in the literature. The evolutionary
stability can be characterized, for example, by introducing the concept of invasion bar-
rier, which is useful in the case of a finite population (Weibull, 1995). An important
distinction to be made is that among ESS and evolutionarily stable state (see the next
subsection for the definition of the latter): an analysis of the relation between these two
notions can be found in (Thomas, 1984). Some weakening criteria for evolutionary sta-
bility are the concept of neutral stability (Weibull, 1995) and that of local stability (Pohley
and Thomas, 1983), while an important refinement of the ESS is the regular ESS (Taylor
and Jonker, 1978). Maynard Smith and Parker (Maynard Smith et al., 1976) extend the
study of the ESS to the case of asymmetric games and Selten (Selten, 1980) proves that,
for these games, no mixed action can be evolutionarily stable. Taylor (Taylor, 1979) and
Cressman (Cressman, 1992) study the evolutionary stability in the case of two types
of players (see Chapter 2). In Chapter 3 we briefly present the different existing defi-
nitions of N-species ESS, first introduced by Garay and Varga (Garay and Varga, 2000),
and we define our new notion of Group Fitness Evolutionary Stable Strategy. Cressman
(Cressman, 1992) devotes a text to the development of static ESS conditions in diverse
theoretical models of evolutionary biology, providing a wide overview of the differ-
ent definitions of the evolutionary stability notion. Evolutionary stability can also be
defined adopting a dynamical point of view: see e.g. (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003),
where the authors state a necessary and sufficient condition for an action to be evolu-
tionarily stable, which is related to the replicator equation. Also Pholey and Thomas’
local stability has been defined in order to find a static concept in better agreement with
the dynamical aspects of the process of natural selection. Cressman et al. (Cressman
et al., 2001) focused on a dynamical approach to the ESS in the case of N species. An
application driven approach leads to a setwise generalization of the ESS, the Evolutionarily
Stable Set (ES): see (Thomas, 1985), (Cressman, 1992), (Weibull, 1995).
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1.2.3 Population Games and Evolutionarily Stable State
Population games study strategic interactions within a large polymorphic populations
of individuals playing pure actions (Sandholm, 2009). In this scenario, the notion of
evolutionary stability is associated with the state of the population instead that to a
mixed action (see e.g. (Taylor and Jonker, 1978), (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) and
(Sandholm, 2009)). More precisely, a population state (also called profile), is defined by
a vector x = (x1, . . . , xM), with
M
∑
i=1
xi = 1, where xi is the proportion of individuals in
the population playing pure action i ∈ A. Note that x ∈ ∆(A), so it is formally equiv-
alent to a mixed action in ∆(A). A population game is identified by the continuous
vector valued payoff function F : ∆(A) → RM, depending on the state of the popu-
lation. Let Fi(x) denote the payoff of pure action i in a population in state x. If mixed
actions are considered, the payoff of mixed action q ∈ ∆(A), denoted by F(q, x), can
be thought as the average fitness of a group of individuals such that a proportion qi of
the group uses pure action i, against a population in state x, i.e:
F(q, x) =
M
∑
i=1
qiFi(x).
Definition 2. A population state q is a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium profile if:
F(q,q) ≥ F(x,q),
for all population states x ∈ ∆(A).
Definition 3. A population state q is evolutionarily stable if:
F(q, x) > F(x, x),
for all x 6= q in a neighborhood of q.
Remark 1. If the payoff function F is linear in the population state, then evolutionarily stable
state and ESS coincide.
1.3 A Dynamic Approach to EGT
The notion of dynamics has been introduced into evolutionary games by Taylor and
Jonker (Taylor and Jonker, 1978), in order to provide a dynamic foundation of May-
nard Smith’s static concept of evolutionary stability. Through a system of differential
equations, the authors describe the evolution of the distribution of actions within a pop-
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ulation, where the share of individuals playing a certain action is supposed to change
according to the actions’ success (represented by the fitness function). They then show
the relation between the stable points of their dynamics and the ESSs of the game. The
model has been named the replicator dynamics by Schuster and Sigmund (Schuster and
Sigmund, 1983).
The need for a dynamical approach to games is already felt at the earliest stages of
classical game theory, when Neumann and Morgenstern, in the introduction of their
treatise (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947), suggest the idea of completing their static
solution concept with some notion of dynamics. The first dynamic models are due to
Brown and Von Neumann, who defined the Brown-Von Neumann-Nash dynamics, as a
tool for computing the equilibria in zero-sum games (Brown and Neumann, 1950). In
the last decades, a large number of dynamics has been introduced in GT framework: see
e.g. gradient-based dynamics (Rosen, 1965), fictitious play (Gilboa and Matsui, 1991), pro-
jection dynamics, best response dynamics (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991), Boltzman dynamics
and logit dynamics (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998).
When a dynamic approach is adopted, a player is supposed to occasionally reconsider
its choice of action, adjusting its action in response to several information, like its own
current payoff, the average current payoff, the historical actions of the others, etc. In
(Sandholm, 2010), the author introduces, in population games framework, the notion of
revision protocols, which specify the general rule followed by players updating their ac-
tions in time (see e.g. imitative protocol, natural selection protocol, evaluative protocol). A re-
vision protocol generates a continuous time Markov process over the finite set of states
of the system. For large populations of players and finite time games, this stochastic
process can be approximated by its expected motion, given by the deterministic mean
dynamics. Then, each revision protocol can be viewed as defining a map, called deter-
ministic evolutionary dynamic, from population games to mean dynamics. On the basis
of the revision protocols which induce them, it is possible to identify different fam-
ilies of deterministic evolutionary dynamics. Sandholm defines four main classes of
deterministic dynamics for population games: imitation (which includes the replicator
dynamics), excess payoff, pairwise comparison and perturbed pairwise comparison dynamics.
In the following subsection, we give the formal definition of the standard replicator
dynamics in EGT. In Section 2.3.2 we use Rosen’s gradient-based dynamics in our new
framework of group-players evolutionary games. In Chapter 5 we study the replicator
dynamics of policies coupled with the dynamics of individual states in a particular
Markov decision evolutionary game (see Chapter 4 for an introduction to MDEG). In
Chapter 7 we deal with a different kind of dynamical system, a hybrid stochastic system
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for a two players non-zero sum game.
1.3.1 Replicator Equation
While the ESS notion is related to themutation mechanism in a population, the replicator
dynamics focuses on the selection mechanism, that favors some behavioral phenotypes
over others.Consider a large population of haploid individuals programmed to play the
same action during their entire lifetime and suppose that offspring inherit the parent’s
action. In the standard setup for replicator dynamics, only pure actions are allowed
and thus a vector q ∈ ∆(A) is interpreted as a population state and not as a mixed
action. This means that qi represents the share of the population adopting pure action i
(instead of representing the probability that an individual plays i); in our mathematical
treatment, we do not distinguish between the two interpretations.
The replicator dynamics consists in a system of differential equations describing how
the frequencies of pure actions evolve in time depending on their success. The evolu-
tion of qi, with i ∈ A, is expressed as:
q˙i(t) = qi(t)(Fi(q(t))− F¯(q(t))), (1.6)
where Fi(q) denotes the immediate fitness of an individual playing pure action i in a
population whose state is q and F¯(q) =
M
∑
i=1
piFi(q) is the average immediate fitness in
the population (in state q). The growth rate q˙i(t)/qi(t) of the fraction of the population
using action i is thus equal to the difference between the immediate fitness of that action
and the current average fitness in the population.
In a two-action game, withA = {1, 2}, if p indicates the share of the population playing
action 1, we have that F¯(q) = qF1(q) + (1− q)F2(q), and thus, by substituting this into
(1.6) we obtain:
q˙(t) = q(t)(1− q(t))(F1(q(t))− F2(q(t)). (1.7)
1.3.2 Convergence and Stability: the Folk Theorem of EGT
It is easy to see that any Nash equilibrium is a rest point of the replicator dynamics,
that is an equilibrium of the ODE (1.6). In fact, if an action in ∆(A) is a NE, all pure
strategies in its support earn the same maximal payoff against that strategy, and thus
they all earn the population average payoff. This implies that the right side of (1.6) is
zero for that action.
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The folk theorem of evolutionary game theory (Cressman, 2003), (Hofbauer and Sig-
mund, 2003) establishes the relation between the rest points of the replicator dynamics,
and the Nash equilibria of the symmetric game. Before stating the folk theorem, we
define the following notions:
• an orbit is interior if it is such that x(t) ∈ int∆ := {x ∈ ∆|xi > 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,M},
∀t ≥ 0;
• a rest point x∗ is Lyapunov stable if, for every neighborhoodUx∗ of x∗ there exists
a neighborhood Vx∗ of x∗ such that x(0) ∈ Vx∗ implies x(t) ∈ Ux∗ , ∀t ≥ 0;
• a rest point x∗ is attracting if it has a neighborhood Ux∗ such that x(t) → x∗ for
t→ ∞ holds for ∀x ∈ Ux∗ ;
• a rest point x∗ is asymptotically stable (or an attractor) if it is both stable and
attracting.
Theorem 2. [Theorem 2.5.3 (Cressman, 2003)]
i. any strict Nash equilibrium is asymptotically stable;
ii. if a rest point is the limit of an interior trajectory, then it is a Nash equilibrium;
iii. if a rest point is Lyapunov stable, then it is a Nash equilibrium,
Any ESS is asymptotically stable (Hofbauer et al., 1979), but the converse does not hold
in general; only in the special case of two-actions games, we have that dynamic stability
is equivalent to evolutionary stability. More precisely, the following result holds.
Theorem 3. [Theorem 2.5.4 (Cressman, 2003)] Every interior trajectory that is not initially at
rest, converges to an ESS. Furthermore, for the replicator dynamics, the following three state-
ments are equivalent:
i. q ∈ ∆(A) is stable.
ii. q is asymptotically stable.
iii. q is an ESS.
1.4 The Hawk-Dove Game
One of the most studied examples of evolutionary games, is the Hawk-Dove game, first
introduced by Maynard Smith to study the level of aggressiveness in a population of
animals competing for a natural resource (Maynard Smith, 1972). It has been later used
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in a wide variety of fields, spanning from biology to economics, where the notion of ag-
gressive behavior can be translated into a short-term orientedmaximization of “selfish”
individuals (see e.g. (Tomassini et al., 2010), (Hanauske et al., 2010)). In engineering,
for example, it is used in (Altman et al., 2009) to study competition of congestion con-
trol algorithms in communication networks, while in (Altman et al., 2008a) it serves
to study the interactions between mobile phones that can choose which power to use
when transmitting packets.
The standard model has been reformulated in many different ways and a large number
of revisited versions of the Hawk-Dove game can be found in the literature. Houston
and McNamara (Houston and McNamara, 1988), for example, study a repeated ver-
sion of the Hawk-Dove model, including a state variable representing animal’s level
of energy resources and they define an ESS which depends on that variable. Cress-
man (Cressman, 1992) defines a density dependentHawk-Dove game, where he modifies
the payoff matrix including in the individual’s fitness a term that is independent of
its strategy, to reflect the biological intuition that population growth rates decrease as
density increases (”background fitness”). Crowley (Crowley, 2000) defines a generalized
Hawk-Dove game, modeling interactions between individuals that may differ in size,
where size represents "resource holding power". He considers three different situa-
tions, based on the amount of information that interacting individuals have about their
sizes: the symmetric case, in which no information about sizes is used, the asymmetric
case, in which the individuals know their relative sizes, and a mixed-symmetry case, in
which each individual only knows its own size.
In Chapter 2 we define a Hawk-Dove model in a new framework, where players are
supposed to be (symmetric) groups of interacting individuals. In Chapter 3 we define
the notion of GFESS and we compute such equilibrium as a function of the size of the
groups for the group-players Hawk-Dove game. In Chapter 6 we study a particular
example of a dynamic version of the game, where players are characterized by an in-
dividual state and transition probabilities between two states depend on the action of
player’s opponent.
The Standard Hawk-Dove Game
Suppose that two animals contest for a resource (food, territory,. . . ) of value V. They
dispose of two possible pure actions, Hawk (H) and Dove (D), where the first corre-
spond to an aggressive behavior, the second to a passive one. The game is played as
follows:
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• if two Hawks meet, they fight and each of them has equal probability to win the
fight and to be injured. The fight has a cost C;
• if two Doves meet, there is no fight and they equally share the resource;
• if an Hawk meets a Dove, the Hawk gets the resource and the Dove retreats with-
out being injured.
The payoff matrix associated with the game is:
( H D
H (V − C)/2 V
D 0 V/2
)
(1.8)
There are three possible outcomes, depending on the values of V and C.
• If V > C, the game admits a unique pure strict Nash equilibrium, which is also
evolutionarily stable (H,H).
• If V = C, the symmetric pure actions pair (H,H) is still the unique Nash equilib-
rium; in this case it’s not strict (as FH(H) = FD(H)) but it is an ESS.
• If C > V, it’s an anti-coordination game, which admits three Nash equilibria:
the two non-symmetric pure actions pair (H,D), (D,H) and a mixed NE (q∗, q∗),
with q∗ = V/C, where q∗ is the probability of playing H. The only ESS is (q∗, q∗):
being a random matching game, a non-symmetric Nash equilibrium can’t be an
ESS.
The replicator equation of the game is:
q˙ = q(1− q)(FH(q)− FD(q))
= q(1− q)(1
2
(V − C)q+V(1− q)− V
2
(1− q))
q(1− q)
2
(V − Cq), q ∈ [0, 1].
It’s easy to verify the folk theorem statements and that, for the Hawk-Dove game the
interior orbit of the replicator equation converges to the ESS (q∗, q∗).
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Group Players
”A society of ants, bees, or termites achieves a kind of individuality at a
higher level. Food is shared to such an extent that one may speak of a
communal stomach. Information is shared so efficiently by chemical signals
and by the famous ’dance’ of the bees that the community behaves almost
as if it were a unit with a nervous system and sense of organs of its own.”
Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 1976
Summary
In this chapter we present a new model for evolutionary games, in which the con-
cept of the player as a single individual is substituted by that of a player as a whole
group. We still consider pairwise interactions among these individuals, but we sup-
pose that the fitness theymaximize is that of their group. We analyze a Hawk-Dove
game with group players and, as it results to be concave, we prove the existence of
a symmetric Nash equilibrium through Rosen’s conditions. We explicitly compute
it and we obtain that the fact of teaming together makes individuals less aggressive
at equilibrium. We finally define a gradient based dynamics as a counterpart of the
replicator equation, such the equilibrium of the game is asymptotically stable for
such dynamics.
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2.1 Introduction
We introduce in this chapter a new scenario for evolutionary games, where the notion
of the player as a single individual is replaced by that of a player as a whole group. We
still consider pairwise interactions among individuals but we assume that they maxi-
mize the fitness of the group they belong to. We suppose that the number of groups
is finite and we consider two different scenarii: the case of an infinite and that of a fi-
nite population of individuals. We allow pairwise interactions within members of the
same group and between individuals of different groups. Groups are supposed to be
monomorphic, that is, all individuals in a group play the same (possibly mixed) action.
As individuals are indistinguishable, the behavior of an individual is fixed and does
not depend on the individual it encounters.
Figure 2.1: Individuals are divided into a finite number of symmetric groups. Each individual can
interact with a member of its own group or of a different one.
In order to provide simple but meaningful results, we analyze the Hawk-Dove game
in this framework, and we characterize its equilibria. We adopt the Nash equilibrium
as solution concept, rather than the ESS. As a matter of facts, in our game, even if the
population of individuals may be infinitely large, the number of players is finite, and,
as the Nash equilibrium requires stability against the deviation of one player, in our
framework this implies stability against the deviation of a whole group of individuals.
In the next chapter we present the GFESS, a new concept of equilibrium for group-
players games, which considers local deviations within a group. We show here that we
obtain a concave game and we thus apply Rosen’s results (Rosen, 1965) to prove that the
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game admits a unique Nash equilibrium. We finally define a gradient-base dynamics,
which converges to the considered equilibrium.
Motivations
In standard EGT, each interacting individual is the player of the game and it chooses
its actions in order to maximize its own utility. Many example showing the modeling
weaknesses of this assumption can be found. Since in evolutionary games the fitness is
defined as related to the reproduction rate, the classical evolutionary game paradigm
cannot represent those situations in which only one selected member of a group is re-
sponsible for reproduction: in a beehive, for example, the fitness is related to the entire
swarm and not to a single bee. Furthermore, in many species, we find altruistic behav-
iors, which may hurt the individual adopting it, favoring instead the group it belongs
to. Altruistic behaviors are typical of parents toward their children: they may incubate
them, feed them or protect them from predators at a high cost for themselves. An-
other example can be found in flock of birds: when a bird sees a predator it gives an
"alarm call" to warn the rest of the flock, attracting the predator’s attention to itself.
Also the stinging behavior of bees is an altruistic one: it serves to protect the hive, but
it’s lethal for the bees which strives. Other examples can be found also different con-
texts. Ass already mentioned, in engineering applications to wireless communication,
power control games have frequently been studied in the framework of standard EGT
(see e.g. (Altman and Hayel, 2008)). Papers that consider these games usually assume
that each mobile can control selfishly its power. In practice however the protocols for
power control are not determined by the users of the terminal but by the equipment
constructors; this implies that the real competition is among a final number of equip-
ment constructors.
State of Art
The notion of group is not new in evolutionary game theory and different models con-
sidering the presence of a finite number of sub-populations have been developed. In
those cases, however, the group has a different connotation from the one we intro-
duce here, since it mainly serves to distinguish players with different characteristics
and thus to represent asymmetric contexts between individuals. The first evolution-
ary model considering groups has been introduced by Taylor (Taylor, 1979), who de-
scribes a population composed of two types of individuals, I and J, with inter-group
and intra-groups interactions. The state of the population as a whole is described by
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the pair of vectors (p,q), which are the distributions over the pure actions of a player
of type I and J respectively, with p = (p1, . . . , pm) and q = (q1, . . . , qn). If the popu-
lation is in state (p,q) and a sub-population is in state (r, s), the average fitness of a
player of type I is given by: F(r|p,q) =
m
∑
i=1
F(i|p, q) and the average fitness of type J
is: G(s|p,q) =
n
∑
j=1
G(j|p, q). The ESS for the two populations model is defined as a pair
of actions (p∗,q∗) which is stable against simultaneous small deviations of p and q,
which means that, for all (r, s) with r 6= p or s 6= q:
F(r|p¯, q¯) + G(s|p¯, q¯) < F(p∗|p¯, q¯) + G(q∗|p¯, q¯),
where p¯ = ǫr + (1 − ǫ)p∗, and q¯ = ǫs + (1 − ǫ)q∗. If the fitness functions are lin-
ear in (p,q), with F(r|p¯, q¯) = r(Ap¯ + Bq¯), G(s|p¯, q¯) = s(Cp¯ + Dq¯), then the ESS
condition translates into the conditions: r(Ap¯+ Bq¯) + s(Cp¯+ Dq¯) ≤ p∗(Ap¯+ Bq¯) +
q∗(Cp¯+ Dq¯), where, if the equality holds, then r(Ar+ Bs) + s(Cp+ Ds) < p∗(Ar+
Bs) + q∗(Cr+ Ds). Cressman studied (Cressman, 1992) the same scenario but he gives
a weaker definition of the ESS: while Taylor’s ESS performs better in both groups than
any other mutant action pair, he requires jut that (p∗,q∗) performs better for (at least)
one of the two groups, and thus, either:
r(Ap¯+ Bq¯) < p∗(Ap¯+ Bq¯)
or
s(Cp¯+ Dq¯) < q∗(Cp¯+ Dq¯).
Cressman provides different equivalent definitions of this ESS in the two-species con-
text. Both Taylor’s and Cressman’s definitions have been later extended to a multipop-
ulation scenario: see the following chapter for an introduction to the N-species ESS.
Our framework is closer tomultipopulation games as defined by Sandholm (Sandholm,
2010). He considers a society composed of p populations, each withmassmi and a set of
strategies Si, i = 1, . . . , p. The population state xi of population i is given by a distribution
over the set of strategies Si, while a social state x describes the behavior in all p popula-
tions. The game is defined by the payoff function F, which assigns to each social state a
vector of payoffs, one for each strategy in each population. By F¯i(x), Sandholm denotes
the average payoff function in population i. He thus also considers the payoff associ-
ated with a whole group of interacting individuals, but, while Sandholm focuses on the
different dynamics in this kind of games, introducing the notion of revision protocol,
we mainly adopt here a static approach and we consider different solution concepts. In
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particular, we study here the Nash equilibrium for a group-player Hawk-Dove game,
while in the following chapter we define and we characterize a new equilibrium, the
GFESS, in a general framework.
The chapter is structured as follows: in the next section we describe our framework
and we define the fitness of a group-player in two different cases: that of an infinite
population of individuals and that of a finite one. In Section 2.3 we study the Hawk-
Dove game in both contexts: we first prove, in Subsection 2.3.1 the existence and the
uniqueness of the equilibrium and we then explicitly compute it. We finally define a
gradient based dynamics in Section 2.3.2.
2.2 The General Model
We consider a population of individuals divided into N groups, G1, . . . ,GN with N ≥ 2;
for simplicity of presentation we will consider symmetric groups of the same size. Let
A = {a1, a2 . . . aM} be the set of pure actions and ∆(A) be the corresponding set of
mixed actions. We suppose that the sub-population in each group is monomorphic, that
is all individuals in the same group adopt the same action. Individuals are indistin-
guishable and their behavior is fixed. We thus associate to each group Gi the mixed
action (or state vector) pi = (pi1, . . . , p
i
M) ∈ ∆(A), with
M
∑
l=1
pil = 1. We define amultiac-
tion as the vector of all N group’s actions, denoted by p = (pi, . . . ,pN) ∈ ∆(A)N . Let
πij be the probability that an individual in group Gi meets an individual in group Gj.
The expected fitness of a (group) player Gi playing pi ∈ ∆(A) in a population whose
multiaction is p is defined by:
Γi(pi,p−i) = πii(pi,pi) +
N
∑
j=1,j 6=i
πijF(pi,pj), pi,pj ∈ ∆(A), (2.1)
where p−i = (p1, . . . ,pi−1,pi+1, . . . ,pN), and F(pi,pj) (resp. F(pi,pi)) denotes the im-
mediate fitness of an individual playing mixed action pi against an opponent playing
pj (resp.pi). The function Γi is linear in p−i. Note that, as the groups are symmetric,
the expected fitness only depend on the strategy used by the player and by the popu-
lation, i.e. Γi(pi,p−i) = Γ(pi,p−i), ∀i = 1, . . . ,N. The probabilities πij depend on the
size of the population. In what follows we see the case of an infinite and that of a finite
population of individuals.
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The Case of an Infinite Population of Individuals
If the population of individuals is infinitely large, we can assume that the probability
of an interaction among two individuals of the same group equals the probability of an
interaction among actors of different groups. We thus have that:
πii = πij = 1/N ∀i, j = 1, . . . ,N.
The resulting expected fitness of a (group) player Gi playing pi ∈ ∆(A) in a population
whose multiaction is p is given by:
Γ(pi,p−i) =
1
N
F(pi,pi) +
1
N
N
∑
j=1,j 6=i
F(pi,pj), pi,pj ∈ ∆(A). (2.2)
2.2.1 The Case of a Finite Population of Individuals
In order to study the impact of the size of groups on the equilibrium, we now consider
a finite population of individuals, with size NK, which is thus divided into N groups
of size K. The probability that an individual in group Gi meets an individual in group
Gj is given by:
πij =


K− 1
NK− 1 if i = j
K
NK− 1 if i 6= j
i, j = 1, . . . ,N
The expected fitness of a group playing action pi ∈ ∆(A) in a population whose multi-
action is p can be rewritten as:
Γ(pi,p−i) =
K− 1
NK− 1F(p
i,pi) +
K(N − 1)
NK− 1
N
∑
j=1,j 6=i
F(pipj), pi,pj ∈ ∆(A) (2.3)
2.3 Hawk-Dove Game with Group Players
We study here the Hawk-Dove game in the framework of group players. Let A =
{H,D}; the payoff associated with actors’ pairwise interactions is given by the follow-
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ing matrix:
( H D
H 1/2− δ 1
D 0 1/2
)
, (2.4)
which is obtained from (1.8) with V = 1 and C = 2δ. With some abuse of notation,
since a mixed action is given by p = (pH, pD) with pD = 1− pH, the action of a group i
is represented simply by the probability of being aggressive, pi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, . . . ,N.
2.3.1 Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium
As in our model the number of player is finite and each player corresponds to a group,
we adopt the Nash equilibrium as solution concept rather than the ESS. This choice is
also justified by the fact that, as the Nash equilibrium is stable against the deviation of
on player, in our model this implies the stability against the deviation of a whole group
of individuals, as the player is the group.
The existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium for concave games have been proved
by Rosen (Rosen, 1965). He considers N players games where each player disposes of a
set of mixed actions ∆i, i = 1, . . . ,N, andwhere player’s i payoff function Fi(p) depends
on the vector of actions of all the the N players, p = (p1, . . . , pN) ∈ ∆ := ∆1× . . .× ∆N .
The game is said to be concave if the product space of actions ∆ is convex, closed and
bounded ∀p ∈ ∆, and Fi(p) is continuous in p and concave in pi (for fixed p−i). Then,
every concave game admits a Nash equilibrium. Rosen also introduces the weighted
sum of payoffs σ(p, r) =
N
∑
i=1
riFi(p), with ri ∈ R+ and its pseudogradient:
g(p, r) =


r1∇1F1(p)
r2∇2F2(p)
...
r1∇NFN(p)

 . (2.5)
The equilibrium point of the game p ∈ ∆ is proved to be unique when σ(p, r) is diago-
nally strictly concave for a positive r, which means that for a fixed non-negative vector
r ≥ 0 and every vector q 6= p:
(p− q)′g(q, r) + (q− p)′g(p, r) > 0.
Hofbauer and Sandholm (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2008) establish the connection be-
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tween diagonally strictly concave games and stable population games. They define a
p−players game and a p unit masses population game, proving that the diagonal con-
cavity of the first one is equivalent to the stability of the latter.
In what follows we prove that the infinite and the finite-population models are concave
games and they both satisfy the diagonal concavity condition, which prove the exis-
tence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium. In (Brunetti and Altman, 2013) we present
this model also in a third case, where the population of individuals is finite and the
number of groups is random, but it does not satisfy the diagonally concavity condition.
Infinite Population
From the definition of ∆(A), it trivially follows that the product space ∆ = ∆(A)N =
[0, 1]N is convex, closed and bounded. When considering an infinite population and
the Hawk-Dove payoff matrix (2.4), the fitness of a (group) player adopting action pi ∈
[0, 1] in a population whose multiaction is p = (p1, . . . , pN) ∈ [0, 1]N (2.2) equals
Γ(pi,p−i) =
1
N
F(pi, pi) +
1
N
N
∑
j=1,j 6=i
F(pi, pj)
=
1
N
[(
(−δ)(pi)2 + 1
2
)
+
N
∑
j=1,j 6=i
(
(−δpj + 1
2
)pi +
1− pj
2
)]
.
(2.6)
Function Γ in (2.6) is continuous in p and it’s easy to verify that it’s also concave in pi,
i.e.
Γ(ǫpi + (1− ǫ)qi,p−i) > ǫΓ(pi,p−i) + (1− ǫ)Γ(qi,p−i),
with qi ∈ [0, 1]. From Theorem 1 in (Rosen, 1965), it follows that there exists an equilib-
rium point p∗ for our game. We verify that it is also unique. Let σ(p, r) :=
N
∑
i=1
riΓ(p),
ri ≥ 0 and its pseudogradient (Rosen, 1965):
g(p, r) :=


r1∇1Γ(p1,p−1)
r2∇2Γ(p2,p−2)
...
r1∇NΓ(pN ,p−N)

 . (2.7)
To prove that σ(p, r) is diagonally strictly concave for a positive r ≥ 0, we need to prove
that the inequality (p− q)′g(q, r) + (q− p)′g(p, r) > 0 holds for all q = (q1, . . . , qN) 6=
p. A sufficient condition for this inequality to hold is given in Theorem 6 in (Rosen,
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1965). It states that, if the symmetric matrix:
[G(p, r) + G′(p, r)],
is negative definite, where G(p, r) is the Jacobian with respect to p of g(p, r):
G(p, 1) =
∂g(p, r)
∂p
=


∂g(p, r)
∂p
. . .
∂g(p, r)
∂p
...
. . .
...
∂g(p, r)
∂p
. . .
∂g(p, r)
∂p

 ,
then σ(p, r) is diagonally strictly concave. We fix r = (1, . . . , 1); the pseudogradient of
our game is:
g(p, 1) =


−2δp1
N
+
1
N ∑j 6=1
(−δpj + 1
2
)
−2δp2
N
+
1
N ∑j 6=2
(−δpj + 1
2
)
. . .
−2δpN
N
+
1
N ∑j 6=N
(−δpj + 1
2
)


. (2.8)
We thus obtain that:
G(p, 1) = − δ
N
(1¯+ I),
where 1¯ is the N×Nmatrix with all the elements equal to 1 and I is the identity matrix.
The sum (1¯+ I) has N− 1 eigenvectors of the form (1, 0,−1, 0, . . .)′ with a correspond-
ing eigenvalue 1 and one eigenvector (1, 1, . . . , 1)′ with eigenvalue N+ 1, which means
that G(p, 1) has strictly negative eigenvalues and thus it is strictly negative definite.
From theorem 2 in (Rosen, 1965), this proves the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of
our game. We explicitly compute it and we resume our results in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2. The group-players Hawk-Dove game with an infinite population of individuals
admits a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium which is given by
p∗ =
N − 1
N + 1
1
2δ
. (2.9)
Proof. We have already proved the existence and the uniqueness of the equilbrium
through Rosen’s conditions. We thus compute the symmetric equilibrium value p∗ by
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maximizing the group fitness function. We have that:
∂Γ(pi,p−i)
∂pi
=
−2δ
N
pi +
1
N
N
∑
j=1,j 6=i
(
1
2
− δpj).
By imposing
∂Γ(pi,p−i)
∂pi
= 0, we get:
pi =
1
2δN
N
∑
j=1,j 6=i
(−δpj + 1
2
).
To obtain the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game, we set pi = pj = p∗, which
leads to:
p∗ =
N − 1
N + 1
1
2δ
.
It is interesting to study the two extreme cases N → ∞ and N = 2.
• When the number of groups is infinite, i.e. N → ∞, we obtain:
p∗ =
1
2δ
which is the value of the equilibrium of the corresponding standard Hawk-Dove
game. This is consistent with a similar result in (Haurie and Marcotte, 1985),
that shows the convergence of Nash equilibrium to Wardrop equilibrium as the
number of players goes to infinity.
• When we have only two players (formed by an infinity of individuals), i.e. N = 2
, we obtain:
p∗ =
1
6δ
which means that two groups are less aggressive then two standard players.
Figure 2.2 shows the probability of being aggressive p∗ at the equilibrium, as a function
of the number of players N in an infinite population of individuals, plotted for three
different values of the cost δ (involved in an encounter between two aggressive individ-
uals). We can observe that the equilibrium p∗ is an increasing function of the number of
groups. Note that when N increases, the probability of meeting a member of a different
group also increases: we thus obtain that the level of aggressiveness is higher when the
probability of interactions among individuals of different groups increases. Hence, if
an individual is aggressive, it causes less damage to its group. This can explain the fact
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that the equilibrium probability of being aggressive is increasing in N. As one may ex-
pect, we also observe that when the cost δ increases, at the equilibrium, the probability
p∗ of being aggressive decreases.
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δ=4
Figure 2.2: The value of p∗ as a function of the number of groups 2 ≤ N ≤ 20 for three different
values of δ. The upper dashed curve is obtained with δ = 0.6, the middle curve with δ = 1 and the
lower dotted one with δ = 4.
Finite Population of Individuals
If the population of individuals has finite size NK, with payoff matrix (2.4). The fitness
defined in (2.3) becomes:
Γ(pi,p−i) =
K− 1
NK− 1
[
(−δ)(pi)2 + 1
2
]
+
K
NK− 1
N
∑
j=1,j 6=i
[
(−δpj + 1
2
)pi +
1− pj
2
]
.
Proposition 3. The Hawk-Dove game with a finite population divided into N groups admits a
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium which is given by
p∗ =
K(N − 1)
K(1+ N)− 2
1
2δ
. (2.10)
Proof. It is easy to verify that, as in the infinite population case, Rosen’s conditions for
the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium introduced in (Rosen, 1965) are
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satisfied. We thus compute the symmetric equilibrium:
∂Γ(pi,p−i)
∂pi
= −2 K− 1
NK− 1δp
i +
K
NK− 1
N
∑
j=1,j 6=i
(
1
2
− δpj)
and, by imposing
∂Γ(pi,p−i)
∂pi
= 0, we obtain:
pi =
K
2(K− 1)
N
∑
j=1,j 6=i
(−pj + 1
2δ
).
If pi = pj = p, then:
p =
K(N − 1)
2(K− 1) (
1
2δ
− p).
The symmetric Nash equilibrium is thus given by:
p∗ =
K(N − 1)
K(1+ N)− 2
1
2δ
.
In Figure 2.3 we plotted the value of the equilibrium p∗ as a function of N, with 2 ≤
N ≤ 20, for three different values of K and a fixed δ = 2. As in the previous case, we
can observe that p∗ is an increasing function of N. In Figure (2.4) we plotted p∗ as a
function of the size of the groups. We can note that p∗ rapidly decreases for small K;
when K > 10, p∗ stabilizes and it is very slowly decreasing. The explanation for this
behavior is that when K is small, then the probability of meeting an individual of one’s
own group is quite sensitive to K, which is not the case when K is large.
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Figure 2.3: The value of p∗ as a function of the number of groups 0 ≤ N ≤ 20 for three different
values of K and δ = 2. Upper dashed line is obtained with K = 2, middle line with K = 10 and
lower dotted line with K = 70.
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Figure 2.4: The value of p∗ as a function of the size of groups 1 ≤ K ≤ 50 for three different values
of N. Upper dashed line is obtained with N = 2, middle line with N = 10, lower dotted line with
N = 70.
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2.3.2 Convergence to the Equilibrium
In evolutionary games, instead of interpreting the equilibrium as a static notion, it’s
preferable to suppose that individual agents can gradually adjust their choices to their
current strategic environment, and to study whether the induced distribution of actions
converges to a stable situation. To provide a dynamic foundation of the equilibrium of
our game, we introduce actions’ dynamics in our model, such that the Nash equilibria
computed above are asymptotically stable for these dynamics.
We assume that each group-player changes its action in order to increase the payoff of
the group. By following Rosen’s approach (Rosen, 1965), we can describe the interval
∆(A) = [0, 1] through the mapping hi(pi) = (pi, 1− pi)′, so that [0, 1] = {p|hi(p) ≥ 0}.
Let h(p) = (p1, 1− p1, p2, 1− p2, . . . , pN , 1− pN) be the function representing all the
2N constraints, such that [0, 1]N = {p|h(p) ≥ 0}. We suppose that a group changes
its action at a rate proportional to the gradient of its payoff function with respect to its
action and subject to the 2N constraints. This leads to the action dynamics:
p˙i = ri∇iΓ(pi,p−i) +
2N
∑
j=1
uj∇ihj(p), (2.11)
where Γ(pi,p−i) is the fitness of Gi and the vector u lies in a bounded subset U(p) ⊂
R
2N . The sum on the right hand of (2.11) serves to assure that pi remains in [0, 1]. More
precisely, define the N × 2N matrix H = [∇1h(p) ∇2h(p), . . . ,∇h2N(p)], which is
independent of p:
H =


1 −1 0 0 0 . . . . . .
0 0 1 −1 0 0 . . .
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . . . . . . . 1 −1


(2.12)
Define the function:
f (p,u, r) = g(p, r) + H(p)u.
From the definition of the pseudogradient, the system of N dynamic equations can be
written as:
p˙ = f (p,u, r), u ∈ U(p),
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where the set U(p) is given by:
U(p) = {u|‖ f (p,u, r)‖ = min
vj ≥ 0, j ∈ J,
vj = 0 otherwise
‖ f (p,u, r)‖}
and:
J = J(p) = {j ∈ {1, . . . , 2N}|hj(p) ≤ 0}.
According to Rosen’s theorem, the negative definiteness of the Jacobian G(p, r) guar-
antees the global asymptotic stability of the equilibrium for the system (2.11). We thus
use equations (2.11) as a counterpart of replicator dynamics in our groups evolution-
ary game. The global stability of the equilibrium point permits to determine the equi-
librium point for any concave game by appropriate mathematical programming com-
putational methods. In particular, gradient methods for a concave nonlinear program-
ming problem (Rosen, 1965) can be modified to find the equilibrium point for a concave
game.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we proposed a new approach to evolutionary games, modeling those
situations in which the player is not the individual involved in the interactions, as the
fitness is associated with a whole group rather than to the single interacting individual.
We studied the Hawk-Dove game, in this group-players framework in two different
cases: for an infinite population of individuals and for a finite one. We verified that the
obtained Hawk-Dove group-players game is convex, which allowed us to prove the
existence and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium through Rosen’s results (Rosen,
1965). We then explicitly computed it as a function of the number of groups. We finally
defined a gradient-based dynamics, such that the equilibrium obtained is asymptoti-
cally stable for this dynamics. In the following chapter we define a different concept of
equilibrium, related to a notion of local deviation within a group.
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A New Equilibrium Concept: Group
Fitness Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
”Imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited
to all we now know and understand, while imagination embraces the entire
world, and all there ever will be to know and understand.”
Albert Einstein, 1929
Summary
Following the idea of group players presented in the previous chapter, we intro-
duce here a new concept of equilibrium, the Group Fitness Evolutionarily Stable
Strategy, based on the group fitness function and related to a notion of deviation
within groups. We compare the GFESS to the standard ESS and we characterize
it in the case of two pure actions games. We illustrate our results through some
classical examples and we show a possible application in multiple access control
framework.
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3.1 Introduction
We pursue here the line of research presented in Chapter 2, studying a large population
in which pairwise interactions among randomly selected individuals occur, but where
the actual player of the game is the whole group. While in Chapter 2 we restrain to
symmetric groups of the same size and we study the symmetric Nash equilibria of the
game, we now consider groups with different sizes and we introduce a new concept of
equilibrium, the Group Fitness Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (GFESS). The stability
required by the GFESS is related to a notion of deviation within a group, and thus of a
“fraction” of the player (instead of a fraction of a population). We thus do not attempt
to simply extend the standard definitions of EGT to a multipopulation setting, but we
provide a new modeling framework, where the player is the group but the interactions
occur among individuals.
We explore the relationship between GFESS and standard ESS and, for the particular
case of two strategies games, we provide a characterization of the equilibria. We then
extend the definition of group’s fitness to the case in which the payoff matrix associated
with intragroup interactions is different from that associated with intergroups interac-
tions, and we apply this model to study a problem of multiple access control.
State of Art
Garay and Varga (Garay and Varga, 2000) first define the N-populations strict ESS for
multipopulation games with symmetric conflicts within the species (populations) and
asymmetric conflicts between them. The player is the individual and the fitness is
defined through a system of payoff matrices {Aij} where Aij represents the payoff of
species i in its conflict with species j. Then p∗ = (p1∗, . . . ,pN∗) is a N-populations strict
ESS if, for all p 6= p∗ and for i ∈ {1, . . . ,N} with pi 6= pi∗, there exists 0 < ǫip < 1 such
that, for all 0 < ǫi < ǫip we have:
pi
(
N
∑
i=1
A
ijp¯j
)
< pi∗
(
N
∑
i=1
A
ijp¯j
)
,
where p¯j = ǫjpj + (1− ǫj)pj∗. The authors prove that this is equivalent to require that
pi
(
N
∑
i=1
A
ijpj
)
< pi∗
(
N
∑
i=1
A
ijpj
)
,
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for all p 6= p∗ in some neighborhood of p∗.
The static definition of strict N-populations ESS extends Maynard Smith’s standard
definition of evolutionary stability and that given by Hofbauer and Sigmund for asym-
metric matrix games (J.Hofbauer and K.Sigmund, 1988). The authors also introduce
a weaker notion of stability, the evolutionary dynamical stability: a state p∗ is said to be
evolutionarily dynamically stable if, ∀p 6= p∗, the vector (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ RN is an asymp-
totically stable rest point of the system
ǫ˙i = ǫi[pi∗ − p¯i]
[
A
ijp¯j
]
, i = 1, . . . ,N.
A evolutionarily dynamically stable state is equivalent to the standard ESS for N = 1
and to the Cressman definition of two-species ESS for N = 2 (Cressman, 1992). In
an analogous setting, Cressman et al. (Cressman et al., 2001) focuses on a dynamical
approach to the ESS, assuming that selection acts much faster than mutation and thus
the incumbent population has enough time between mutations to eliminate the less
fit ones. They define a dynamics for the game and they provide a definition of a N-
populations ESS related to a property of local asymptotically stability for the dynamics
introduced. Their ESS is equivalent to the dynamically stable state in (Garay and Varga,
2000), and it is such that at least one of the species earns more that any mutant strategy.
While in (Garay and Varga, 2000) and (Cressman et al., 2001) it is assumed that all pop-
ulations have the same number of individuals and thus the size of the populations is
not considered, in our model the GFESS is defined as a function of the groups’ (nor-
malized) sizes, which allows us to study the impact of groups sizes on the equilibrium
output.
Sandholm (Sandholm, 2010) compares the two rather different ways of extending the
standard definition of ESS to multipopulation games. The Taylor’s condition (see Chap-
ter 2) for a N-populations state x = (x1, . . . , xN) to be an the ESS requires that, for any
multipopulation incumbent state y = (y1, . . . , yN) 6= x in a neighborhood of x, the ag-
gregate payoff, i.e. the payoff of the society as a whole, of the invading society in state
x, exceeds the aggregate payoff of the society in state y, and thus (y− x)′F(y) < 0.
For Cressman ESS, it is enough that for one population i in the society composed of
N populations, action xi earns a higher average payoff than the corresponding yi and
thus (yi − xi)′Fi(yi) < 0, where Fi(yi) denotes the average payoff of population i. The
more appropriate extension of the evolutionary stability studied byMaynard Smith and
Price, with monomorphic populations of mixed strategists, is the ESS concept defined
by Cressman, while Taylor ESS is more useful to understand the dynamics of behavior
in polymorphic populations of pure strategists.
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Note that for N = 1 these N-population games reduces to the standard EGT models
whereas in our framework, if there’s only one group, there’s no game but an optimiza-
tion problem, since the player is the group.
The chapter is structured as follows. We first introduce in Section 3.2 the definition of
the GFESS and we analyze the relationship between GFESS standard ESS. In Section 3.3
we provide the characterization of the GFESS in the case of two actions game. Section
3.4 gives some numerical illustration through three classical examples, the Hawk-Dove
game, the Stag Hunt game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In section 3.5 we study an
application in multiple access control in slotted Aloha.
3.2 Group Fitness Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
Consider a large population divided into N groups, denoted by Gi, i = 1, 2, ..,N where
the normalized size of Gi is αi, with
N
∑
j=1
αj = 1. Suppose that each individual in group Gi
interacts with amember ofGj with probability αj, i, j = 1, . . . ,N. LetA = {a1, a2, .., aM}
be the finite set of pure actions and ∆(A) the corresponding set of mixed actions; as we
did in the previous chapter, we suppose that all individuals in the same group adopt
the same (mixed) action and thus, we associate to each Gi a vector qi = (qi1, q
i
2, .., q
i
M) ∈
∆(A), where qik is the probability that an individual in group Gi chooses an action ak ∈
A,
M
∑
l=1
qil = 1. Let q = (q
1, . . . ,qN) ∈ ∆(A)N denote the multiaction of the population.
The expected fitness of a group-player Gi is:
Γi(qi,q−i) =
N
∑
j=1
αjF(qi,qj), (3.1)
where q−i = (q1, . . . ,qi−1,qi+1, . . . ,qN) ∈ ∆(A)N−1 and F(qi,qj) denotes the imme-
diate expected fitness of an individual adopting action qi against an opponent playing
qj. F(·, ·) is assumed to be bilinear. Γi is thus a weighted sum of the possible individual
fitness, where the weights are given by the normalized sizes of the players.
The definition of the GFESS is related to a robustness property against local deviations
in a group. While in Chapter 2 we consider symmetric Nash equilibria among groups,
which are stable against the deviation of one group-player, here we consider deviations
of a ’fraction of the player’, i.e. of a share of individuals in a group, and we define and
characterize the equilibria (not necessarily symmetric) which are robust against these
deviations. More precisely, an ǫ− deviation in group Gi consists in a (possibly) large
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Figure 3.1: The population of individuals is divided into a finite number of groups Gi, i = 1, . . . ,N.
Each individual can interact with a member of its group or of a different one. All individuals in Gi
adopts the same strategy qi (no matter which individual they encounter).
deviation of a small fraction ǫ of individuals of the group from the incumbent action qi
to a different (mutant) action pi. From the definition of the group fitness function 3.1,
this is mathematically equivalent to a small deviation in the action by all members of
Gi to the mixed action p¯i := ǫpi + (1− ǫqi) ∈ ∆(A). The population’s state after the
deviation becomes (q1, . . . ,qi−1, ǫpi + (1− ǫ)qi,qi+1, . . . qN) and the average payoff of
the mutant group is given by:
Γi(p¯
i,q−i) =
N
∑
j=1
αjF(p¯
i,qj) = Γi(q
i,q−i) + ǫ(−αiΩ(pi,qi) + Γi(pi,q−i)− Γi(qi,q−i))
+ ǫ2αiΩ(p
i,qi)
= Γi(q
i,q−i) + ǫ
(
αi(F(p
i,qi) + F(qi,pi)− 2F(qi,qi)) + ∑
j 6=i
αj(F(p
i,qj)− F(qi,qj)
)
+ ǫ2αiΩ(p
i,qi),
(3.2)
where Ω(pi,qi) := F(pi,pi)− F(pi,qi)− F(qi,pi)) + F(qi,qi).
Definition 4. A multiaction q = (q1,q2, ..,qN) is a Group Fitness Evolutionarily Stable
Strategy (GFESS) if for all i = 1, . . . ,N and for all pi 6= qi ∈ ∆(A), there exists some
ǫpi ∈ (0, 1), which may depend on pi, such that for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫpi)
Γi(p¯i,q−i) < Γi(qi,q−i), (3.3)
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where p¯i = ǫpi + (1− ǫ)qi.
Note that a GFESS is stable against local deviations in one group, i.e., we suppose that
only one mutant group can be present in the population at the same time. We define:
Ψi(pi,q) := Ω(pi,qi)− Γi(pi,q−i) + Γi(qi,q−i), (3.4)
and we provide, in the following proposition, a characterization of the GFESS, which is
equivalent to Definition (4).
Proposition 4. A multiaction q = (q1,q2, ..,qN) is a GFESS iff it satisfies the two following
conditions:
i. ∀pi ∈ ∆(A)
Ψi(pi,q) ≥ 0, (3.5)
ii. if ∃pi 6= qi such that:
Ψi(pi,q) = 0⇒ Ω(pi,qi) < 0 (3.6)
Proof. It follows from the definition that multiaction q is a GFESS iff ∀ǫ ∈ (0, ǫpi) the
difference Γi(p¯i,q−i)− Γi(qi,q−i) is strictly negative; if we explicit this difference we
get:
ǫ2αiΩ + ǫ[αi(F(p
i,qi) + F(qi,pi)− 2F(qi,qi)) + ∑
j 6=i
αj(F(p
i,qj)− F(qi,qj))] < 0
⇔ −ǫ[αi(F(pi,qi) + F(qi,pi)− 2F(qi,qi)) + ∑
j 6=i
αj(F(p
i,qj)− F(qi,qj))]− ǫ2αiΩ > 0.
As ǫ is small, this is true if either the coefficient of ǫ is strictly positive or if it is null and
the coefficient of ǫ2 is strictly positive. As the coefficient of ǫ is:
− [αi(F(pi,qi) + F(qi,pi)− 2F(qi,qi)) + ∑
j 6=i
αj(F(pi,qj)− F(qi,qj))]
= αi(Ω(pi,qi)− F(qi,qi) + F(pi,pi)) + ∑
j 6=i
αj(F(pi,qj)− F(qi,qj))
= αiΩ(pi,qi)− Γi(pi,q−i) + Γi(qi,q−i) = Ψ(pi,q),
conditions (i) and (ii) straightforwardly follow.
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3.2.1 Nash Equilibrium and Group-Players
Definition 5. The multiaction q = (q1,q2, ..,qN) is a Nash Equilibrium of the N groups
game if ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}
Γi(qi,q−i) ≥ Γi(pi,q−i), pi 6= qi. (3.7)
If it holds with strict inequality, then q is a strict Nash equilibrium.
It trivially follows that any strict Nash (multiaction) equilibrium is a GFESS. Note that,
if multiaction q satisfies condition (3.6), it implies that there exists an action pi 6= qi ∈
∆(A) such that: {
αiΩ(pi,qi) = Γi(qi,q−i)− Γi(pi,q−i)
Ω(pi,qi) < 0
,
and thus:
Γi(qi,q−i) > Γi(pi,q−i).
It follows that, if ∀i = 1, . . . ,N, condition (3.6) is satisfied ∀pi 6= qi ∈ ∆(A), then
multiaction q is a strict Nash equilibrium. The GFESS we defined can be interpreted as
a local strict Nash equilibium in the groups game.
3.2.2 GFESS and Standard ESS
Since we consider pairwise interactions among individuals and the fitness of a group is
defined as aweighted sum of individual fitness, we study here the relationship between
the ESS in a standard game (with individual players) and GFESS in a group-players
game.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the fitness function F related to pairwise interactions among
individuals is symmetric, i.e. F(p,q) = F(q,p). Then, if q∗ ∈ ∆(A) is an ESS in the
standard game, multiaction q = (q∗, . . . ,q∗) ∈ ∆(A)N is a GFESS in the N group-players
game.
Proof. Let q∗ ∈ ∆(A) be an ESS in a standard evolutionary game and let q = (q∗, ..,q∗) ∈
∆(A)N be a multiaction for the N group-players game. From the symmetry of the fit-
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ness function:
Ψi(pi,q∗) = −
(
αi(F(pi,q∗) + F(q∗,pi)− 2F(q∗,q∗) + ∑
j 6=i
αj(F(pi,q∗)− F(q∗,q∗)
)
= −2αi(F(pi,q∗)− F(q∗,q∗))− (1− αi)(F(pi,q∗)− F(q∗,q∗))
= −(1+ αi)(F(pi,q∗)− F(q∗,q∗)).∗
From the definition of ESS, we obtain that Ψi(pi,q∗) ≥ 0, which means that multiaction
q satisfies the first condition (3.5). If there exists a pi 6= q∗ such that Ψi(pi,q∗) = 0,
then F(pi,q∗) = F(q∗,q∗) and Ω(pi,q) = F(pi,p) − F(pi,pi). Since q∗ is an ESS,
F(pi,q∗) = F(q∗,q∗), implies that F(pi,pi) < F(q∗,pi), and thus condition (3.5) is
satisfied. This completes the proof.
In order to provide a characterization of the GFESSs, for simplicity of presentation, in
the next section, we consider the case of two pure actions games.
3.3 Analysis of N Groups Games with Two Pure Actions
In this section we study the group-players game when the set of pure actions is given
by A = {X,Y}. The payoff matrix associated with pairwise interactions among indi-
viduals is:
A =
(X Y
X a b
Y c d
)
, (3.8)
where the entries of the matrix Aij, i, j ∈ {X,Y} give the payoff of the first (row) indi-
vidual if it plays pure action i against the second (column) individual playing action
j. The payoffs of the column (individual) player are given by the transposed of A. A
mixed strategy qi ∈ ∆(A) is given by qi = (qiX, qiY), where qiY = 1− qiX. With some
abuse of notation, in the following we identify a strategy simply as the probability of
playing strategy A, i.e. qi = qiX ∈ [0, 1].
Conditions (3.5)-(3.6) can be rewritten as follows:
• ∀pi ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, ..,N:
Ψi(p
i,q) = (qi − pi)
(
αi(F(q
i, 1)− F(qi, 0)) +
N
∑
j=1
αj(F(1, qj)− F(0, qj))
)
≥ 0.
(3.9)
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• If Ψi(pi,q) = 0 for some pi 6= qi, then:
∆ < 0, where ∆ = a− b− c+ d. (3.10)
We now give a characterization of the possible GFESS for two pure actions games, de-
pending of the values of the payoff matrix and on the size of the groups. We distinguish
between pure, mixed and fully mixed GEES. Without loss of generality, we reorder the
groups according to their size, to have α1 ≤ α2 ≤ . . . ≤ αN .
Pure GFESS
We identify a pure multiaction with a number NX ∈ {0, ...,N}, which indicates that the
NX first groups use pure action X and the remaining N − NX groups play pure action
Y. For example, NX = N (resp. NX = 0) stands for the multiaction (X, . . . ,X) (resp.
(Y, . . . ,Y)), where all groups choose pure action X (resp. Y).
Proposition 6. For the two pure actions game, we have the following characterization of the
pure GFESS.
i. If ∀i = 1, . . . ,N:
a− c > αi(b− a) or
{
a− c ≥ αi(b− a)
∆ < 0
then NX = N is a GFESS;
ii. If ∀i = 1, . . . ,N:
b− d < αi(d− c) or
{
b− d ≤ αi(d− c)
∆ < 0
then NX = 0 is a GFESS;
iii. Let 1 ≤ NX ≤ N − 1 and define H(NX) :=
NX
∑
j=1
αj(a− c) +
N
∑
j=NX+1
αj(b− d). If:
{
H(NX) > αi(b− a) i = 1, . . . ,NX
H(NX) < αi(d− c) i = NX + 1, . . . ,N
or


H(NX) ≥ αi(b− a) i = 1, . . . ,NX
H(NX) ≤ αi(d− c) i = NX + 1, . . . ,N
∆ < 0
then NX is a GFESS.
Proof.
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i. The pure multiaction NX = N (corresponding to (X, . . . ,X)) is a GFESS in the
two actions game if, either it satisfies condition (3.9) with strict inequality for all
i, or, if the inequality is not strict, if for some i it holds with equality, for these,
the condition (3.10) is verified. Note that NX = N means that qi = 1 for all
i = 1, . . . ,N. We can then rewrite condition (3.9) as:
(1− pi)
(
αi(a− b) +
N
∑
j=1
αj(a− c)
)
= (1− pi)
(
αi(a− b) + a− c)
)
≥ 0
∀pi 6= 1, ∀i = 1, . . . ,N. Since (1− pi) > 0, the latter inequality is satisfied iff:
a − c ≥ αi(b − a) ∀i. We thus have that, either condition (3.9) is satisfied with
strict inequality for all i, or, if the equality holds for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, then
condition (3.10) needs to be satisfied, i.e. ∆ < 0, which completes the proof of (i).
ii. Following the same line of the proof of (i), for the pure multiaction NX = 0 (cor-
responding to qi = 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,N) condition (3.9) can be rewritten as:
−pi
(
αi(c− d) +
N
∑
j=1
αj(b− d)
)
= −pi
(
αi(c− d) + b− d)
)
≥ 0
∀pi 6= 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,N, which leads to:
αi(c− d) + b− d ≤ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . ,N,
and thus, either b− d < αi(c− d) for all i or αi(c− d) + b− d ≤ 0 and ∆ < 0.
iii. We now consider the pure multiaction NX, with NX ∈ {1, . . . ,N − 1}, (i.e. of the
kind (X, . . . ,X,Y, . . . ,Y)). Following the line of (i) and (ii), for NX, condition (3.9)
becomes


(αi(a− b) +
NX
∑
j=1
αj(a− c) +
N
∑
j=NX+1
(b− d) ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . ,NX
(αi(c− d) +
NX
∑
j=1
αj(a− c) +
N
∑
j=NX+1
(b− d) ≥ 0 i = NX + 1, . . . ,N.
By defining H(NX) :=
NX
∑
j=1
αj(a− c) +
N
∑
j=NX+1
αj(b− d), from the considerations in
(i) and (ii), we obtain (iii), which completes the proof.
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Fully Mixed GFESS
We say that a multiaction q is fully mixed if each group i uses a mixed action qi =
(qi1, . . . , q
i
M) ∈ ∆(A) which assigns positive probability to each pure action, i.e., 0 <
qil < 1 for l = 1, . . . ,M, i = 1, . . . ,N.
Proposition 7. Define, for i = 1, . . . ,N :
qi∗ :=
d− b+ ((1+ N)αi − 1)(d− c)
(N + 1)αi∆
. (3.11)
If ∆ < 0 and 0 < qi
∗
< 1, ∀i = 1, . . . ,N, then the multiaction q∗ = (q1∗, . . . , qN∗) is the
unique fully mixed GFESS equilibrium of the N group-players two pure actions game.
Proof. From the definition of the GFESS for the two actions game, we can observe that
a fully mixed multiaction q = (q1, . . . , qN) ∈]0, 1[N can satisfy condition (3.9) only with
equality, i.e.:
αi(F(q
i, 1)− F(qi, 0)) +
N
∑
j=1
αj(F(1, qj)− F(0, qj)) = 0 ∀i = 1, . . . ,N,
This leads to
αi∆q
i + b− d+ αi(c− d) + ∆
N
∑
j=1
αjq
j = 0.
By imposing it for all i = 1, . . . ,N, we get:
qi∗ =
d− b+ ((1+ N)αi − 1)(d− c)
(N + 1)αi∆
.
q = (q1∗, . . . , qN∗) is an admissible fully mixed multiaction if qi∗ ∈]0, 1[ and, if ∆ < 0 it
is a GFESS.
Remark 2. Note that every fully mixed GFESS is a strict Nash equilibrium since the condition
(3.10) is satisfied for all pi and all i (see Subsection 3.2.1).
Mixed GFESS
We now look for equilibria with both mixed and pure actions. We represent a mixed
multiaction by (NX,NY,q), where group i for i = 1..,NX (resp. i = NX + 1, ..,NX + NY)
uses pure action A (resp. B) and the remaining N − (NX + NY) groups adopt a strictly
mixed action qi ∈]0, 1[.
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Proposition 8. Mixed multiaction in the form (NX,NY,q) is a GFESS iff:


∆ < 0
αi∆ + d− b+ αi(c− d) + ∆(αNX + y) ≥ 0, i = 1, ..,NX
d− b+ αi(c− d) + ∆(αNX + y) ≤ 0, i = NX + 1, ..,NX + NY
qi =
d− b+ αi(d− c)− y∆
∆αi
, i = NX + NY + 1, ..,N
(3.12)
where y =
(N − NX − NY)(d− b) + ∆αNX + (d− c)∑Nj=NX+NY+1 αj
∆(N − NX − NY + 1) .
Proof. Let us consider mixed multiaction (NX,NY,q). From the condition (3.9), it is a
GFESS iff: 

αi∆ + b− d+ αi(c− d) + ∆y > 0, i = 1, ..,NX
b− d+ αi(c− d) + ∆y < 0, i = NX + 1, ..,NX + NY
αi∆q
i + b− d+ αi(c− d) + ∆y = 0, i = NX + NY + 1, ..,N
(3.13)
where y =
N
∑
i=1
αjq
j. To compute qi, i = NX + NY + 1, ..,N, we add together the N −
NX − NY last equations’ left hand sides in (3.13), which gives:
∆y− ∆αNX + (N − NX − NY)(b− d) + (c− d) ·
N
∑
j=NX+NY+1
αj + ∆(N − NX − NY)y = 0,
(3.14)
and thus we obtain:
y =
(N − NX − NY)(d− b) + ∆αNX + (d− c)∑Nj=NX+NY+1 αj
∆(N − NX − NY + 1) (3.15)
This agrees with (3.12), completing the proof of the proposition.
3.4 Some Examples
In this section we study some examples of games with two group-players and two
pure actions. The normalized sizes of the two groups are α1 = α and α2 = 1 − α,
with 0 < α ≤ 0.5. We define three different games, where the payoff associated with
a pairwise interaction among individuals belongs, respectively, to the anticoordination
class, coordination class and pure dominance class of (standard) games. We compute
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the equilibria as a function of α, in order to understand the impact of the relative size
of groups at the equilibrium.
3.4.1 Hawk-Dove Game
We first consider the Hawk-Dove game, defined in (1.8), which belongs to the anticoor-
dination class. We fix the values of the parameters V = 1 and C = 2 and we compute
the GFESSs as a function of α ∈ [0, 0.5]. Note that, as ∆ = −1 < 0, the second condition
(3.10) is always satisfied, and thus GFESSs and strict NEs coincide. We find that:
• the asymmetric pure multiaction (H,D) is a GFESS for 0 < α < 0.2;
• the asymmetric mixed multiaction (H, q2∗) is a GFESS for 0 < α < 0.3;
• the fully mixed (q1∗(α), q2∗(α)) is a GFESS for 0.3 < α < 0.5 where, from (3.11):
q1∗(α) =
2− 3α
6α
,
q2∗(α) =
3α− 1
6α
.
For α ∈ [0, 0.2] the game thus admits two equilibria (H,D) and (H, q2∗), whereas, for
the other values of α the equilibrium is unique. When α = 0.5, we have q1∗(α) =
q2∗(α) = 1/6, which corresponds to the symmetric Nash equilibrium obtained in the
previous chapter (with δ = 1).
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Figure 3.2: The fully mixed equilibrium actions q1∗ (upper line) and q2∗ (lower line), respectively
of the first and the second group for 0.3 < α < 0.5 for the two group-players Hawk-Dove game.
3.4.2 Stag Hunt Game
We now consider a well-known example in classical GT, the Stag Hunt game, which
belongs to the coordination class. The story behind has been described by Rousseau.
Two individuals go out on a hunt; if they cooperate they can hunt a stag, otherwise,
hunting alone, a hunter can only get a hare. The game represents those situations in
which collaboration is rewarding for the players and social cooperation is in conflict
with safely one. The general payoff matrix of this game is:
( S H
S a b
H c d
)
, with a > c ≥ d > b,
where S and H stand respectively for Stag and Hare. In standard game theory, co-
ordination games admit two strict pure action NEs (which are thus also ESSs), and a
non-strict symmetric mixed NE. For the Stag Hunt game theses are, respectively, the
risk dominant equilibrium (H,H), the payoff dominant one (S, S)and the mixed NE,
q1∗ = q2∗ =
d− b
a− b− c+ d , which is not evolutionarily stable.
To study the two group-players game with the above payoff matrix associated with
pairwise interactions, we set a = 2, b = 0, c = 1, d = 1. Since ∆ = 2 > 0 the
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second condition (3.10) for the GFESS is never satisfied, and thus condition (3.9) must
be satisfied with strict inequality. This implies that the group-players Stag Hunt game
do not admit the fully mixed GFESS. We obtain the following GFESSs:
• the pure symmetric (S, S) and (H,H), for all values of α;
• the pure non-symmetric (S,H) for 0.25 < α < 0.5;
We observe that the ESSs of the standard game are GFESSs of the group-players Stag
Hunt game for any value of α, while, in a specific interval of values of α, our game also
admits the non symmetric pure GFESS (S,H).
3.4.3 Prisoner’s Dilemma
We consider another classical example in game theory, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which
belongs to the pure dominance class. The story beyond the game is the following: two
criminals are arrested and separately interrogated. They can either accuse the other,
either remain silent. If both of them accuse the other (defect), they will be both impris-
oned for two years. If only one accuse the other, the accused is imprisoned for three
years while the other is free. If both remain silent (cooperate), each of them will serve
one year in jail. The general payoff matrix is the following:
(C D
C a b
D c d
)
, with c > a > d > b,
where C and D stand respectively for cooperation and defection. In standard GT, pure
dominance class games admit a unique pure, strict and symmetric NE, which is also the
unique ESS. For the Prisoner’s Dilemma this equilibrium is (D,D). We set a = 2, b = 0,
c = 3, d = 1 and we compute the corresponding GFESSs. As in the previous example,
condition (3.10) is never satisfied, since ∆ = 0. We obtain that the non-symmetric pure
multiaction (D,C) is the only GFESSs for all values of α ∈ [0, 0.5], which means that the
smaller group defects and the bigger cooperates.
3.5 GFESSs in a Multiple Access Control Game
In this section we introduce a refinement of our model and we apply it to a MAC
problem. We modify the group fitness function defined in (3.1) by supposing that
the immediate payoff matrix differs if the interacting individuals belong to the same
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group or to two different ones. The expected fitness function of group Gi playing
(possibly mixed) action qi ∈ ∆(A) in a population of N groups playing multiaction
q = (q1, . . . ,qN) ∈ ∆(A)N , is defined as follows:
Γ′i(q
i,q−i) := αi J(qi,qi) + ∑
j 6=i
αiF(qi,qj), (3.16)
where J(·, ·) indicates the immediate expected fitness related to an interaction within a
group and F(·, ·) is the immediate expected fitness associated with interactions among
individuals of different groups. After an ǫ−deviation of group i to action pi the fitness
of player Gi can be expressed as follows:
Γ′i(p¯
i,q−i) = Γ′i(q
i,qj) + αiǫ2Ω(pi,qi) + ǫ[αi(J(pi,qi) + J(qi,pi)− 2Ki(qi,qi))
+ ∑
j 6=i
αj(Ji(pi,qj)− Ji(qi,qj))],
where p¯i = ǫpi + (1− ǫ)qi and Ω′(pi,qi) := J(pi,pi)− J(pi,qi)− J(qi,pi)) + J(qi,qi).
We define
Ψ′i(p
i,q) := αi(2J(qi,qi)− J(pi,qi)− J(qi,pi))−∑
j 6=i
αj(F(pi,qj)− F(qi,qj))
= αiΩ
′(pi,qi)− Γ′i(pi,q−i) + Γ′i(qi,q−i),
(3.17)
and, as in Proposition 4, we determine the general conditions for a multiaction q =
(q1, . . . ,qN) to be a GFESS:
• ∀pi ∈ ∆(A):
Ψ′i(p
i,q) ≥ 0,
• If ∃pi 6= qi ∈ ∆(A) such that:
Ψ′i(p
i,q) = 0⇒ Ω′(pi,qi) < 0
3.5.1 A MAC Game
We now apply this group-players model to a particular MAC problem. We consider a
population of mobiles forming a sparse ad-hoc network, where mobiles compete with
their neighbors on the access to a radio channel. We suppose that mobiles are randomly
placed over a plane, and that they are divided into a finite number N of groups Gi,
with normalized size αi, i = 1, . . . ,N. Mobiles are matched through (both inter-groups
and intra-groups) pairwise interactions, where each mobile decides either to transmit
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(T) or to not transmit (S) a packet to a receiver when they are within transmission
range of each other. Interferences occur as in the Aloha protocol: if more than one
neighbor of a receiver transmits a packet at the same time then collision occurs and
the transmission fails. The channel is ideal for transmission and all errors are due to
collisions. Let µ be the probability that a mobile k has its receiver R(k) within its range.
When a mobile k transmits, all mobiles within a circle of radius R centered at node R(k)
cause interference to k for its transmission to R(k), so that more than one transmission
within a distance R of the receiver in the same slot causes a collision and the loss of
mobile’s k packet at R(k). All mobiles in group Gi transmits with probability pi ∈ [0, 1],
i = 1, . . . ,N. If a mobile transmits a packet, it occurs a transmission cost of δ.
R(k) 
k 
G1 
G2 G3 
G4 
p3 
p4 
Figure 3.3: When a mobile k transmits, all mobiles within a circle of radius R centered at node R(k)
cause interference to k for its transmission to R(k), so that more than one transmission within a
distance R of the receiver in the same slot causes a collision and the loss of mobile’s k packet at R(k).
A transmitter in group Gi transmits with probability p
i ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, . . . ,N.
The packet transmission is successful if the other users do not transmit (stay quiet) in
that given time slot. If a mobile transmits successfully a packet, it gets a reward of V.
We suppose that the payoff V is greater than the cost of transmission, i.e., δ < V. We
denote by γ the probability that a mobile is alone in a given local interaction; the tagged
mobile does not know whether there is another transmitting mobile within its range of
transmission. Let P1 (resp. P2) be the matrix representing the immediate fitness of a
group when two mobiles belonging to the same group (resp. of two different ones)
interact:
P1 ≡
( T S
T −2δ 1− δ
S 1− δ 0
)
, P2 ≡
( T S
T −δ 1− δ
S 0 0
)
.
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The definition of P1 implies that when two mobiles of the same group Gi interact, any
successful transmission is equally rewarding for group i. When two ofmobiles in group
Gi interact and play qi ∈ [0, 1], the expected fitness of Gi is:
J(qi, qi) = µ
(
qi[γ(1− δ) + (1− γ)((1− δ)(1− qi)− 2δqi)] + (1− γ)(1− δ)(1− qi)qi
)
= µqi[(1− δ)(2− γ)− 2(1− γ)qi].
(3.18)
If a mobile in Gi interacts with a mobile in a different group Gj playing qj ∈ [0, 1], its
expected payoff is the following:
F(qi, qj) = µqi[γ(1− δ) + (1− γ)((1− δ)(1− qj)− δqj]
= µqi[1− δ− (1− γ)qj]
(3.19)
The total expected payoff of Gi is then given by:
Γ′i(q
i,q−i) = µqi[1− δ+ (1− γ)(αi(1− δ− qi)−
N
∑
j=1
αjq
j)] (3.20)
The multiaction q is a GFESS of the group-players MAC game if ∀i = 1, . . .N:
Ψ′i(p
i, q) ≡ (qi − pi)[1− δ+ (1− γ)(αi(1− δ− 2qi)−
N
∑
j=1
αjq
j)] ≥ 0.
Note that, in this game, the condition Ω′(pi,qi) < 0 reduces to (pi − qi)2(1− γ)αi >
0. Since the latter inequality is always true, the second condition is always satisfied
and thus the first condition is sufficient to guarantee the existence of a GFESS. In the
following proposition we give a characterization of the GFESSs of the presented MAC
game. Without loss of generality, we reorder the groups so that α1 ≤ α2 . . . ≤ αN .
Proposition 9. We find that:
i. The pure symmetric multiaction (S, . . . , S) is never a GFESS.
ii. If a fixed group Gi adopts pure action T, then if i < N, at the equilibrium all smaller
groups transmit. If i = N, i.e. the bigger group GN uses action T at the equilibrium, then
(T, . . . , T) is an equilibrium iff γ > γ¯.
iii. If a fixed group Gi adopts pure action S, then at the equilibrium, all smaller groups also
use S.
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iv. The game admits a unique fully mixed GFESS q∗ = (q1
∗
, . . . , qN
∗
), given by:
qi
∗
=
(1− δ)(1+ γ+ (1− γ)(2+ N)αi)
2(N + 2)(1− γ)αi (3.21)
under the condition: γ < γ.
v. If a fixed group Gi adopts a mixed action q
i ∈]0, 1[, then if qi > 1− δ
2
, at the equilibrium
all smaller groups may use pure action T, whereas if qi <
1− δ
2
, smaller groups may
play S.
The thresholds γ and γ¯ are defined as follows:
γ ≡ min
αi
αi(N + 2)(1+ δ)− (1− δ)
αi(N + 2)(1+ δ) + (1+ δ)
,
γ¯ ≡ max
αi
(
1− 1− δ
αi(δ+ 1) + 1
)
.
Proof. The multiaction q = (q1, . . . , qN) ∈ [0, 1]N is a GFESS if ∀i = 1, . . . ,N, the condi-
tion Ψ′i(p
i,q) ≥ 0 is verified ∀pi ∈ [0, 1].
i. If, ∀i = 1, . . . ,N qi = 0, then
Ψ′i(p
i, 0) = −pi[1− δ+ (1− γ)(1− δ)αi < 0 ∀pi ∈ [0, 1],
which proves that (S, . . . , S) is never a GFESS.
ii. Let q be a GFESS such that qi = 1 for a fixed i. This implies that
1− δ− (1− γ)(αi(1+ δ) + Y] ≥ 0,
with Y =
N
∑
j=1
αjq
j). Then, if αj < αi we have that
1− δ− (1− γ)(αj(1+ δ) + Y] ≥ 1− δ− (1− γ)(αi(1+ δ) + Y] ≥ 0
and thus qj = 1 satisfy the GFESS condition. If all the groups transmit, then the
condition for the GFESS is satisfied iff:
1− δ− (1− γ)((1+ δ)αi − 1) ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, . . . ,N
and thus γ ≥ 1− 1− δ
αi(δ+ 1) + 1
, ∀i.
46
3.5. GFESSs in a Multiple Access Control Game
iii. Let q be a GFESS such that qi = 0 for a fixed i. This implies that
1− δ+ (1− γ)(αi(1− δ)−Y] ≤ 0.
If αj < αi, then:
1− δ+ (1− γ)(αj(1− δ)−Y] ≤ 1− δ+ (1− γ)(αj(1− δ)−Y] ≤ 0
and thus Ψ′j(p
i,q) ≥ 0.
iv. Let q be a fully mixed GFESS. Then, ∀i: 1− δ+ (1− γ)(αi(1− δ− 2qi)− Y) = 0.
After some algebra we thus obtain that Y =
(1− δ)(N + 1− γ)
(1− γ)(N + 2) , and by substi-
tuting it in the previous equations we obtain the expressions of qi. By imposing
that 0 < qi < 1 ∀i we obtain the condition γ < γ.
v. Let q be a GFESS such that qi ∈]0, 1[ for a fixed i. Then, if for a j < i, qj = 0 (resp.
1), Ψ′j(p
i,q) ≥ 0 iff qi > 1− δ
2
(resp. qi >
1− δ
2
).
As an example, we consider a two groups MAC game, in which we fix a low value
of the cost of transmission, δ = 0.2, and we study the equilibria as a function of the
value of the parameter γ, which is the probability that the transmitter is alone. We
first set α = 0.5 and we obtain that, for γ < γ = 0.35 the game admits a fully mixed
symmetric GFESS (q∗, q∗). In figure 3.4 we compare q∗ to the value of the equilibrium in
the corresponding individual-players game: q∗std := min(1,
1
1− γ −∆), and we observe
that q∗ is lower than q∗std. Let pS(q) be the probability of a successful transmissions in a
population under profile q. For N = 2, it equals:
pS(q) := µ[γ(αq1 + (1− α)q2)] + (1− γ)(2α2q1(1− q1)+
+ α(1− α)((1− q2)q1 + (1− q1)q2) + 2(1− α)2q2(1− q2))].
In figure 3.5 we plot the probability p∗S = pS(q
∗) of a successful transmission in a pop-
ulation under the equilibrium (q∗, q∗) as a function of γ for α = 0.5. We note that the
probaility to transmit successfully is higher for the two group players game than in the
standard case.
47
Chapter 3. A New Equilibrium Concept: Group Fitness Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
0 ≤ γ ≤ 35
Eq
ui
lib
ria
 
 
q*
Standard ESS
Figure 3.4: The value of the equilibrium strategy q∗ in a two symmetric groups MAC game as a
function of γ for α = 0.4, compared to the ESS q∗std of the standard game.
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Figure 3.5: The probability pS(q
∗) of a successful transmission at the equilibrium for the fully
mixed GFESS in a two symmetric groups MAC game and in the standard game, as a function of γ.
We then set α = 0.4, to consider an asymmetric case, where the two groups have dif-
ferent sizes. For γ < γ = 0.3 the game admits a fully mixed GFESS (q1
∗
, q2
∗
), and for
γ = γ¯ > 0.53, the game admits a pure symmetric equilibrium (T, T). These equilibria
are plotted in 3.6. In the interval 0 ≤ γ < 0.4 we also have a GFESS in the form (T, qT∗).
In figure 3.7 we plot the equilibrium actions of the second group qT∗ and q2
∗
, and we
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observe that the latter is lower than qT∗, i.e. the probability that the second (bigger)
group transmits at the equilibrium is higher if the first group plays pure action T than
if it plays mixed action q1
∗
.
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Figure 3.6: The value of the equilibria of the two groups in a two groups MAC game as a function
of γ for α = 0.4
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Figure 3.7: The value of the equilibrium strategy of the second group in the fully mixed equilibrium
(q1
∗
, q2
∗
) and in the mixed equilibrium (T, qT∗) as a function of γ for α = 0.4.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented a new concept of evolutionary stability in the group-
players framework, the GFESS, implying stability against local deviations within each
group. While the ESS in standard EGT is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium, the
GFESS can be seen as a strict local Nash (in the group context), which is stable against
local deviations within a group. For the particular case of two pure actions games, we
provided a characterization of the GFESSs, distinguishing between pure, fully mixed
and mixed GFESS, and we studied three classical examples considering group players:
the Hawk-Dove game, the Stag Hunt game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. By computing
the equilibria as functions of the size of the groups, we saw how the presence of groups
impacts the equilibrium output. We then introduced a slightly different situation by
redefining the fitness of a group, where the immediate payoff associated with the pair-
wise interactions among individuals in the same group differs from that of inter-group
interactions and we applied this model to a MAC problem.
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Part II
Individual State and Policy
Dynamics in Evolutionary Games
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Chapter 4
Markov Decision Evolutionary
Games
”A mathematician, like a painter or a poet, is a maker of patterns. If his
patterns are more permanent than theirs, it is because they are made with
ideas. A painter makes patterns with shapes and colours, a poet with
words. [. . . ] A mathematician, on the other hand, has no material to work
with but ideas, and so his patterns are likely to last longer, since ideas wear
less with time than words. The mathematician’s patterns, like the painter’s
or the poet’s must be beautiful; the ideas like the colours or the words, must
fit together in a harmonious way. Beauty is the first test: there is no
permanent place in the world for ugly mathematics.”
G.H. Hardy, A Mathematician’s Apology, 1940
Summary
In this chapter we briefly introduce Markov Decision Evolutionary Games
(MDEG), which combine Markov Decision Processes and Evolutionary Game The-
ory. These games involve a large population of players characterized by an in-
dividual state and randomly matched in pairwise interactions. The fitness of an
individual depends on the actions played in the interaction and on the distribu-
tion of the individual states in the population. The action taken by a player also
determines the transition probabilities to its next individual state. Players aim at
maximizing the average sum of their immediate expected fitness during their finite
life time. Under certain assumptions, it is possible to transform this game into a
standard evolutionary game and find its equilibria.
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a particular class of stochastic evolutionary games, Markov
Decision Evolutionary Games (MDEG), as defined by Altman and Hayel (Altman and
Hayel, 2010). In MDEG games, each player belonging to a large population is associ-
ated with an individual state. During its finite life time the player meets several times
other users through random pairwise interactions and it may move among different
states. The actions played by an individual determine not only its immediate fitness
but also the transition probabilities to its next state. The objective of a player is the
maximization of its expected immediate fitness during its life time, which depends also
on the distribution of individual states in the populations. Following a method similar
to that used in (Filar and Raghavan, 1984) for one controller, the authors transform this
game into an equivalent standard evolutionary game and they study its ESSs.
State of Art
Stochastic games have been first introduced by Lloyd Shapley (Shapley, 1953). Hemod-
els a play which proceeds by steps from "position" to "position" (state to state), accord-
ing to transition probabilities jointly controlled by two players. Each state (or position)
corresponds to a specific matrix game and the transition probabilities from one posi-
tion to the other are determined by the current matrix game and by the actions used by
the two players. The transition function considered is time homogeneous and players’
evaluation of sequences of payoffs have a stationary structure. The author proves the
existence of optimal stationary strategies.
Stochastic games belongs to the wider class of sequential games, which are processes
generating a sequence of one-shot, non-cooperative games played by the same set of
players. The transition probabilities which determine the game to be played at any time
t+ 1 are functions of t, the game played at t, and the actions chosen at t. A stochastic
game is thus a sequential game where these transition functions are stationary and the
players’ evaluations of the sequences of payoffs have a stationary structure. Jovanovic
and Rosenthal (Jovanovic and Rosenthal, 1988) define anonymous sequential games as
processes of one-shot, non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, where in-
dividuals affect their opponents only when aggregated, ad not at an individual level.
While in stochastic games the notion of state is associated with the system, Jovanovic
and Rosental relate it to individuals. Furthermore, they look at equilibria composed of
"distributional strategies" (which are sequences of state-action distributions) and there-
fore they do not restrain to the stationary state of the system. After proving that every
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anonymous sequential game admits an equilibrium, they also consider the stationary
case, where the utility and the transition probabilities do not depend on time.
Flesch et al. (Flesch et al., 2013) unify stochastic games as defined by Lloyd Shapley
and EGT into stochastic evolutionary games, which are described as irreducible two-person
stochastic games with symmetric payoff matrices and symmetric transition probabili-
ties. At each stage of the game, two players belonging to a large population interact
with each other in one of finitely many environments. The transition probabilities be-
tween the environments determine the impact of each of these environments on the
fitness of the individuals. Under the irreducible transition law assumption, the authors
extend the notion of evolutionary stability in terms of stationary strategies and define
the replicator dynamics in this multi-state framework. In contrast with (Flesch et al.,
2013), the notion of state in MDEG has an individual connotation, as in (Jovanovic and
Rosenthal, 1988), but transition probabilities and policies are assumed to be stationary.
Stochastic games and Markov Decision Processes (MDP), are both two suitable math-
ematical structures for the classes of dynamic, stochastic, decision models. Filar and
Vrieze (Filar and Vrieze, 1997) present the theories of stochastic games and MDP in a
complete unified fashion, and by defining Competitive Markov Decision Processes, they
emphasize the importance of the link between these two topics extensively studied by
mathematicians, engineers and economists.
Themutations in a populationmodeled by standard EGT are randomdeviations, which
means that the notion of randomness is somehow implied by the requirement of evo-
lutionary stability. However, since the population considered is large, evolutionary
games can be thought as continuous deterministic approximations of discrete stochas-
tic games, where a finite set of players may take random actions.
Tembine et al. (Tembine et al., 2009) analyze the connection between stochastic and de-
terministic evolutionary games, studying the mean-field asymptotic of MDEG. More pre-
cisely, they define a finite population game, called mean field interaction, in which, at each
stage, each individual interacts with other randomly selected players, and thus interac-
tions may involve more than two individuals. The states and the actions of each player
in an interaction determine the instantaneous payoff for all the players involved. Ac-
tions also determine the transition probabilities to the next state of the players involved
in the interactions. The authors provide a rigorous derivation of the asymptotic behav-
ior of this system when the size of the population grows to infinity and they show that
the large population asymptotic of the mean field interaction is equivalent to a MDEG
in which a local interaction is described by a single player against a population profile.
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Applications
MDEG can find a wide range of applications in different fields. Altman and Hayel
present a simple application ofMDEG tomobile communications in (Altman andHayel,
2008), where mobile terminals transmit packets occasionally and their destination may
occasionally receive simultaneously a transmission from another terminal which results
in a collision. When packets collide, one of the packets can still be received correctly
if transmitted at a higher power. Successful transmissions is rewarded, but energy
consumption is penalizing. The action corresponds to the choice of power transmis-
sion level, and the set of available actions depend on the individual state of the player,
which consists in the level of the battery. The state can be either full, in which case there
are two transmitting power levels available, or almost empty in which only the weak
power level is available. Transmission at high power is costly in terms of energy con-
sumption and thus it results in a higher probability of moving to the lower energy level.
The authors define the fitness of a terminal as the total number of packets successfully
transmitted during its lifetime and characterize the ESS in this context.
Figure 4.1: Each mobile can be in full or in almost empty battery state. In state full, it can choose to
transmit ah high power or at at low power, while, if the battery is almost empty, it can only transmit
at low power. If a destination receives simultaneously a transmission from two terminal, packets
collide, but one of the packets can still be received correctly if transmitted at a higher power.
In Chapter 5 we’ll develop the dynamical aspect related to MDEG theory, studying the
interdependent dynamics of individual states and policies, where players are supposed
to control a continuous time MDP and we illustrate other possible application fields. In
Chapter 6 we’ll see a particular dynamic version of the Hawk-Dove game in a MDEG
kind of framework.
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In what follows, we first give some basic notions of Markov Decision Process (MDP)
and we then introduce MDEG as presented in (Altman and Hayel, 2010), focusing on
the notion of occupation measure and that of equivalence between policies.
4.2 Markov Decision Process
AMarkov Decision Process (MDP) can be identified by the tuple {S ,A,Q}, where:
• S is the finite set of individual states, with |S| = K;
• A is the set of available actions. For each state s ∈ S , As ⊆ A is the subset of
available actions for a player in state s.
• Q is the set of transition probabilities . Given the individual states s, s′ ∈ S and
the actions a, a′ ∈ A, Qts′(s, a, a′) denotes the probability to move from state s to
state s′ taking action a when interacting with an individual that takes action a′ at
time t.
In what follows we restrain to time homogeneous transition probabilities, which do not
depend on t, and we also suppose that they only depend on the player’s action (a) and
not on that of its opponent (a′). A policy u = {u0, u1, u2, . . .} of a player is a sequence
of probability measures on A chosen as functions of the present state of the player and
on the history of its previous states and actions. That is, u0 = u0(η), where η is the
initial state and ut+1 = ut+1(ht, st+1, ), where st+1 is the state at time t+ 1 and ht is the
state-action history of the player until time t:
ht := (sl , al , l = 0, . . . , t) t = 0, 1, 2, . . . (4.1)
LetH be the set of all possible states-actions histories which can be observed, and U the
set of all policies. We further define the following particular classes of policies:
• UM is the set of Markov policies of a player such that, at every moment t of
decision making, the probability measure ut on A is chosen as a function of the
current moment of time and the current state of the player (ad not on the past
history);
• US is the set of stationary policies, which are such that at any moment t, the
probability measure ut onA is chosen only as a function of the current state of the
player (and not of the current moment of time);
• UD is the set of deterministic policies , (also called pure stationary policies) which
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assign an action to each state.
4.2.1 Occupation measures
In MDEG each player belonging to a large population is associated with a MDP and the
actions played are supposed to determine the fraction of time the player spends in each
state. This implies that the share of the population at a given state may depend on the
distribution of strategies in the population. In order to model this dependence, we need
to define the concept of occupation measure, which describes the expected amount of
time that an individual spends in a given state under a given policy.
Denote by fη,u(s, a) the expected number of time units during which a player is in state
s and chooses action a under policy u, given the initial distribution η. The occupation
measure corresponding to policy u is the quantity:
fη,u := { fη,u(s, a)}.
Let us now define the probability that an individual is in state s using action a under
policy u at local time t, given the initial state probability distribution η:
pt(η, u; s, a) := Puη(Xt = s, At = A).
Note that, since the population is supposed to be totally symmetric, this initial distri-
bution, at local time 0, is the same for all individuals. Define:
pt(η, u; s) := ∑
a∈A
pt(η, u; s, a).
Note that it’s a sub-probability measure, as ∑
s
pt(η, u; s) may be smaller than one. We
have that:
fη,u(s, a) =
∞
∑
t=0
pt(η, u; s, a), fη,u(s) =
∞
∑
t=0
pt(η, u; s). (4.2)
The lifetime of an individual is identified as the time interval before Xt leaves S; the
expected life-time (corresponding to initial state η and policy u) is thus defined as:
Tη,u = ∑
s
fη,u(s).
For a given initial state η, sup
u∈U
Tη,u is assumed to be finite. From (Kallenberg, 1983),
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sup
u∈U
Tη,u = max
u∈UD
Tη,u, which means that this assumption is equivalent to requesting that
the expected lifetime is finite for all deterministic policies.
From the theory ofMDP, if all players use an equilibrium stationary policy us ∈ US, then
no player can benefit by a unilateral deviation to any policy, including non-stationary
ones. Hence us is an equilibrium among all policies and, with no loss of generality, it is
possible to restrain to the set US.
4.3 Markov Decision Evolutionary Games
MDEG combine MDP and EGT into a new game theoretic framework. Consider, as
in standard EGT, a large population of players, randomly matched in pairwise inter-
actions. Each player is characterized by an individual state, such that the fitness of a
player does not depend only on the actions chosen in the interactions, but also on this
individual state. The action taken by a player determines the transition probability to
its next individual state. Each player is thus associated with a MDP, where the transi-
tion probabilitiesQ are time homogeneous and depend only on the action of the player
(and not on the action chosen by its opponent).
Let r(s, a, s′, a′) be the immediate fitness that a player receives when it is in state s and
uses action a in an interaction with a player who is in state s′ and uses action a′. When
the whole population uses a stationary policy u ∈ US, then at any time t (which is
either fixed or is an individual time of an arbitrary player) the state of the system is
independent of t. For all (s, a) ∈ S × AS, the fraction of the population in stationary
regime in individual state s, that uses action a when all the population uses stationary
policy u is given by:
α(u; s, a) =
fη,u(s, a)
Tη,u
. (4.3)
Then, the stationary system state is:
α(u) = {α(u; s, a)}. (4.4)
Denote by r(u; s, a) the immediate reward that a player receives when it is in state s
and it uses action a while interacting with a player whose policy is u. We have that:
r(u; s, a) = ∑
(s′,a′)
α(u; s′, a′)r(s, a, s′, a′).
Consider an arbitrary tagged player and let Xt and At be respectively its state and
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action at time t (as measured on its individual clock). Then its expected immediate
reward at that time is given by
Rt(u) = r(u;Xt, At).
Assume now that a player arrives in the system at time 0. The global expected fitness
of a player choosing a policy v in a population whose policy is u is then:
Fη(v, u) =
∞
∑
t=0
Eη,v[Rt(u)]
When η is concentrated on state s we write with some abuse of notation Fη(v, u) =
Fs(v, u), and when η is fixed, the index is omitted. When the system is in its stationary
state, the global expected fitness simplifies to:
Fη(v, u) =
∞
∑
t=0
Eη,v[Rt(u)] = ∑
(s,a)
fη,v(s, a)
Tη,u
∑
(s′,a′)
fη,u(s′, a′)r(s, a, s′, a′) (4.5)
Remark 3. Equation (4.5) would not hold if the policy of a player could depend on the absolute
time or on the behavior (i.e. on the actions) of other players. On the other hand, since players
are not distinguishable, and since the lifetime distribution of a mobile depends only on its local
time, we may expect equation (4.5) to hold.
Two policies v and v′ are said to be equivalent if the corresponding occupation mea-
sures coincide. We shall write v =e v′. Note that if v and v′ are equivalent policies
for a given player, then for any policy u used by the rest of the population, the fitness
expressed by equation (4.5) under v and under v′ are the same. Indeed, the fitness
depends only of the policy used through the occupation measures.
By considering the expression (4.5) for the fitness, Altman and Hayel (Altman and
Hayel, 2010) define the ESS in a MDEG framework. The authors further define the
modified global expected fitness function:
F˜η(v, u) = ∑
(s,a)
fη,v(s, a) ∑
(s′,a′)
fη,u(s′, a′)r(s, a, s′, a′),
which is bilinear in the occupation measures. They then define the weak ESS, related
to the notion of equivalent class in terms of occupation measure. They show how to
transform a MDEG into a standard evolutionary game and to compute the equilibria.
While Altman and Hayel focus on a static definition of the ESS in MDEG framework,
in the next chapter we consider MDEG from a dynamical point of view. We associate
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each player to continuous time MDP and we model the interdependent dynamics of
individual states and policies.
In Chapter 6 we study a simple Hawk-Dove game in MDEG framework, where, in
contrast to what we presented here, the transition probabilities of a player may depend
on the action of the opponent it interacts with and not on its action.
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State Policy Couple Dynamics
“We repeat most emphatically that our theory is thoroughly static. A
dynamic theory would unquestionably be more complete and preferable.”
Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,
1953
Summary
In this chapter, we present a new dynamical approach to MDEG, where individ-
ual states are supposed to evolve in time according to a continuous time MDP. We
introduce the concept of interdependent dynamics of states and policies in a gen-
eral framework, and we then define the State Policy coupled Dynamics (SPcD) in
a simple case, in order to find closed-form solutions and to establish the relation
between the equilibria of the defined system of differential equations and the equi-
libria of the game. These solutions are obtained by assuming that the processes of
states and policies move with different velocities, which allows us to apply two dif-
ferent approximation techniques: the singular perturbation method, and a matrix
approach.
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5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we presented MDEGmodels, introduced by Altman and Hayel
(Altman and Hayel, 2010), where each player is associated with an individual state.
During its finite life time the player meets several times other users through random
pairwise interactions and it maymove among different states. The actions played by an
individual determine its immediate fitness and the transition probabilities to the next
state. The evolution of states is thus described by a discrete time MDP. In contrast with
Altman and Hayel, who transform the problem into an equivalent standard evolution-
ary game and look for its ESS, we study here the dynamics involved in the game. We
consider both the local dynamics of individual states and the dynamics intrinsically
related to the global evolution of the distribution of policies in the population, which
are described by interdependent differential equations. Individuals are thus assumed
to control a CT-MDP instead of a discrete time one. We give some general results about
the convergence of the coupled dynamical system to an equilibrium of the population
game. We deepen the analysis of the convergence of the coupled dynamics in a particu-
lar casewith two states and two actions, for whichwe propose two different approaches
to the problem.
State of Art
Evolutionary games can be interpreted as a branch of dynamical systems through the
replicator equations (see e.g. (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998)), which represents an im-
portant foundations for understanding individuals’ behaviors in a population. In the
last years the relationship between evolutionary dynamics and learning algorithms has
been investigated. In (Borgers and Sarin, 1997), for example, the authors analyze the
“Cross’ learning process”, which is a simple learning model where a player updates
its action only on the basis of its own action and on the fitness it gets (and not on the
others’ actions). They prove that, in a particular case, this dynamics converges to the
replicator dynamics. The authors also provide a discussion on the relation between
learning and evolution, comparing the interpretation of the stochastic game underly-
ing Cross’ learning process model, and the deterministic population game underlying
the replicator dynamics. In (Beggs, 2005), the author investigates the convergence of
fitness and strategies in another similar model of reinforcement learning, the “Erev and
Roth’s model”. The author shows that in a two-person constant-sum game, when both
players learn according to Erev and Roth’s rule, the long-run behavior of the system is
related to a system of equation similar to the ‘adjusted replicator dynamic’ introduced
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in (Maynard Smith, 1982).
In general, a learning procedure describes how each individual adapts its action based
on the information it has, like its own fitness, average fitness, historical actions of the
others, probabilistic beliefs on the other actions, etc. An analysis of level of informa-
tion under learning processes in games is given in (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). As
already mentioned in Section 1.3, many different learning algorithms/dynamics have
been proposed in the game theory literature, like Brown-Nash-Von Neumann, logit dy-
namics, etc. All these dynamics can be generalized to the notion of revision protocols
(Sandholm, 2010) which define a general rule (“compare and innovate”, “target and
innovate”, “compare and non-innovate”, etc.) followed by individuals (see Section 1.3
for more details).
Motivations and Applications
Our model finds its first motivation in the study of optimal power control policies in
wireless networks (Altman andHayel, 2008) (see the Introduction to the previous chap-
ter). In Information and Communications Technology, it can be used to study social
networks applications, crowd sourcing and Internet of Things (IoT). Emerging appli-
cations in engineering such as crowd-sourcing and (mis)information propagation, for
example, involve a large population in a complex network of heterogeneous users or
agents, who strategically make dynamic decisions. These agents interact with each
other in a complex environment, in which each individual takes strategic and dynamic
decisions in response to the agents it interacts with. In all these applications, the ac-
tion set of each agent depends on a local state. In social networks, for example, each
agent may decide to add/remove friends/news based on its own current status. Its
decision impacts its own status dynamics but also the interaction with other agents.
In IoT, a sensor has to determine when to upload its information to the fusion center.
This decision impacts its battery level but also the communication quality as collisions
may occur for example. As pointed out in several references cited above, the replicator
dynamics equations are related to several learning algorithms that can be implemented
in such sensors or actuators in IoT. Then, by studying these equations, we can under-
stand the convergence behavior of decentralized algorithms that can be used in such
applications.
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This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.2 we introduce our evolutionary game
model that takes into account an individual state dynamics coupled to the policies ones.
A complete characterization of the coupled dynamical system is performed in Section
5.3, for a particular two states and two pure actions game. By assuming that the two
dynamic processes evolve with different velocities, in Subsection 5.3.6 and 5.3.7 we find
the equilibria of the game through two different techniques: the singular perturbation
method and by rewriting the problem as a matrix game. We then compare the two
solutions obtained andwe prove that they are equivalent in terms of fitness and average
sojourn time. Some applications in network systems are proposed in Section 5.3.9.
5.2 General Model
5.2.1 The Individual State Dynamical Model
We consider here a population game in which each individual controls a Continuous
Time Markov Decision Process (CT-MDP) (Guo and Hernandez-Lerma, 2009). Let S
be the finite individual state space of players, with |S| = K. We suppose that each
player disposes of the same finite set of actions,A, with |A| = M. CT-MDP are defined
through the set of transition ratesR, which describe the rate of the process’ transitions
from one state to another. More precisely, we denote by Rs(s′, a) the transition rate
from state s′ to state s given action a, which satisfies Rs(s′, a) ≥ 0 for all s′ ∈ S , s′ 6= s,
and a ∈ A. These quantities are conservative, i.e.
∀s′ ∈ S , ∀a ∈ A, ∑
s
Rs(s′, a) = 0.
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Also the transition rates are stable, i.e.
sup
a∈A
Rs′(a) < ∞, ∀s′ ∈ S
with Rs′(a) := −Rs′(s′, a) ≥ 0. Since the set of actions is finite, the stability of the
transition rates is guaranteed. Note that the transition rates of a player only depend on
its actions, and not on the others’ ones.
In standard evolutionary games, each individual plays a pure action, whereas in our
framework, individuals choose a deterministic policy in the finite set UD = {u1, . . . , uD}
(see the definition in Section 4.2 for the definition of UD).
The choice of a policy determines the time spent by each individual in each state. In-
deed, for any state s′ and action a, the sojourn time in state s′ is a random variable
which follows an exponential distribution with parameterRs′(a) = ∑
s 6=s′
Rs(s′, a). Then,
under a given deterministic policy uj ∈ UD, as there is a unique action a = uj(s′) as-
sociated with each state s′, such that uj(a|s′) = 1, the time spent in any state s′ for
any individual choosing this policy, follows an exponential distribution with parame-
ter Rs′(a) = Rs′(uj(s′)). This implies that the fraction of individuals in a given state
depends on the distribution of policies over the population. This fraction is important
to define the fitness obtained for each individual at each pairwise interaction. Given a
deterministic policy uj ∈ UD and a state s ∈ S , we denote by Ts(uj) the average sojourn
time that an individual playing policy uj spends in state s, which is given by:
Ts(uj) =
1
Rs(uj(s)) .
Note that a general sojourn time distribution could also be considered, but we consider
the exponential distribution, in order to obtain closed-form solutions of the equilibrium
Markovian policy of the defined game.
5.2.2 Population of Players
Let us consider a fixed population of N players, where each one controls a CT-MDP,
with S , A and R respectively the finite set of states, actions, and transition rates. Let
∆(A) be the set of distributions over A. We define the proportion of individuals (deci-
sion makers) that are in state s ∈ S at time t as wNs (t) :=
1
N
N
∑
l=1
1{sl(t)=s}, where 1 is the
indicator function, i.e. 1{sl(t)=s} = 1 if the state of player l at time t is s, and it equals
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zero otherwise. For each state s, we denote by Yls(t) the probability that an individual
l is in state s at time t under a deterministic policy u ∈ UD, i.e. Yls(t) = Pus0(sl(t) = s),
where s0 is the initial state. Then, from Assumption 1, Pus0 does not depend on s0 and,
from the law of large numbers, when the size of the population grows to infinity, then
Yls(t) can be approximated by the proportion of individuals in state s at time t, given
by ws(t) = lim
N→∞
wNs (t). This means that the individual state dynamics, corresponds to
the dynamics of the proportion of individuals in state s in the global population. Let
S = {s1, . . . , sK} and wi = wsi . We further suppose that the individual dynamics also
depends on the policies and that, for any state si ∈ S , there exists a Lipschitz function
hi which describes the dynamics of wi as follows:
w˙i(t) = hi(w(t),q(t)), ∀si ∈ S , (5.1)
wherew(t) = (w1(t) . . . ,wK(t)) is the vector of state probabilities and q(t)=(q1(t) . . . , qD(t))
is the vector of distribution over the deterministic policies in the population, such that
qj(t) indicates the proportion of individuals playing deterministic policy uj ∈ UD =
{u1, u2, . . . , uD} at time t. Indeed, we have seen previously that the choice of a such
policy has an impact on the state dynamics of this individual.
5.2.3 Policies Dynamics
We assume that the proportion of individuals choosing each deterministic policy is
evolving over time as a dynamical process. Without specifying any revision protocol,
we define the dynamics of policies through a set of Lipschitz continuous functions G :=
{g1, . . . , gD}, such that:
q˙j(t) = gj(w(t),q(t)) ∀uj ∈ UD. (5.2)
Then, the dynamical evolution of states and policies distributions in the population is
represented by a system of K+ D equations:


w˙1 = h1(w(t),q(t))
...
w˙K(t) = hK(w(t),w(t))
q˙1(t) = g1(w(t),q(t))
...
q˙D(t) = gD(w(t),q(t))
(5.3)
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5.2.4 Two Time-Scales Behavior
We assume that the state and the policy dynamics move with different velocities. By
supposing that the individual state dynamics movemuch faster then the slow updating
policies processes, we can consider the singular perturbation model (Kokotovic et al.,
1986), briefly presented in what follows, to find the rest points of the system (5.3). We
first introduce Assumption 1, which assures that, under any deterministic policy, there
exists a stationary distribution over the individual states which does not depend on the
initial state.
Assumption 1. Under any deterministic policy, the stochastic process of the individual states
forms an ergodic Markov chain.
Singular Perturbation Method
The singular perturbation model of finite dimensional systems has been extensively
studied inmathematical literature (see e.g. (Levinson, 1950) (Hoppensteadt, 1967) (O’Malley,
1971)) and it was the first method used in control theory as a tool to simplify dynamic
models. Following Kokotovic’s approach (Kokotovic et al., 1986), we provide here the
basic concepts of singular perturbation asymptotics and time-scale modeling that will
be used in the next section. Consider the interdependent dynamics:
x˙ = g(x, z,u, ǫ, t), x(t0) = x0, x ∈ Rn, (5.4)
ǫz˙ = h(x, z,u, ǫ, t), z(t0) = z0, z ∈ Rm, (5.5)
where u is the control vector, ǫ is a small scalar and g and h are sufficiently many times
continuously differentiable functions of their arguments. To reduce the order of the
system (5.4)-(5.5), the parameter ǫ is perturbed: when ǫ equals zero, the order of the
system reduces from n+m to n, since equation (5.5) degenerates into the trascendental
equation
0 = g(x¯, z¯, u¯, 0, t). (5.6)
The system is said to be in normal or standard form if and only if the following assump-
tion is satisfied:
Assumption 2. In a domain of interest, equation (5.6) has k ≥ 1 distinct roots:
z¯ = ϕi(x¯, u¯, t), i = 1, 2, . . . , k (5.7)
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This assumption assures that a well defined (n-dimensional) model correspond to each
root. To obtain the i reduced model, one need to substitute z¯ into (5.4) to get the quasi-
steady-statemodel:
˙¯x = g(x¯, ϕi(x¯, u¯, t), u¯, 0, t) = g(x¯, u¯, t). (5.8)
The velocity of z, given by g/ǫ, is large when ǫ is small and thus z may rapidly con-
verge to a root of (5.6), which is the quasi-steady-state of (5.5). Singular perturbation
thus generates a two time-scale behavior of the dynamic system (5.4)-(5.5): the slow
process is approximated by the reduced model (5.8), while the discrepancy between
the original system and (5.8) is the fast transient. We now investigate the relation be-
tween the original variable z and z¯. Note that the initial value of z¯ may be far from z0,
as it is given by
z¯(t0) = ϕ(x¯(t0), u¯(t0), t0) 6= z0.
We can expect that z is well approximated by z¯ in a sub-interval [t1, T], where t1 > t0,
i.e.:
z = z¯(t) +O(ǫ), ∀t ∈ [t1, T]. (5.9)
However, it is possible to constrain the quasi-steady state x¯ to start from x0 to have:
x = x¯(t) +O(ǫ), ∀t ∈ [t0, T]. (5.10)
We introduce a new time variable to study the behavior of the variable z. Let
ǫ
dz
dt
=
dz
dτ
⇒ dτ
dt
=
1
ǫ
,
and τ = 0 when t = t0. The new time variable
τ =
t− t0
ǫ
, τ = 0 at t = t0
is stretched, that is, τ goes to infinity when ǫ goes to zero. We define the boundary layer
systemwhich describes z as a function of τ:
dzˆ
dτ
= g(x0, zˆ(τ), u, 0, t0), zˆ(0) = z0, (5.11)
where x0 and t0 are fixed parameters. We thus obtain that:
z = z¯(t) + zˆ(τ)− z¯(t0) +O(ǫ), (5.12)
where z¯(t) is the slow and zˆ(τ) − z¯(t0) the fast transient of z. Two assumptions are
needed to guarantees the validity of the approximations (5.9) and (5.12).
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Assumption 3. The equilibrium z¯(t0) of (5.11) is asymptotically stable uniformly in x0 and
t0, and z0 belongs to its domain of attraction, so zˆ(τ) exists for τ ≥ 0.
This implies that lim
τ→∞ zˆ(τ) = z¯(t0) uniformly in x0 and t0 and thus z is close to its quasi-
steady-state z¯ for t1 > t0. The interval [t0, t1] can be made arbitrarily short my making
ǫ sufficiently small.
Assumption 4. The eigenvalues of ∂g/∂z evaluated along x¯(t), z¯(t), u¯(t) for all t ∈ [t0, T]
have real parts smaller than a fixed negative number, i.e.:
ℜλ
{
∂g
∂z
}
≤ −c < 0.
Note that, if z0 is assumed to be sufficiently close to z¯(t0), then Assumption 4 is stronger
than Assumption 3. Furthermore, Assumption 4 implies that the root z¯(t) is distinct as
required by Assumptios 2. We can now state the main result, often called Tikhonov
theorem.
Theorem 4. [Theorem 3.1 (Kokotovic et al., 1986)] If Assumptions 3 and 4 are satisfied, then
the approximations (5.10) and (5.12) are valid for all t ∈ [t0, T], and there exists a t1 such that
(5.9) is valid for all t ∈ [t1, T].
For the proof of this result, see e.g. (Levinson, 1950), (Hoppensteadt, 1967).
Fast state and slow policy processes
In order to describe the two time-scales behavior of the system (5.3), we introduce the
small positive parameter ǫ > 0:


ǫw˙1 = h1(w(t),q(t))
...
ǫw˙K(t) = hK(w(t),q(t))
q˙1(t) = g1(w(t),q(t))
...
q˙D(t) = gD(w(t),q(t))
(5.13)
Then, the velocity of the state process, w˙i = hi(w,q)/ǫ, is fast when ǫ is small, which
means that the states dynamics may rapidly converge to its steady-state. From the
singular perturbation theory, if the assumptions introduced above are satisfied, one
can solve the reducedmodel and easily find a good approximation of the solution of the
original system (5.3). When supposing the two time-scales behavior of the states and
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policies dynamic system, an alternative technique to find a solution of (5.3) consists in
considering the stationary distribution of states and then solve the policies dynamics.
Let r(s, a; s′, a′) be the immediate fitness that a player gets when it is in state s and plays
action a against an individual in state s′ using action a′. When the distribution of the
individual states is stationary, we denote by F(ui, uj) the immediate expected fitness of
a player using deterministic policy ui ∈ UD against a population playing uj ∈ UD. It
can be defined as a function of the average sojourn times as follows:
F(ui, uj) = ∑
s,s′∈S
Ts(ui)
∑s′ Ts′(ui)
r(s, ui(s); s′, uj(s′))
Ts′(uj)
∑s′ Ts′(uj)
. (5.14)
Remark 4. In discrete time MDEG (see Chapter 4) introduced in (Altman and Hayel, 2010),
stationary distributions can be computed considering occupation measures (see Section 4.2.1),
whereas in our continuous time setting we deal with average sojourn time expressions. It is
possible to establish a relation between discrete and continuous time MDEG by transforming
the CT-MDP into an equivalent discrete time MDP through the uniformization technique (see
e.g. (Puterman, 1994) (Ibe, 2008)), which makes the total transition rate from a state the same
for all states and allows to consider the discrete time MDP embedded at transition epochs of each
event. But, since we focus here on the replicator dynamics and not on the equilibria of the game,
we study the MDEG in continuous time, where each individuals control their transition rates.
Once we have defined the expected fitness function, we assume that each individual
chooses its deterministic policy in order to maximize its immediate expected fitness
and we then define a stationary equilibrium u∗ policy for our continuous-time MDEG
problem.
Definition 6. Under the Assumption 1 and assuming that the distribution over the states is
time homogeneous, a policy u∗ ∈ UD is a deterministic equilibrium policy if, ∀ uj ∈ UD:
F(u∗, u∗) ≥ F(uj, u∗).
Note that, from Assumption 1, if a deterministic policy u∗ is optimal, than no player
can benefit from unilateral deviations to any policy, including non deterministic ones.
Hence , if all population uses an equilibrium among stationary policy, then no player
can benefit by a unilateral deviation to any policy. We have seen in Section 1.3.2 that, in
standard evolutionary game theory, there is a relation between equilibria of a game and
rest points of the replicator dynamics. We can establish a similar relationship in our
setting. Given the vector of policies distributions at time t, q(t) = (q1(t), . . . , qD(t)),
we denote by F(uk,q) := ∑
uj∈UD
F(uk, uj)qj(t) the immediate expected fitness of an
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individual using policy uk ∈ UD against a populations in state q, and by F¯(q) :=
∑
i,j∈UD
qi(t)F(ui, uj)qj(t) the average expected fitness of the population.
Based on the expression (5.14), we can define the dynamics of the evolution of qk(t)
over time, where uk ∈ UD:
q˙k(t)
qk(t)
= (F(uk(t),q(t))− F¯(q(t))) . (5.15)
Every interior rest point of the replicator dynamics (5.15) is a stationary equilibrium
policy for the game we defined. Note that the dynamics proposed in equation (5.15)
assumes that the distribution over the individual states is already stationary, as the
state dynamics update very quickly compared to the policy dynamics. Getting results
about equilibrium policies in the general case may be complicated, as the number of
deterministic policies UD explodes and it becomes very difficult to properly write a
clear mathematical analysis to obtain closed-form solutions of the equilibrium. In the
next section, we present a complete analysis and characterization of the equilibrium
policy for a particular gamewith two states and two strategies, considering the coupled
dynamical system.
5.3 Complete Characterization of the Game with Two States
and Two Actions
5.3.1 Individual State and Its Dynamics
In this section we study a particular case of the state-policy coupled dynamics model.
We suppose that each player can be in one of two possible states, with S = {1, 0}. Every
individual goes through a cycle that starts in state 1 and moves to states 0 after some
random time, at a rate that depends on its policy. After some exponentially distributed
time it returns to state 1 and so on. At each pairwise interaction, the set of available
actions of a player depends on its state: in state 1, A1 = {x, y}, whereas in state 0 an
individual can only use y. We consider the set of deterministic policies UD := {ux, uy},
where ux (resp. uy) is the deterministic policy which consists in always playing action
x (resp. y) in state 1. Under both policies, in state 0 an individual plays y. Each player
chooses one deterministic policy andwe denote by qi(t) the proportion of individuals in
the population that play the deterministic policy ui at time t. Note that qy(t) = 1− qx(t).
We suppose that the policy chosen impacts the fitness of the player interacting with
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another individual and also the time it spends in state 1. We define by µi the rate of
decay from state 1 to state 0 when using policy ui, i ∈ {x, y}, where µx > µy, and by µ
the rate of change from state 0 to state 1.
µ µ µx 
POLICY ux POLICY uy 
µy 
1 1 
0 0 
Figure 5.1: A player can choose between policy ux and uy. Accordingly with this choice, in state 1
the individual plays, respectively x or y and move to state 0, at a rate µx or µy. In state 0, under
both policies, the only available action is y and the rate at which the player returns to state 1 is µ.
As stated in Section 5.2.2, since the population considered is large, from the law of large
numbers, the individual state dynamics can be approximated by the population state
dynamics. Let w1(t) denote the share of individuals in state 1, which is equivalent to
the probability that an individual in the population is in state 1 at time t. We define the
dynamics of w1(t) as follows:
w˙1(t) = −µxw1(t)qx(t)− µyw1(t)(1− qx(t)) + µ(1− w1(t)). (5.16)
The first (resp. the second) term on the right side of the equation indicates that the
share of individuals in state 1 which choose policy ux (resp. uy) at time t, given by
µxw1(t) (resp. w1(t)(1− qx(t))), leaves state 1 at a rate µx (resp.µy), whereas the third
term indicates that individuals in state 0 move to state 1 at rate µ (independently on the
policy chosen).
5.3.2 Individual Fitness
At each pairwise interaction, the immediate fitness obtained by an individual, which
depends on its current action and the current action of its opponent, is given by the
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following fitness bimatrix:
A :=
( x y
x (a, a) (b, c)
y (c, b) (d, d)
)
, (5.17)
where x and y are the available actions and the matrix entry Aij indicates the payoff
respectively of the first (row) and the second (column) player. The expected fitness of a
player interacting at time t, depends on the population profile at time t, which is now
expressed by the couple ξ(t) := (w1(t), qx(t)). We denote by rx(ξ(t)) (resp. ry(ξ(t)))
the expected fitness of an individual playing pure action x ∈ A, against a population
whose profile is ξ(t). By considering payoff matrix (5.17), we obtain the following
expressions:
rx(ξ(t)) := w1(t)(qx(t)a+ (1− qx(t))b) + (1− w1(t))b,
ry(ξ(t)) := w1(t)(qx(t)c+ (1− qx(t))d) + (1− w1(t))d.
We can now define the fitness of an individual choosing deterministic policy ui ∈ UD
at time t, denoted by Fi(ξ(t)), i = x, y. The fitness Fi(ξ(t)) depends on the population
profile ξ(t). As we are dealing with a large system, from the law of large numbers, we
can assume that the probability that any individual is in state 1 at time t equals w1(t)
and it is the same for all players, as explained in Section 5.2.2. Then, an individual
choosing policy ux will be in state 1 (resp. 0) at time t with probability w1(t) (resp.
1− w1(t)), and it will get an immediate fitness rx(ξ(t)) (resp. ry(ξ(t))). The expected
immediate fitness of an individual choosing policy ux at time t is thus given by
Fx(ξ(t)) = w1(t)rx(ξ(t)) + (1− w1(t)))ry(ξ(t)).
If an individual plays policy uy, whatever its state is, it plays pure action y, which leads
to:
Fy(ξ(t)) = w1(t)ry(ξ(t)) + (1− w1(t)))ry(ξ(t)) = ry(ξ(t)).
The average expected fitness of a populationwhose profile at time t is ξ(t) = (w1(t), qx(t))
is
F¯(ξ(t)) = qx(t)Fx(ξ(t)) + (1− qx(t))Fy(ξ(t)). (5.18)
5.3.3 Equilibrium Profile
We study the properties of stability of the population profile, supposing that individ-
uals play deterministic policies in UD. Let q∗ = (q∗x, q∗y) and define supp(q∗) = {ui ∈
UD|q∗i > 0, given ξ∗}.
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Definition 7. A population profile ξ∗ = (w∗1 , q
∗
x) is an equilibrium profile iff ∀ui ∈ supp(q∗)
we have that:
Fi(ξ
∗) ≥ Fj(ξ∗) ∀j 6= i, i, j ∈ {x, y}
An equilibrium profile is a particular population profile ξ∗ = (w∗1 , q
∗
x)which is stable in
the sense of robustness against a deviation of the proportion of individuals playing the
deterministic policy ux. In other words, this definition says that no individual has an
interest in changing its deterministic policy, considering this population profile. Note
that an equilibrium policy, if adopted by the whole population, determines a stationary
individual state.
Remark 5. It can be easily proved that if the population profile ξ∗ = (p∗1 , q
∗
x) satisfies the
indifference principle, i.e.:
Fx(ξ∗) = Fy(ξ∗),
then it is an equilibrium profile.
5.3.4 Policy Based Replicator Dynamics
As we consider here policies instead of actions, we introduce a policy based replicator
dynamics (PbRD), to study the evolution of the share of individuals using deterministic
policy ux at time t, represented by qx(t). The PbRD is given by the following equation:
q˙x(t) := qx(t)(Fx(ξ(t))− F¯(ξ(t))). (5.19)
Then, the growth rate of the population share using the deterministic policy ux at time
t is:
q˙x(t)
qx(t)
= Fx(ξ(t))− F¯(ξ(t)), (5.20)
By substituting (5.18) into (5.19):
q˙x(t) = qx(t)[Fx(ξ(t))− qx(t)Fx(ξ(t)− (1− qx(t))Fy(ξ(t))]
= qx(t)(1− qx(t))(Fx(ξ(t))− Fy(ξ(t))),
= g(w1(t), qx(t)).
We can investigate the dynamics of actions in this framework, where the fitness is a
function of the population profile depending on policies and states and establish its
relation with the dynamics of policies. If we pick one random individual in the popu-
lation at time t, the probability that it plays pure action x, denoted by q(t), is given by
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the product qx(t)w1(t). From this and from definition (5.19), we obtain:
q˙(t) = q˙x(t)w1(t) + qx(t)w˙1(t) = qx(t)[w1(t)(Fx(ξ(t))− F¯(ξ(t))) + w˙1(t)]
=
q(t)
w1(t)
[w1(t)(Fx(ξ(t))− F¯(ξ(t))) + w˙1(t)],
which leads to the following equation for the growth rate of the proportion of individ-
uals playing pure action x in the population at time t:
q˙(t)
q(t)
= (Fx(ξ(t))− F¯(ξ(t))) + w˙1(t)w1(t) . (5.21)
Equation (5.21) shows how the evolution of states impacts the dynamics of actions in
our context. The growth rate of action x is increasing in the growth rate of state 1. We
observe that a sufficiently high growth rate of state 1 can lead to a growing rate of action
x even if policy ux is non-optimal.
5.3.5 State-Policy Coupled Dynamics
We define the system of State-Policy Coupled Dynamics (SPcD) which combines the
dynamics of the individual state and the dynamics of the policies used in the popula-
tion:
(S)
{
w˙1 = h(w1(t), qx(t))
q˙x = g(w1(t), qx(t))
where ξ(t) = (w1(t), qx(t)) is the population profile at time t. Note that, since h and
g are continuously differentiable functions of ξ, (i.e. the partial derivatives ∂h/∂w1,
∂h/∂qx, ∂g/∂w1, ∂g/∂qx are continuous) they are locally Lipschitz continuous func-
tions with respect to ξ in the compact space [0, 1]2, which guarantees the existence of a
solution of the system (S).
The rest point of the SPcD is ξ∗ = (w∗1 , q
∗
x) satisfying:{
h(ξ∗) = 0
g(ξ∗) = 0.
(5.22)
Lemma 1. Any interior rest point of the SPcD (S) is an equilibrium profile of the state-policy
game.
Proof. Trivially, if ξ∗ is internal, it satisfies the indifference principle Fx(ξ∗) = Fy(ξ∗), so
ξ∗ is an equilibrium profile.
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Remark 6. Note that the converse does not necessarily hold. Any equilibrium profile is a rest
point of the PbRD in (5.19), but it’s not necessarily a rest point of the individual state dynamics.
Lemma 2. Any Lyapunov stable rest point of the SPcD (S) is an equilibrium profile of the
state-policy game.
Proof. Suppose that ξ∗ = (w∗1 , q
∗
x) is a stable rest point. If supp(q
∗) = {ux, uy} then, ξ∗ is
an interior rest point and by Lemma 1, ξ∗ is an equilibrium profile. Let supp(q∗) = {ux}
and let us suppose that ξ∗ is not an equilibrium. This implies that Fy(ξ∗) > F¯(ξ∗), and,
from the continuity of the fitness function, there exists a neighborhood Uξ∗ of ξ∗ such
that ∀ξ ∈ Uξ∗ , ξ 6= ξ∗, Fy(ξ) > F¯(ξ). This implies that, for this profile, the component
qy increases exponentially, which contradicts the Lyapunov stability of ξ∗. The proof is
analogous if supp(q∗) = {uy}, which complete the proof of the lemma.
5.3.6 Singular Perturbations Approximation Method
As introduced in Section 5.2, we consider the existence of a small parameter ǫ > 0, such
that:
ǫw˙1 := h(w1, qx).
We then rewrite the system of the two coupled differential equations as follows:
(Sǫ)
{
ǫw˙1 = h(w1, qx),
q˙x = g(w1, qx).
We can thus approximate the solution of (Sǫ) using the standard singular Perturbation
Model (Kokotovic et al., 1986) introduced in the previous section. The quasi-steady-
state-model is obtained by first solving in w1 the transcendental equation 0 = h(w1, qx)
and then rewriting the differential equation q˙ as a function of the obtained roots. As the
transcendental equation has a unique real solution w¯1 := π1(qx), our system satisfies
Assumption 2 and we can thus solve the quasi-steady-state equation:
q˙x = g(π1(qx), qx). (5.23)
If the Assumption 4 is satisfied, the reduced model is a good approximation of the
original system. In our case, this assumption simplifies to the following condition:
∂h
∂w1
(w1, qx) < 0. Since
∂h
∂w1
(w1, qx) = −µxqx − µy(1− qx)− µ < 0, we can apply the
singular perturbation method to solve (Sǫ).
The two-time-scale behavior of w1(t) and qx(t) also has a geometric interpretation, as
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trajectories in R2. If we define the manifold sets Mǫ := {ϕ s.t. w1 = ϕ(qx, ǫ) & ǫ =
h(qx, ϕ(qx, ǫ))}, it is possible to rewrite the problem in terms of invariant manifolds.
When the parameter ǫ = 0, then M0 is an equilibrium manifoldwhich corresponds to
the quasi steady state model. As Assumption 4 is satisfied, the equilibrium manifold
M0 is stable (attractive) (Kokotovic et al., 1986). An important result states that the
existence of a conditionally stable manifold M0 for ǫ = 0 guarantees the existence of an
invariant manifold Mǫ satisfying the following convergence for all ǫ ∈ [0, ǫ∗]:
ϕ(ǫ, qx)→ ϕ(0, qx), and Mǫ → M0 as ǫ→ 0.
The positive constant ǫ∗ is determined by imposing themanifold condition:
ǫ
∂ϕ
∂x
g(ϕ(qx, ǫ), qx) = h(ϕ(qx, ǫ), qx),
for all qx and ǫ ∈ [0, ǫ∗]. We illustrate in Figure 5.2 the attractiveness of the slow mani-
fold M0 for a numerical example.
Let us now compute the solution of the system (S0), i.e. the system obtained with
ǫ = 0. We suppose that the distribution of individual states is stationary (expressed
by Equation (5.16)). By imposing w˙1 = 0, we obtain the following slow manifold
M0 := {ϕ s.t. w1 = ϕ(qx, 0) & 0 = h(qx, ϕ(qx, 0))}:
ϕ(qx, 0) =
µ
µ+ µxqx + µy(1− qx) := ϕ1(qx). (5.24)
We can now rewrite the PbRE (5.19) as:
q˙x(t) = qx(t)(1− qx(t))
[
Fx(π1(qx(t)), qx(t))− Fy(π1(qx(t)), qx(t))
]
.
Proposition 10. For ǫ sufficiently small, the solution of the system (Sǫ) can be approximated
by the solution of S0. This is given by the population profile ξ∗ = (w∗1 , q
∗
x), such that:
w∗1 =
µ− s∗(µx − µy)
µ+ µy
and q∗x =
s∗(µ+ µy)
µ− s∗(µx − µy) , (5.25)
where s∗ is the equilibrium of the replicator dynamics (1.6) for the standard evolutionary game
whit payoff matrix given by (5.17):
s∗ =
d− b
∆
with ∆ = a− b− c+ d.
Proof. Let us first study the equation q˙x = 0 before substituting the stationary equation
of the state dynamics. To solve this equation is equivalent to find the population profile
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ξ = (π1, qx) such that:
Fx(π1, qx) = Fy(π1, qx).
By replacing the expressions of the fitness (5.18) and (5.3.2) in the latter equality we get
π1 [π1(qxa+ (1− qx)b) + (1− π1)b] + (1− π1)− [π1(qxc+ (1− qx)d) + (1− π1)d]
= π1(qxc+ (1− qx)d) + (1− π1)d.
After some manipulations,
π1aπ1qx + π1b(1− π1qx) + (1− π1)cπ1qx + (1− π1)d(1− π1qx) = cπ1qx + d(1− π1qx).
This equality corresponds to
π1qx [π1a− π1b+ (1− π1)c− (1− π1)d− c+ d)] = d− π1b− (1− π1)d.
Thus
π1qx [π1a− π1b− π1c+ π1d] = π1d− π1b.
We finally obtain
π1qx =
d− b
∆
:= s∗.
The stationary condition of the first differential equation (5.16) leads to the following
relation between w1 and qx:
w1 = π1(qx) =
µ
µ+ µxqx + µy(1− qx) ,
then we have to solve now: π1(qx)qx = s∗. The latter equation is equivalent to:
µqx
µ+ µxqx + µy(1− qx) = s
∗.
After some simple manipulations we obtain
qx =
s∗(µ+ µy)
µ− s∗(µx − µy) := q
∗
x.
Finally, as we have π1(qx)qx = s∗ then w∗1 := π1(q
∗
x) =
s∗
q∗x
which leads to
w∗1 =
µ− s∗(µx − µy)
µ+ µy
.
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Note that the rest point q∗x of the PbRE (5.19) verifies the following relation:
q∗xπ1(q
∗
x) = s
∗.
This result says that the equilibrium probability that any individual picked out ran-
domly in the population is playing action x, is equal to s∗. This value is the mixed equi-
librium of the standard matrix game given by matrix A. It means that, if we consider a
state dependent action game, the equilibrium is obtained under conditional probability
over the state.
We have the following necessary and sufficient condition under which the solution
obtained is a strict interior point.
Lemma 3. The solution q∗x obtained in proposition (10) is a strict interior point if and only if:
µ > µx
s∗
1− s∗ .
Proof. The solution obtained in proposition (10) is:
q∗x =
s∗(µ+ µy)
µ− s∗(µx − µy) .
This solution is a strict interior point if and only if:
0 < q∗x < 1.
First, let’s look at the positivity condition q∗x > 0. This is equivalent to:
0 < q∗x ⇐⇒ µ > s∗(µx − µy).
After some basic algebras, the second condition is:
q∗x < 1⇐⇒ µ > µx
s∗
1− s∗ .
We have clearly that for all s∗ ∈]0, 1[, µx and µy:
s∗
1− s∗ µx > s
∗µx > s∗(µx − µy).
Then if µ > µx
s∗
1− s∗ the solution is a strict interior point, and the converse is true. This
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concludes the proof.
Note that this condition does not depend on the rate µy.
Numerical Illustration
We illustrate the theoretical results obtained in this section through a numerical exam-
ple. We fix the values of the transition rates, µ = 10, µx = 1.5 and µy = 1, and the
payoffs of the matrix game: a = −0.3, c = 0, b = 1 and d = 0.5. These values yield to
the following equilibrium of the standard evolutionary game: s∗ =
5
8
= 0.625.
In figure 5.2 we plot the trajectories of the system (Sǫ) of the coupled differential equa-
tions for different initial conditions and for ǫ = 0.01. We simulate a discrete time ver-
sion of the differential equations. We plot also the invariant manifold M0 and we ob-
serve that it is an attractor of the trajectories.
Proposition (10) gives the following solution of the system (S0):
q∗x = 0.7097, and w
∗
1 = 0.8807.
This couple corresponds exactly to the attractor of the trajectories on figure 5.2 and then
our simulation validates the result of this proposition.
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Figure 5.2: Trajectories of the system (Sǫ) from different starting points and the slow manifold M0
for ǫ = 0.01.
In the next section, we present an alternative method based on rewriting our game into
a matrix game considering only pure policies.
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5.3.7 Matrix Game Approximation Technique
In alternative to the singular perturbation method, when assuming the two time-scales
behavior of the SPcD system, one can consider the distribution over individual states
to be stationary and then solve the obtained standard normal form game. In particular,
by following the approach used in (Altman and Hayel, 2010), we can rewrite the two
states and two actions model as a matrix game, where individuals play deterministic
policies instead of actions. We get the following payoff bimatrix:
( uy ux
uy (F(uy, uy), F(uy, uy)) (F(uy, ux), F(ux, uy))
ux (F(ux, uy), F(uy, ux)) (F(ux, ux), F(ux, ux))
)
(5.26)
where F(ui, uj) is the expected fitness of an individual playing pure policy ui against
an individual using uj, with i, j ∈ {x, y}. Note that, as showed in (Altman and Hayel,
2010), it is possible to apply this matrix game approach to the general model with M
actions and K states but, in this case, the size of the matrix would be of dimension
D×D, where D is the number of deterministic policies. We restrict here our analysis to
the two actions/states case in order to compare the equilibrium obtained with the two
approaches.
The stationary distributions in states 1 and 0 are given respectively by the following
average sojourn times:
T1(i) =
1
µi
1
µ +
1
µi
=
µ
µ+ µi
,
T0(i) =
1
µ
1
µ +
1
µi
=
µi
µ+ µi
,
where i ∈ A denotes the choice of policy ui. The expected fitness F(ui, uj) can be
expressed as a function of these average sojourn times as follows:
F(ui, uj) = ∑
s,s′∈S
∑
a,a′∈A
Ts(a)Ts′(a
′)r(a, a′),
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where r(a, a′) is the immediate fitness of a player using action a against an opponent
playing a′. From the payoffs matrix (5.17), we obtain:
F(uy, uy) = d,
F(ux, uy) = T1(x)b+ T0(x)d,
F(uy, ux) = T1(x)c+ T0(x)d,
F(ux, ux) = T1(x) [T1(x)a+ T0(x)b] + T0(x) [T1(x)c+ T0(x)d] .
(5.27)
By considering this matrix game as a representation of a standard evolutionary game,
we can write the replicator equation. Let δx(t) ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that a player
plays ux at time t. We have that:
δ˙x(t) = δx(t)(1− δx(t))(F(ux, δx(t))− F(uy, δx(t)))
= δx(t)(1− δx(t))
[
F(ux, uy)− F(uy, uy)
+δx(t)(F(ux, ux)− F(uy, ux) + F(uy, uy)− F(ux, uy))
]
.
(5.28)
We can compute the mixed equilibrium δ∗x by solving the indifference principle equa-
tion F(uy, δ∗x) = F(ux, δ
∗
x), with F(ui, q) = (1− q)F(ui, uy) + qF(ui, ux) with i ∈ A. We
obtain:
δ∗x =
F(uy, uy)− F(ux, uy)
F(ux, ux)− F(uy, ux) + F(uy, uy)− F(ux, uy) .
If 0 ≤ δ∗x ≤ 1, then it is an admissible equilibrium for the matrix game and it corre-
sponds to a rest point of the replicator dynamics (5.28). We resume our result in the
following proposition.
Proposition 11. If the distribution of the individual states is stationary, the equilibrium policy
of the game can be computed by applying the matrix game approximation technique, which leads
to the equilibrium
δ∗x =
s∗
T1(x)
. (5.29)
under the condition 0 ≤ s∗ ≤ T1(x).
Proof. As we have mentioned above, the equilibrium can be computed by imposing the
indifference principle, which leads to:
δ∗x =
F(uy, uy)− F(ux, uy)
F(ux, ux)− F(uy, ux) + F(uy, uy)− F(ux, uy) .
By substituting the values of the fitnesses (5.27) into the latter equation and by carrying
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out the values of the time ratios T1(x) and T0(x), we get:
δ∗x =
µ(d−b)
µ+µx
µ2a+µµxb+µxµc+µ2xd
(µ+µx)2
+ d− µb+2µxd+µc
(µ+µx)
=
µ(d−b)
µ+µx
µ2a+µµxb+µxµc+µ2xd+d(µ+µx)2−(µ+µx)(µb+2µxd+µc)
(µ+µx)2
.
After some algebra:
δ∗x =
µ(d− b)
µ+ µx
· (µ+ µx)
2
µ2(a+ d− b− c) =
s∗
T1(x)
.
In order for δ∗x to be an admissible equilibrium, it must satisfy δ
∗
x ∈ [0, 1], which com-
pletes the proof.
In figure 5.3 we illustrate the convergence of the replicator equation (5.28 ) to the equi-
librium δ∗x = 0.71875, which is obtained by setting, as in the previous numerical exam-
ple, µ = 10, µx = 1.5 and µy = 1, and a = −0.3, c = 0, b = 1 and d = 0.5, starting from
qx(0) = 0.2 and qx(0) = 0.9.
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Figure 5.3: Convergence of the replicator dynamics to the equilibrium δ∗x = 0.71875, obtained by
setting µ = 10, µx = 1.5 and µy = 1, and a = −0.3, c = 0, b = 1 and d = 0.5, starting from
qx(0) = 0.2 and qx(0) = 0.9.
5.3.8 Relation Between the Equilibria
In section 5.3.6, we suppose that each individual plays a deterministic policy ui ∈ UD,
which consists in always choosing action i in state 1 and action y otherwise and, by
applying the singular perturbation method, we determine the equilibrium profile ξ∗ =
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(w∗1 , q
∗
x) of such game. In section 5.3.7, we assume that the distribution of individual
states is already stationary which allows us to rewrite the game as a standard evolu-
tionary game and to compute its mixed equilibrium δ∗. While q∗x represents the share
of the population choosing policy ux at the equilibrium, δ∗ represents the probability of
choosing the deterministic policy ux. This means that, in the first case, the population
considered is polymorphic (with a fraction q∗ of the population choosing policy ux and
the remaining 1− q∗x choosing uy), while in the latter case we have a monomorphic pop-
ulation, where all individuals play the same mixed action (which consists in choosing
ux with probability δ∗x). We can compare the equilibria q
∗
x and δ
∗
x obtained with these
two different approaches.
Proposition 12. The relation between the equilibrium δ∗x and the equilibrium q
∗
x is the follow-
ing:
q∗x < δ
∗
x .
Proof. We evaluate the difference between the equilibria δ∗x , obtained by solving our
model as a matrix game in (5.29) with the value of the equilibrium obtained through
the singular perturbation method, and q∗x in (10):
δ∗x − q∗x =
s∗(µ+ µx)
µ
− s
∗(µ+ µy)
µ− s∗(µx − µy)
= s∗
(µx − µy)(µ− s∗(µ+ µx)
µ(µ− s∗(µx − µy)) .
If we consider the same values of the parameters chosen for the previous numerical
example, the matrix game approach gives the following equilibrium:
δ∗x =
s∗(µ+ µx)
µ
= 0.71875 > q∗x = 0.7097,
which verifies the proposition 12.
We now compare the two equilibria in terms of the average fitness fitness of the pop-
ulation, i.e. F¯(δ∗x) and F¯(ξ
∗), with ξ∗ = (w∗1 , q
∗
x), and we verify that, as expected, the
fitnesses are equal.
Proposition 13. The average fitness of the population at the equilibria points obtained with the
two approaches are equals, i.e. F¯(ξ∗) = F¯(δ∗x).
Proof. Considering the first approach, based on the singular perturbations method, we
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have:
F¯(ξ∗) = q∗xFx(ξ∗) + (1− q∗x)Fy(ξ∗)
= Fy(ξ∗) + q∗x(Fx(ξ∗)− Fy(ξ∗)),
with ξ∗ = (w∗1 , q
∗
x). At the equilibrium state, we have Fx(ξ
∗) = Fy(ξ∗) and thus F¯(ξ∗) =
Fy(ξ∗) = ry(ξ∗) = w∗1(q
∗
xc+(1− q∗x)d)+ (1−w∗1)d. Knowing that q∗xw∗1 = s∗, we obtain:
F¯(ξ∗) = s∗c+ (1− s∗)d.
By rewriting the game into a matrix game, we obtain the following equilibrium profile:
δ∗x =
s∗
T1(x)
. The average fitness of the population in this case is:
F¯(δ∗x) = δ∗xF(ux, δ∗x) + (1− δ∗x)F(uy, δ∗x)
= F(uy, δ∗x) + δ∗x(F(ux, δ∗x)− F(uy, δ∗x)).
At the equilibrium, we have the following equality F(ux, δ∗x) = F(uy, δ
∗
x) and then the
average fitness of the population becomes simply:
F¯(δ∗x) = F(uy, δ
∗
x) = δ
∗
xF(uy, ux) + (1− δ∗x)F(uy, uy).
The average fitness of the population is: F¯(δ∗x) = δ
∗
x(T1(x)c+ T0(x)d) + (1− δ∗x)d. Since
δ∗xT1(x) = s
∗,
F¯(δ∗x) = s
∗c+ (1− s∗)d,
which completes the proof.
Finally, we prove that the two equilibria obtained with the two approaches are in the
same equivalent class in terms of average sojourn times. Let T1(q) be the average so-
journ time in state 1 for an individual in a polymorphic population whose profile is ξ∗,
and let T1(δ∗x) be the average sojourn time in state 1 for an individual in a monomophic
population playing mixed action δ∗. For the monomorphic population case, we obtain:
T1(δ∗x) = δ
∗
xT1(x) + (1− δ∗x)T1(y) = δ∗x
µ
µ+ µx
+ (1− δ∗x)
µ
µ+ µy
. (5.30)
For the case of the polymorphic population:
T1(q∗x) = π1(q
∗
x) =
µ
µ+ µxq∗x + µy(1− q∗x)
. (5.31)
The equivalence between these average sojourn times is proved in the following propo-
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sition.
Proposition 14. The mixed equilibrium δ∗x and the equilibrium obtained by the singular per-
turbation approach yield to the same average sojourn times, i.e.
T1(δ∗x) = T1(q
∗
x).
Proof. We first rewrite δ∗x as a function of the immediate payoffs in matrix (5.17):
δ∗x =
(µx + µ)(d− b)
µ∆
.
where ∆ := a− b− c+ d. We substitute it in (5.30), and we get:
T1(δ
∗
x) =
µ∆ + (µx + µy)
µ∆(µ+ µy)
.
Analogously, we substitute the expression of s∗ in q∗x in proposition(10), and we rewrite
it in (5.31), which leads to:
T1(q
∗
x) =
µ∆ + (µx + µy)
µ∆(µ+ µy)
.
which proves that T1(q∗x) = T1(δ
∗
x).
The previous results show that we can define two equivalent classes for deterministic
policies that yield same average fitness and average sojourn times.
5.3.9 Applications in Network Systems
Energy Control in Wireless Network
The two-states two pure actions model can be applied to describe a particular problem
that arises in dynamic power control in mobile networks, which has been presented in
(Altman and Hayel, 2008). The underlying idea is based on the fact that battery life is a
very critical issue in wireless systems, and then, defining optimal transmission policies
based on battery levels is very important. Moreover, this energy management problem
is even more important when interactions occurs between the devices, complicating
the analysis of such control systems. We then consider a system in which the action
of each device impacts the lifetime of its battery or its battery level, and also impacts
its transmission rate. A large number of mobiles transmit packets occasionally. Each
transmitter can be in Full (F) or Almost empty (A) battery state. When a mobile is in
F state it can choose to transmit packets using high (h) or low (l) power, whereas if it
is in state A, it can only transmit packets using l power. In general, several mobiles
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try to join a common receiver at the same time and interferences occur between the
received signals. We suppose that transmissions are sparse so that the probability that
more than two mobiles transmit simultaneously is negligible. We also assume that
a transmission is successful either if the mobile is the only transmitter during a slot
or if it transmits at higher power than the other transmitter. The time spent in state F
depends on the action chosen by the mobile. Then the state of the mobile changes to the
lower battery state A. After an exponentially distributed time, its battery state becomes
empty. We assume that the battery is immediately recharged, so that the mobile goes
back to state F. When transmitting at high power, the mobile’s battery is consumed
faster, and thus the transition rate from F to A is faster. Then, in this framework, the
state space corresponds to S := {A, F}, the action space is A := {h, l} = AF and
the restricted action space for state A is AA := {l}. The set of deterministic policies
UD := {uh, ul} is composed of the policy uh such that uh(A) = l and uh(F) = h; the
policy ul such that ul(A) = l and ul(F) = l. Then, the system (S) of coupled dynamics
describes the time evolution of the proportion of mobiles in each state A and F, and
at the same time the proportion of mobiles using policy uh and ul . By assuming that
the state dynamic is highly faster than the policy dynamics (the change of policy has
to be reimplemented into the mobiles by manufacturer or designers), then our analysis
describes the equilibrium situation which corresponds to the long term evolution of
this system.
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Figure 5.4: Energy control in wireless networks. Each mobile continuously moves from full battery
state (F) to almost empty battery state (A) and then back to F. If the mobile chooses policy uh (left
side), in state F it transmits at high power (h), otherwise, if it chooses policy ul it transmits at low
power (l) (right side). In state A, it always transmits at low power. Since high power transmission
is costly in terms of energy consumption, when transmitting at high power, the transition rate to
state A is faster, and thus the time spent in state F is shorter.
Network Formation Games
Another application of the proposed model can be found in network formation games
(Jackson, 2005). We consider a large number of nodes where each node is in one of two
possible states: Infected or Susceptible, so that S = {I, S}. Nodes interact through pair-
wise interactions, during which both nodes exchange contents. If a node is in state S, it
determines the type of unidirectional link to the node it is interacting with. The type of
link can be charged at a price (p) or for free ( f ); if a node is in the infected state (state
I), it can only create free links. Pay connection is safer, so that when a link is not a free
one, the probability for a node to be infected is lower, independently of the choice of
the other node to pay or not and also independent of the state of the other node. After
some random time in I state, a node becomes susceptible again. This application into
networks formation games could ask more assumptions on the model, especially if the
transition rate depends on the state of the opponent. In this case we should define a
more general game framework considering interactive MDPs, like anonymous sequen-
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tial games (Wiecek and Altman, 2014). This generalized framework has a highly more
complicated internal structure. We thus let its analysis as an extension for future works.
It has to be noted that the singular perturbation approach, proposed in Subsection 5.3.6
is valid for this application, by considering a more complicated dynamics of individual
state, which depends on the action also of the opponent.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we considered a particular type of evolutionary game inwhich the action
of the individual not only determines its immediate fitness but it also impacts the transi-
tion rates of the Markov process of the individual state. We defined the interdependent
dynamics of the individual state and of the policy, where the evolution of policies dis-
tribution in the population dynamics is assumed to follow the well-known replicator
dynamics. After introducing these combined dynamics in a general framework, we an-
alyzed a particular case for which we proved the correspondence between stable rest
points of the dynamics and the equilibrium profiles of the evolutionary game. Under
the assumption that the two dynamics evolve with different timescales, we proposed
two methods to obtain the rest points. We gave a complete characterization of these
equilibrium profiles and we showed that these equilibria are equivalent in terms of av-
erage sojourn times and expected fitness. Finally, we illustrated our framework with
two application scenarii in network systems.
89
Chapter 6
A Dynamic Approach for the Study
of a Hawk-Dove Problem
“Mathematics without natural history is sterile, but natural history without
mathematics is muddled.”
J.Maynard Smith, Games, Sex and Evolution, 1987
Summary
We develop in this chapter a dynamic model for the Hawk-Dove game in order to
study the impact of the aggressive behavior of adults on the evolution of young
individuals. As in MDEG presented in Chapter 4, players are associated with a
MDP, but transition probability here do dot depend on the player’s action but on
the action of the individual it meets. We define a Hawk-Dove game with four
possible individual states, where the individual state determines the set of available
actions. By considering the stationary distribution over the states, we transform
the game into a standard evolutionary game, and we compute its equilibria. We
then consider this Hawk-Dove dynamic game with group players as presented in
Chapter 2.
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6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a simple example of a Hawk-Dove game in a MDEG type
of framework, where, in contrast with the theory presented in Chapter 4, we assume
that transition probabilities do not depend on the action of the player but may depend
on the action taken by those it encounters. The Hawk-Dove game is one of the most
studied example to model the level of aggressiveness in a population and it finds many
applications in different fields (see Section 1.4). The aim of our MDEG version of the
game is to study the impact of the aggressive behavior of adults on the evolution of
young individuals.
State of Art
Dynamical models of the Hawk-Dove game can be found in EGT literature. Houston
andMcNamara (Houston andMcNamara, 1988) (Houston andMcNamara, 1991) study
a repeated version of the Hawk-Dove game, where each bird is associated with a state
variable representing animal’s level of energy evolving in time as a Markov Process.
The action played by an animal depends on its reserve of energy and the fitness function
depends on the average level of aggressiveness in the population. Birds are supposed
to choose their policy in order to minimize the probability of dying during a period of
time, and the ESS is in the form: ”play Hawk if and only if reserves are below a critical level
of the energy resources c∗(t)”. McNamara et al. (McNamara et al., 1991) give an analytic
justification of the computations performed in (Houston and McNamara, 1988) in a
simpler setting, where they obtain interesting structural properties of the equilibrium
using dynamic programming tools.
Some of the features considered in the Hawk-Dove model that we define can be found
in (Altman and Hayel, 2008) (see the Introduction to the previous chapter), where the
authors present a simple application of MDEG to mobile communications. As in our
case, individuals can choose among an aggressive and a non-aggressive action only in
one of the possible individual states, while in the others, only non-aggressive one is
allowed.
In what follows, we consider a Hawk-Dove game where players are associated with
one of four possible states, representing the age and the strength of the individual, and
we suppose that the aggressive behavior is possible only in one of these states. Players
aim at maximizing their expected immediate fitness during their lifetime. The system is
assumed to be in its stationary state, whichmeans that the distribution over the individ-
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ual states is stationary, and the game is then transformed into a standard evolutionary
game. We identify the stationary equilibrium of the game and we compute its value.
In Section 6.3 we consider the case of group players presented in Chapter 2, for this
Hawk-Dove MDEG.
6.2 The Model
Let us consider an infinitely large population of players matched in pairwise random
interactions. We define a four state model, such that each individual is born ’young’
(Y) and after each interactionwith another randomly selected individual can become an
adult or remain in young state. Adults can be aggressive (playHawk) or non-aggressive
(play Dove). If a young meets an aggressive adult either it evolves as a ’weak adult’
(AW) or it becomes a ’weak young’ (YW). A weak young, when evolving, can only
become a weak adult, whereas a young who has never been attacked may evolve into
a ’strong adult’ (AS). The tuple {S ,A,Q} describing our game is defined as follows:
• The set of states is S = {Y,YW , AS, AW}, where Y, YW correspond to ’young’ and
’weak young’, AS to ’strong adult’ and AW to ’weak adult’.
• The set of actions is A = {H,D}, with AAS = A, and AAW = AY = AYW = {D}.
Players can choose weather to behave aggressively (H) or not (D) only in AS state,
while in all the other states, players can only play D.
• We define the probability of remaining in the young state (either weak or not)
for a young individual by y ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, the probability for a young
individual to evolve into an adult one is 1− y. Analogously, the probability for
an adult to stay in adult state (either weak or strong) is denoted by x ∈ [0, 1],
while with probability 1− x an adult dies and is replaced by a young individual.
We assume that the transition probabilitiesQts′(s, a, a′) (defined in Section 4.2) are
time homogeneous and do not depend on the action of the player (a), but they
may depend on that of its opponent (a′). We describe the set Q as follows.
– If a young individual meets an adult one, the transition probabilities de-
pend on the action of the player it meets (and not on its action):
QY(Y, ·,D) = y QY(Y, ·,H) = 0
QYW (Y, ·,D) = 0 QYW (Y, ·,H) = y
QAW (Y, ·,D) = 0 QAW (Y, ·,H) = 1− y
QAS(Y, ·,D) = 1− y QAS(Y, ·,H) = 0
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– If a weak young individual meets an adult one, the transition probabilities
only depend on its state (and not on the adult’s action):
QY(YW , ·, ·) = 0
QYW (YW , ·, ·)y
QAW (YW , ·, ·) = 1− y
QAS(YW , ·, ·) = 0
– Analogously, when an adult individual of type i meets another adult, the
transition probabilities only depend on the player state:
QAj(Ai, ·, ·) =
{
x i = j
0 i 6= j
QY(Ai, ·, ·) = 0 QYW (Ai, ·, ·) = 0
Without loss of generality, we restrict to the set of stationary policies US. We assume
that if the population uses some common (mixed) stationary policy (except for a tagged
player) then the global state process before the tagged user is born forms a time-homogeneous
Markov chain; when the tagged player is born, it finds theMarkov chain in steady state.
Since the choice of an action in A is limited to state AS, we can identify a (mixed) sta-
tionary policy u ∈ US with the rule "play action H with probability qu when in state AS, D
otherwise", i.e. u(H|AS) = qu, u(D|AS) = 1− qu and u(D|AW) = u(D|Y) = u(D|YW) =
1. Let uH and uD be the deterministic policies corresponding respectively to qu = 1 and
qu = 0. Let v ∈ US be the common policy adopted by the population . The fraction of
adults of type Ai ∈ {AW , AS} in such a population is defined as:
αi(v) := P(Ai|v)
The total proportion of adults in the population, denoted by P(A), does not depend on
the policy v, and it corresponds to the expected lifetime spent in adult state over the
total expected lifetime of an individual:
P(A) =
1
1−x
1
1−x +
1
1−y
. (6.1)
The probability of being attacked when young is αS(v)qv, which corresponds to the
probability of finding a strong adult playing aggressively. Consequently αW(v) =
P(A)(αS(v)qv) and αS(v) = P(A)(1 − αS(v)qv). We can then explicit the fraction of
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strong and weak adults in the population as a function of P(A):
αS(v) =
P(A)
1+ P(A)qv
, αW(v) =
qvP(A)2
1+ P(A)qv
. (6.2)
Since in classical EGT the fitness function is related to the rate of reproduction of an
individual, we suppose that only adults reproduce and thus the fitness of a young in-
dividual is assumed to be zero. The immediate payoff matrix, describing the fitness of
the row player when meeting the column player, is the following:
AS(H) AS(D) AW Y YW
AS(H)
1
2
− δ 1 1 1 1
AS(D) 0
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
AW −∆ 12 − ∆
1
2
− ∆ 1
2
− ∆ 1
2
− ∆
where δ, ∆ >
1
2
. The parameter δ represents the cost of the fight, whereas ∆ reflects
the loss of fitness for individuals who have been attacked when young. We omitted the
null rows for Y and YW .
The expected immediate fitness for an adult of type i ∈ {AS, AW}, choosing policy
u ∈ US against a population playing v ∈ US is F(i, u, v) := Eu,v[r(i, s, s′, a′)], where
r(i, a, s′, a′) is the immediate fitness of an adult of type i ∈ {AS, AW} playing a ∈ Ai
against an individual in state s′ ∈ S playing a′ ∈ As′ . As each player is born in young
state, F(i, u, v) does not depend on the initial state.
6.2.1 Deriving the Expected Fitness and the Equilibria
We suppose that a tagged individual chooses stationary policy u against a population
playing stationary policy v. The total expected fitness of the tagged player during its
lifetime is given by:
F(u, v) =
1
1− x (αS(v)F(S, u, v) + αW(v)F(W, u, v)) , (6.3)
where
1
1− x is the expected lifetime in adult state. F(S, u, v) denotes the immediate
expected fitness of an adult strong (AS) playing u against a population playing v, with:
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F(S, u, v) =
[
qu
(
(1− P(A)) + αS(v)(1− (12 + δ)qv) + αW(v)
)
+(1− qu)
(
1− P(A)
2
+
1− qv
2
αS(v) +
αW(v)
2
)]
,
(6.4)
and F(W, u, v) is the immediate expected fitness of a weak adult (AW):
F(W, u, v) =
[
(1− P(A))(1
2
− ∆)− αS(v)(12 − ∆−
qv
2
) + (
1
2
− ∆)αW(v)
]
= F(W, v). (6.5)
Note that the fitness of a weak adult F(W, v) does not depend on the policy u, as a weak
adult always plays D. By substituting the expressions (6.4) and (6.5) in (6.3) we obtain:
F(u, v) =
αS(v)
1− x
[
qu
(
(1− P(A)) + αS(v)(1− (12 + δ)qv) + αW(v)
)
+
+(1− qu)
(
1− P(A)
2
+
1− qv
2
αS(v) +
αW(v)
2
)]
+
αW(v)
1− x
[
(1− P(A))(1
2
− ∆)− αS(v)(12 − ∆−
qv
2
) + (
1
2
− ∆)αW(v)
]
,
(6.6)
where αS(v) =
P(A)
1+ P(A)qv
and αW(v) =
P(A)2qv
1+ P(A)qv
. By definition we have that
αS(v) + αW(v) = P(A), which leads to:
F(u, v) =
αS(v)
1− x
[
qu
(
1− P(A) + P(A)− αS(v)(12 + δ)qv
)
+
+(1− qu)
(
1− P(A)
2
+
P(A)
2
− qvαS(v)
2
)]
+
αW(v)
1− x
[
1
2
− ∆− αS(v) qv2
]
=
1
1− x
[
αS(v)
(
1
2
− δqvαS(v)
)
qu − ∆αW(v) + P(A)
(
1
2
− qv
2
αS(v)
)]
.
(6.7)
In the following theorem we present the symmetric equilibrium of the game, which
depends on the value of the cost of the fight δ. We obtain that, if the the cost of the fight
is below a certain threshold δ∗ the deterministic symmetric equilibrium policy is uH. If
the cost is strictly higher than δ∗, the symmetric equilibrium is given by a mixed policy
v∗.
Theorem 5. Given the game described in Section 6.2 we have that:
i. if δ ≤ δ∗ the unique symmetric equilibrium is the deterministic policy uH;
ii. if δ > δ∗ the unique symmetric equilibrium is the stationary policy v∗ such that
qv∗ =
1
P(A)(2δ− 1) , (6.8)
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where:
δ∗ =
1+ P(A)
2P(A)
.
Proof. We first look for the equilibrium in pure actions. If the population’s policy is
v = uD (i.e. all individuals in the population plays pure action D in state AS), we
obtain that:
αS(uD) = P(A) and αW(uD) = 0.
By substituting these values and qv = 0 in equation (6.7) we get:
F(u, uD) =
P(A)(qu + 1)
2(1− x) . (6.9)
Note that F(u, uD) is increasing in qu, and thus uD (corresponding to qu = 0) is never
an equilibrium.
We consider the case v = uH. We have that:
αS(uH) =
P(A)
1+ P(A)
and αW(uH) =
P(A)2
1+ P(A)
.
By substituting these values, qv = 1 and, respectively qu = 0 and qu = 1 in 6.7 we get:
F(uD, uH) = − P(A)(2∆P(A)− 1)2(1+ P(A))(1− x) ,
F(uH , uH) =
P(A)(1+ P(A)− δP(A)− ∆P(A)− ∆P(A)2)
(1− x)(1+ P(A))2 .
The aggressive deterministic policy uH is an equilibrium only if the inequality F(uH, uH) ≥
F(uD, uH) holds. We have that:
F(uH , uH)− F(uD, uH) ≥ 0 ⇔ −P(A)(2δP(A)− 1− P(A))2(1+ P(A))2(1− x) ≥ 0.
The latter inequality is satisfied if and only if
1+ P(A)− 2δP(A) ≥ 0.
We thus obtain that the aggressive behavior uH is an equilibrium in deterministic poli-
cies if and only if δ ≤ 1+ P(A)
2P(A)
, which proofs the first statement of the theorem.
We now apply the indifference principle to find the equilibrium in mixed policies. By
substituting qu = 0 in (6.7) we obtain:
F(uD, v) =
1
1− x
[
P(A)
(
1
2
− qvαS(v)
2
)
− ∆αW(v)
]
=
1
1− x
[
P(A)(1− 2∆P(A)qv)
2(1+ P(A)qv)
]
.
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For policy uH, equation (6.7) becomes:
F(uH , v) =
1
1− x
[
αS(v)
(
1
2
− δqvαS(v)
)
− ∆αW(v) + P(A)
(
1
2
− qv
2
αS(v)
)]
.
We impose the indifference among the two possible pure policies of the first player, i.e.
F(uD, v) = F(uH, v) and we find the following value:
qv∗ =
1
P(A)(2δ− 1) .
If 0 < qv∗ < 1, then the policy v∗ s.t. v
∗(H|AS) = qv∗ is an admissible mixed policy.
By imposing these constraints on (6.8), we get δ >
1+ P(A)
2P(A)
, which completes the
proof.
In figure 6.1 we plot the equilibrium probability qv∗ , i.e. the probability of being aggres-
sive in state AS at the equilibrium defined in (6.8), as a function of the proportion P(A)
of adults in the population, for three different values of δ. The continuous higher line is
obtained with δ = 4, the dotted line with δ = 6, the continuous lower one with δ = 10.
As expected we can observe that qv∗ is a decreasing function of P(A): this means that
the higher the proportion of adults in the population is, the lower is the probability of
being aggressive. As a matter of fact, the aggressive behavior of strong adults is re-
warding only when adopted against a non-aggressive individual, while it is costly if
adopted against another aggressive adult. In figure 6.2, qv∗ is plotted as a function of
the threshold δ∗. The continuous higher line is obtained with P(A) = 0.15, the dotted
line with P(A) = 0.5, the continuous lower one with P(A) = 0.88. As the value of δ∗
represents the cost of the fight between two aggressive adults, as expected, we can see
that qv∗ is decreasing in δ∗.
Remark 7. We observe that the equilibrium value qv∗ , corresponding to the probability of play-
ing aggressively in state AS, does not coincide with the mixed Nash equilibrium q∗ =
1
2δ
of the
standard Hawk-Dove game, even when x → 1, so that P(A) ≃ 1. As a matter of fact, even if
there are almost only adult individuals in the population, the fraction of weak adults may not be
negligible, and thus we still may have a populations with two types of adults.
6.3 The Dynamic Hawk-Dove Game and Group Players
We now reformulate this Hawk-Dove game, considering groups players, as presented
in Chapter 2. States are associated with individuals within a group, which are ran-
domly matched in pairwise interactions, but the rules that determine their policy are
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Figure 6.1: The equilibrium qv∗ plotted as a function of the proportion P(A) of adults in the popu-
lation for different values of δ. The higher line is obtained with δ = 4, the middle line with δ = 6,
the lower one with δ = 10.
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Figure 6.2: The equilibrium qv∗ as a function of the value of δ for different values of P(A). The
higher line is obtained with P(A) = 0.15, the middle line with P(A) = 0.5, the lower one with
P(A) = 0.88.
chosen in order to maximize the fitness of the group they belong to. We suppose that
the large population of individuals is divided into N symmetric groups of the same size
and that all players within a group choose the same policy. We further suppose that the
probability of being a strong (or a weak) adult does not depend on the group the player
belongs to, but it depends only on the average quantity q¯u :=
∑
N
l=1 qul
N
, which is the av-
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erage probability of being aggressive in state AS in the population. These probabilities
are given, respectively by:
αS(u¯) := P(AS|u¯) = P(A) (1− αS(u¯)q¯u) ,
αW(u¯) := P(AW |u¯) = P(A) (αS(u¯)q¯u) .
where u¯ is the mixed policy such that u(H|AS) = q¯u. These quantities can be rewritten
as:
αS(u¯) =
P(A)
1+ P(A)q¯u
, (6.10)
αW(u¯) =
q¯uP(A)2
1+ P(A)q¯u
. (6.11)
We suppose that the entire population chooses the same stationary policy u ∈ US, ex-
cept for a fixed group i playing ui ∈ US. We have that:
q¯u =
qui + (N − 1)qu
N
.
6.3.1 Group Fitness and Equilibria
We associate to pairwise interactions among individuals the payoff matrix defined in
Section 6.2. The expected fitness during the lifetime of a group-player i choosing policy
ui ∈ US, in a population adopting policy u ∈ US is given by:
Γ(ui, u) =
1
1− x
[
αS(u¯)
(
1
N
F(S, ui, ui) +
N − 1
N
F(S, ui, u)
)
+αW(u¯)
(
1
N
F(W, ·, ui) + N − 1N F(W, ·, u)
)]
,
(6.12)
where:
F(S, ui, u) = qui
(
(1− P(A)) + αS(u¯)(1− (12 + δ)qu) + αW(u¯)
)
+ (1− qu)
(
1− P(A)
2
+
1− qv
2
αS(u¯) +
αW(u¯)
2
)
= qui
(
1− P(A)
2
+ αS(u¯)(
1
2
+ δ)qu) + αW(u¯)
)
+
(
1− P(A)
2
+
1− qui
2
αS(u¯) +
αW(u¯)
2
)
,
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is the expected immediate fitness of a strong adult in group i, playing policy ui against
a population playing u and
F(W, ·, u) = (1− P(A))(1
2
− ∆− αS(u¯)(12 − ∆−
qu
2
) + (
1
2
− ∆)αW(u¯)),
is the expected immediate fitness of a weak adult in a population whose policy is u.
Quantities αS(u¯) and αS(u¯) are defined in (6.10) and (6.11) with q¯u =
qui + (N − 1)qu
N
,
while 1/N and N − 1/N are, respectively, the probability for a player of meeting an
opponent in the same group and in a different group.
In order to obtain insight on the impact of the groups on the equilibrium, we shall
focus on some particular values of the parameters. We consider the case of two groups
(N = 2) and we further fix ∆ = 1 and P(A) = 0.5, which means that there’s an equal
share of young and adult individuals in the population. We first look at symmetric
equilibria in deterministic policies and we obtain that, if the cost of the fight is higher
than a certain threshold, the deterministic policy uD is an equilibrium, while, if the cost
is low enough, the deterministic equilibrium policy is uH. This result is presented in
the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Given the group-players dynamic Hawk-Dove model, with N = 2, P(A) = 0.5
and ∆ = 1, the equilibrium in deterministic policy is:
• uH for δ < 1.05;
• uD for δ > 1.333.
Proof. Let us first consider a non aggressive population, i.e. u = uD. We substitute
qu = 0 in (6.12) and we compare the results obtained for the two possible response of
the tagged group i, ui = uD and ui = uH.
Γ(uD, uD) =
−1
2P(A)(x− 1) ,
Γ(uH , uD) =
−P(A)(4+ 2P(A)− 2P(A)δ− P(A)2 − 2P(A)∆
(x− 1)(2+ P(A))2 + 3P(A)2∆ + P(A)3∆− P(A)3δ)
We compute the difference:
Γ(uD, uD)−Γ(uH , uD) = −P(A)(−4+ 3P(A)
2 + 4P(A)δ+ 4P(A)∆− 6P(A)2∆− 2P(A)3∆ + 2P(A)3δ)
2((x− 1)(2+ P(A))2)
(6.13)
If the population is aggressive, i.e. if u = 1, we have that:
Γ(uD, uH) =
P(A)(−2− P(A) + P(A)2 + 2P(A)∆− 3P(A)2∆− P(A)3∆ + P(A)3δ)
(x− 1)(2+ P(A))2
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Γ(uH , uH) =
P(A)(−1− P(A) + P(A)δ+ P(A)∆− P(A)3∆− P(A)2∆ + P(A)3δ)
(x− 1)(1+ P(A))2
In this case:
Γ(uH , uH)− Γ(uD, uH) = P(A)(−2− 3P(A)− 2P(A)
2 + 4P(A)δ+ 2P(A)∆− A2∆)
((x− 1)(1+ P(A))2(2+ P(A))2
+
P(A)(4P(A)2δ− 2P(A)3∆ + 4P(A)3δ− 2P(A)3 + 2P(A)4δ− P(A)4)
((x− 1)(1+ P(A))2(2+ P(A))2)
(6.14)
By substituting ∆ = 1 and P(A) = 0.5in (6.13) and in (6.14), we obtain respectively:
Γ(uD, uD)− Γ(uH , uD) = −3(−4+ 3δ)100(x− 1) > 0⇔ δ >
4
3
= 1.333
Γ(uH , uH)− Γ(uD, uH) = (−61+ 58δ)450(x− 1) > 0 ⇔ δ <
61
58
≃ 1.05
We now consider also symmetric mixed policies. We obtain that, if the cost is higher
that a certain value, the group-players Hawk-Dove dynamic game admits a symmet-
ric mixed (stationary) policy equilibrium u∗. We resume our results in the following
theorem.
Theorem 7. The group-players dynamic Hawk-Dove model, for the fixed values of the param-
eters N = 2, P(A) = 0.5, ∆ = 1, admits the following equilibria:
i. the deterministic policy uH for 0.5 < δ < 1.05 ;
ii. the stationary policy u∗ for δ ≥ 0.8125, with:
qu∗ = −
−4+ 7δ−√12− 48δ+ 49δ2
(−1+ 2δ) ;
iii. the deterministic equilibrium policy uD for δ ≥ 1.333.
Proof. By substituting the values of N = 2, P(A) = 0.5 and ∆ = 1 in 6.12, we obtain:
Γ(ui, u) =
(−16qui − 5q2ui − 6quiqu + 9δq2ui − 16+ 10quiδqu − q2u + δq2u)
4((−1+ p)(4+ qui + qu)2)
.
We compute the derivative:
∂Γ(ui, u)
∂ui
=
(−8− 6qui − 10qu − quiqu − q2u + 18δqui + 2quiδqu + 10δqu + 2δq2u)
((x− 1)(4+ qui + qu)3)
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and, by imposing
∂Γ(ui, u)
∂ui
= 0, we find:
qui =
−8− 10qu − q2u + 10δqu + 2δq2u
−6− qu + 18δ+ 2δqu
We now impose the symmetry qui = qu and we obtain the two solutions:
qu1 := −
−4+ 7δ−√12− 48δ+ 49δ2
(−1+ 2δ)
qu2 :=
−(−4+ 7δ+√12− 48δ+ 49δ2
(−1+ 2δ)
The second solution qu2 is always negative and thus it is not acceptable, while the first
solution satisfies 0 < qu1 < 1 iff δ > 0.8125. We set qu∗ = qu1 and we define by u∗
the policy corresponding to play H with probability qu∗ in state AS. This completes the
proof.
From Theorem 7, we can observe that it is possible to determine two intervals of the
values of the cost δ (involved in a fight between two aggressive strong adults), in which
we have two equilibria. More precisely, we can observe that:
• for 0.5 < δ ≤ 0.8125 the game admits one deterministic equilibrium policy uH;
• for 0.8125 < δ ≤ 1.05 the game admits two equilibria, the deterministic uH and
the mixed u∗;
• for 1.05 < δ < 1.333 the game admits one mixed equilibrium u∗;
• for δ ≥ 1.333 the game admits one deterministic equilibrium policy uD.
In figure 6.3 we plot the probability of being aggressive in state AS at the equilibrium,
as a function of the cost δ. In figure 6.4 we compare the mixed equilibrium policies
obtained for the dynamic Hawk-Dove game, respectively for group-players and for
individual-players. We can observe that the probability of being aggressive (in state
AS) at the equilibrium is lower for group-players. This is coherent with what we found
in chapter 2.
6.4 Conclusion
We revisited in this chapter the Hawk-Dove game in a MDEG framework. In this con-
text an individual may be in one of several states, and the actions played by individuals
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Figure 6.3: The probability of being aggressive in state AS at the equilibria, obtained with N = 2,
P(A) = 0.5 and ∆ = 1, as a function of the cost δ.
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Figure 6.4: The equilibrium value qu∗ as a function of the value of δ
involved in pairwise interactions determine not only the immediate fitness but also the
transition probabilities of the players’ individual state. We found that the described
game has a unique symmetric equilibrium, which can be the pure aggressive policy
uH or a mixed equilibrium policy v∗, depending on the value of the cost of the fight
between two aggressive individuals δ. We then further extended our dynamic Hawk-
Dove game, by considering group-players as presented in Chapter 2. We fixed the
number of groups N = 2, the share of adults P(A) = 0.5 and ∆ = 1, to compute the
equilibria as a function of the cost of the fight δ. If the cost is very low, the aggres-
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sive deterministic policy uH is an equilibrium, otherwise, above certain values of the
cost, we have a mixed equilibrium policy u∗ and the deterministic policy uH. In par-
ticular, for δ ∈ [0.8125, 1.05] the game admits the two equilibria uH and u∗ and, for
δ ≥ 1.333 the equilibria uD and u∗. The presence of groups in the dynamic Hawk-Dove
game thus brings novel features with respect to the individual player game: the fact
the non-aggressive policy uD can an equilibrium and the fact of having more than one
equilibrium (for some values of δ). We also compared the mixed equilibria obtained
respectively for the individual-players and the group-players games and we obtained
that the probability of being aggressive in strong adult state is higher for individual-
players. This is coherent with the results obtained in Chapter 2, where we showed that
the presence of groups lowers the level of aggressiveness.
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Part III
Stochastic Hybrid Dynamics
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Chapter 7
Hybrid Stochastic Systems
”Nature almost surely operates by combining chance with necessity,
randomness with determinism...”
Eric Chaisson, Epic of Evolution: Seven Ages of the Cosmos, 2007
Summary
In this chapter we extend the theory of control of an hybrid stochastic dynamical
system to the case of a two players non-zero sum game. The system evolves in con-
tinuous time and it is subjected to abrupt changes of the parameters, determined
by two (discrete time) Markov decision processes, each of which is controlled by a
player that aims at minimizing its objective function. As we did in Chapter 5, we
assume a two time scale behavior of the system: the lengths of the time intervals
between the “jumps" of the parameters are assumed to be small, which means that
parameters evolve faster than the state of the system. This allows us to approxi-
mate the hybrid game with a deterministic averaged dynamic game. We prove that
an asymptotic Nash equilibrium of such hybrid game can be constructed on the
basis of a Nash equilibrium of a deterministic averaged dynamic game.
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7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study a non-zero sum dynamic game whose state is described as
a hybrid dynamical system that evolves in continuous time and that is subjected to
abrupt changes of the parameters. These changes are determined by two Markov de-
cision processes, each of which is controlled by a player that aims at minimizing its
objective function. The lengths of the time intervals between the “jumps” of the pa-
rameters are assumed to be equal to a small positive parameter ǫ, which means that
parameters change their values frequently (the smaller is the parameter ǫ, the higher
is the frequency). The MDPs are thus supposed to move faster than the state of the
system. We then define an averaged dynamic game which allows us to approximate
the hybrid system. More precisely, the main result of this chapter establishes that an
asymptotic Nash equilibrium of the game defined by the solutions of the hybrid sys-
tem (see Definition 1 in Section 7.2 below) can be constructed on the basis of a Nash
equilibrium of the game defined by the solutions of the deterministic averaged system.
The principal difference of our result from those obtained in the aforementioned works
is in that the information structures of the hybrid and the averaged games need to be
adjusted. In fact, we show that an asymptotic Nash equilibrium of the hybrid game,
in which each of the players chooses its actions on the basis of the full information of
its states/actions histories can be constructed on the basis of an open loop Nash equi-
librium of the averaged game, where players have no information about their previous
state/action history (nor about the state of the system).
State of Art
Hybrid dynamics control problems, with stochastic control and two time scales behav-
ior, have been first introduced by Altman and Gaitsgory (Altman and Gaitsgory, 1993),
in the case of one controller and linear dynamics and then extended to a two players
zero-sum game (Altman and Gaitsgory, 1995). In (Altman and Gaitsgory, 1997) and
(Nguyen et al., 2001) these models are generalized to non linear dynamics, respectively
for one controller and for the zero-sum game.
The problem of optimization of a nonlinear hybrid system governed by a Markov de-
cision process is close in nature to stochastic singular perturbed control problems in-
tensively studied in the literature (see, for example, (Abbad and Filar, 1992), (Bensous-
san and Blankenship, 1987), (Bensoussan, 1989), (Bielecki and Filar, 1991), (Delebecque
and Quadrat, 1978), (Kokotovic et al., 1986), (Kushner, 1990), (Philips and Kokotovic,
1981), (Pervozvansky and Gaitsgory, 1988) and references therein). The main idea in
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dealing with this category of problems is to optimize slow motions, assuming that the
fast ones are approximated by their quasi stationary distributions of states obtained
with “frozen” slow variables and controls, (see (Kokotovic et al., 1986), (Bensoussan,
1989), (O’Malley, 1974), (Kokotovic, 1984)). A common approach is an application of
singular perturbations or averaging techniques to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation for problems in continuous time (as in (Bensoussan and Blankenship, 1987),
(Bensoussan, 1989)) or to the dynamic programming equation for singularly perturbed
discrete timeMDPs (Abbad and Filar, 1992), (Bielecki and Filar, 1991), (Delebecque and
Quadrat, 1978), (Philips and Kokotovic, 1981), (Pervozvansky and Gaitsgory, 1988). In
contrast to this approach, here we continue the line of research started in (Altman and
Gaitsgory, 1997) and (Nguyen et al., 2001), where an averaging method is applied di-
rectly to the “slow” stochastic equation.
Such type of systems arise in modeling admission control in telecommunication net-
works, in which the dynamics of the state variables (representing information packets
transmission times at different nodes) is determined by MDPs describing the changes
of the routes, their numbers and the type of sessions that are present in the networks
(see e.g. (Shi et al., 1998)).
The chapter is organized as follows. In Sections 7.2 and 7.3, the hybrid and, respectively,
averaged deterministic games are introduced. In Section 7.4, the main results are stated
(see Propositions 15 and 16), and in Section 7.4.1, these are proved.
7.2 Hybrid Game
Let the dynamics of the state vector Z(t) ∈ RN be described by the equation
Z˙(t) = f 1(Z(t),Y1(t)) + f 2(Z(t),Y2(t)), Z(0) = z0, t ∈ [0, 1], (7.1)
where f i(·, ·) : RN ×RNi → RN , i = 1, 2, are continuous functions satisfying Lipschitz
conditions in z (see Assumption 6 below). The functions Yi(t) ∈ RNi , i = 1, 2, are
“controls" defined by two players. These controls are not chosen directly by the players.
They are obtained as the result of the players controlling the transition probabilities of
two associated stochastic discrete event systems described as follows.
The system i (i = 1, 2) has a finite state space S i and it changes its states at discrete mo-
ments of time tj = jǫ, j = 0, 1, . . . , ⌊ǫ−1⌋, where ǫ > 0 is a small parameter representing
the time unit and ⌊b⌋ stands for the greatest integer which is smaller then or equal to
b. The player i has a finite action space Ai, and if it chooses an action a ∈ Ai, then,
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provided that the current state of system i is s ∈ S i, its next state will be s′ ∈ S i with
the probability Qis′(s, a) ≥ 0 ( ∑
s′∈S i
Qis′(s, a) = 1).
A policy ui = {ui0, ui1, . . . , uij, . . . , ui⌊ǫ−1⌋} of the player i is a sequence of probability mea-
sures on Ai chosen as functions of the present state of the player and of its states/actions
history. That is, ui0 = u
i
0(s
i
0) and u
i
j+1 = u
i
j+1(h
j,i
0 , s
i
j+1), where h
j,i
0 is the states/actions
history of the ith system/player from time 0 to time t:
hj,i0 := (s
i
l , a
i
l , l = 0, ..., j), j = 1, ..., ⌊ǫ−1⌋, i = 1, 2. (7.2)
Let Ui stand for the set of all such policies and let F i be the discrete σ−algebra of all
subsets of Hi, which is the set of all possible states-actions histories of player i that can
be observed until time ǫ−1. Each initial distribution β of the initial states (s10, s
2
0) and a
policies pair (u1, u2) ∈ U1 × U2 uniquely define a probability measure P(u
1,u2)
β over the
space of samples H := H1 ×H2 equipped with the discrete σ−algebra F := F 1 ⊗F 2.
Denote by E(u
1,u2)
β the corresponding expectation operator. When the distribution of
the initial states is concentrated on a single states pair ζ = (ζ1, ζ2), we shall denote
the corresponding probability measure and the mathematical expectation operator as
P
(u1,u2)
ζ and E
(u1,u2)
ζ .
Let gi : S i × Ai → RNi be a given vector function and let Sij and Aij, j = 0, 1, . . . , ⌊ǫ−1⌋,
be the state-action processes of the system/player i. Then Yi(t) in (7.1) are defined by
the equations
Yi(t) = gi(Si⌊t/ǫ⌋, A
i
⌊t/ǫ⌋), i = 1, 2. (7.3)
Note that the dynamics of the state vector Z(t) is fully determined by the states/actions
realizations {Sij, Aij}, i = 1, 2. For convenience, Z(t) will be referred to as a “macro
state" vector of the system and {Sij} will be referred to as “micro states" of the players
i = 1, 2.
Along with the class of policies U := U1 × U2 described above, we will be dealing with
two other classes of policies UM := UM1 ×UM2 and US := US1 ×US2 , where UMi and USi
(i = 1, 2) are defined as follows:
• UMi is the set of Markov policies of the player i such that, at every moment tj = jǫ
of decision making, the probability measure uij on Ai is chosen as a function of
two arguments, one being the current moment of time and the other being the
current micro state of the player i.
• USi is the set of stationary policies of the player i. That is, it is the set of policies
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such that at any moment tj = jǫ, the probability measure uij on Ai is chosen as a
function of the current micro state of the player i.
Note that, as follows from the definitions above, US ⊂ UM ⊂ U .
Assumption 5. Under any stationary policy, the state space of the stochastic processes {Sij, Aij}
(i = 1, 2) forms an aperiodic Markov chain such that all states communicate (regular Markov
chain).
Asmentioned above, we make the following assumption about the functions f 1 and f 2.
Assumption 6. The functions fi(·, ·), i = 1, 2 are continuous and satisfy Lipschitz conditions
in the first argument. That is, there exist positive constants C1, C2 such that
‖ f i(z, yi)− f i(z˜, yi)‖ ≤ Ci‖z− z˜‖, i = 1, 2 (7.4)
for arbitrary z and z˜ from a sufficiently large subset of RN .
Remark 8. According to their definitions, the processes Y1(t) and Y2(t) take values in some
finite subsets D1 and D2 of RN1 and RN2 , that is, Yi(t) ∈ Di, i = 1, 2 . Due to (7.4), it implies
that Z(t) ∈ D ∀t ∈ [0, 1], where D is a compact subset of RN . Note that, since fi(·, ·), i = 1, 2
are continuous, there exist positive constants Mi, i = 1, 2, such that
‖ f i(z, yi)‖ ≤ Mi, ∀(z, yi) ∈ D× Di, i = 1, 2. (7.5)
Assume that the player iwishes tominimize its cost that only depends on the final value
of the macro state, Gi(·) : RN → R, i = 1, 2. To simplify the presentation, we assume
that the cost functions Gi(·) i = 1, 2, satisfy Lipschitz conditions on D (although the
continuity of these functions would suffice our purposes). Thus, wemake the following
assumption.
Assumption 7. There exist positive constants CiG, i = 1, 2, such that
|Gi(z)− Gi(z˜)| ≤ CiG‖z− z˜‖ ∀ Z, Z˜ ∈ D, i = 1, 2. (7.6)
Definition 8. A pair of policies u∗ǫ = (u
1∗
ǫ , u
2∗
ǫ ) ∈ U is an Asymptotic Nash Equilibrium
(ANE) of the hybrid game if


lim
ǫ→0
E
(u1∗ǫ ,u2∗ǫ )
ζ [G
1(Z(1))] ≤ lim
ǫ→0
E
(u1ǫ ,u
2∗
ǫ )
ζ {G1(Z(1))}, ∀u1ǫ ∈ U1
lim
ǫ→0
E
(u1∗ǫ ,u2∗ǫ )
ζ {G2(Z(1))} ≤ lim
ǫ→0
E
(u1∗ǫ ,u2ǫ)
ζ {G2(Z(1))}, ∀u2ǫ ∈ U2
(7.7)
where limits in the left-hand-sides are assumed to exist and the initial micro states ζ = (ζ1, ζ2)
are fixed (and known to the players).
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The fact that the changes of the micro states/actions occur frequently (every moment
tj = jǫ) means that the processes Y1(t) and Y2(t) change their values on a much faster
scale than does the macro state Z(t). This allows one to approximate the solutions of
the hybrid system (7.1) with the solutions of the deterministic averaged control sys-
tem introduced in the next section. Our main result is the construction of ANE of the
stochastic hybrid game on the basis of the Nash equilibrium of the deterministic dy-
namic game considered on the trajectories of the averaged system (see Sections 3-5
below).
7.3 Averaged Dynamic Game
Let ωi(uis) = ωi(u
i
s; s, a) be the vector of steady state probabilities of the micro state-
action pair (s, a) of the player i when it uses a stationary policy uis ∈ USi . That is,
ωi(uis; s, a) := lim
j→∞
P
uis
ζ (S
i
j = s, A
i
j = a), ω
i(uis) = {ωi(uis; s, a)}. (7.8)
Due to the Assumption 5, the limit value ωi(uis; s, a) is independent of the initial condi-
tions. Define the setsWi by the equations
Wi =
⋃
uis∈USi
{ωi(uis)}, i = 1, 2. (7.9)
Note that the setsWi are polyhedrons (see, e.g., (Derman, 1970), pp. 93-95).
Consider a deterministic system, in which the dynamics of the state vector z(t) is de-
scribed by the equation
z˙(t) = fˆ 1(z(t),ω1(t)) + fˆ 2(z(t),ω2(t)), z(0) = z0 t ∈ [0, 1], (7.10)
where
fˆ i(z,ωi) := ∑
s,a
f i(z, gi(s, a))ωi(s, a) ∀ ωi ∈Wi, i = 1, 2. (7.11)
The functions ωi(·), i = 1, 2, are controls chosen by the players. These are assumed to
be measurable functions of t that satisfy the inclusions ωi(t) ∈Wi ∀t ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2.
As one can readily see, from Assumption 6 it follows that
‖ fˆ i(z,ωi)− fˆ i(z˜,ωi)‖ ≤ Ci‖z− z˜‖, ∀z, z˜ ∈ D, ∀ωi ∈Wi, (7.12)
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and from Remark 8 it follows that
‖ fˆ i(z,ωi)‖ ≤ Mi, ∀(z,ωi) ∈ D×Wi. (7.13)
Note that from (7.12) it follows that the solution of (7.10) exists and is unique with any
choice of controls ωi(·), i = 1, 2.
Assume that the player iwishes to minimize the terminal cost function Gi(z(1)), where
Gi(·) is the same as in the previous section (i = 1, 2). Given a pair of controls (ω1(t),ω2(t)),
let Ji(ω1,ω2) stand for the cost function of the payer i obtained with the players adopt-
ing these controls. That is,
Ji(ω
1,ω2) := Gi(z(1)), (7.14)
where z(t) is the solution of (7.10) obtained applying (ω1(t),ω2(t)).
Definition 9. A pair of controls (ω1∗(·),ω2∗(·)) is a Nash equilibrium of the averaged
game if {
J1(ω1∗,ω2∗) ≤ J1(ω1,ω2∗),
J2(ω1∗,ω2∗) ≤ J2(ω1∗,ω2),
(7.15)
for any ω1(·) (resp. ω2(·)).
Note that the Nash equilibrium of the averaged game is defined in the loop setting,
which means that the players have no information about their own past state/action
history, nor about the state of the system. In the next section, we will show how ANE
policies of the hybrid game can be constructed on the basis of a Nash equilibrium pair
of the averaged game.
7.4 Construction of ANE Policies - Main Results
Let ωi(·) be a control of the player i in the averaged game. Partition the time interval
[0, 1] by the points
τl := l∆(ǫ), l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ℓ(ǫ), ℓ(ǫ) := ⌊∆(ǫ)−1⌋, τℓ(ǫ)+1 = 1, (7.16)
where ∆(ǫ) > 0 is a function of ǫ such that
lim
ǫ→∞ ∆(ǫ) = 0, limǫ→0
∆(ǫ)
ǫ
= ∞. (7.17)
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On each interval [τl , τl+1] (l = 0, 1, . . . , ⌊∆(ǫ)−1⌋ − 1), define the time averages ωil ,
ωil :=
1
∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
ωi(t)dt ∈Wi, i = 1, 2, (7.18)
(the validity of the last inclusions follows from the convexity ofWi, i = 1, 2). Note that,
from the fact that ωil ∈ Wi, it follows that there exists a stationary policy uis ∈ USi of the
player i such that
ωil = ω
i
l(s
i
l)
(see (7.8) and (7.9)). Let us define a policy of the player i in the hybrid game that consists
of:
i. Applying, at each j = ⌊τl/ǫ⌋, ⌊τl/ǫ⌋+ 1, . . . , ⌊τl+1/ǫ⌋ − 1, the policy sil , for any
l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ℓ(ǫ)− 1;
ii. Applying an arbitrary stationary policy for ⌊τℓ(ǫ)/ǫ⌋, ⌊τℓ(ǫ)/ǫ⌋+ 1, . . . , ⌊ǫ−1⌋.
Let us denote this policy as uiǫ(ω
i). Note that, by construction, uiǫ(ω
i) ∈ UMi , i = 1, 2.
The main results of the paper are Propositions 15 and 16 stated below.
Proposition 15. Let ω(t) = (ω1(t),ω2(t)) be a pair of controls and let z(t) be the corre-
sponding solution of (7.10). Let also uǫ(ω) = (u1ǫ(ω
1), u2ǫ(ω
2)) be the pair of policies defined
above and let Z(t) be the random trajectory of system (7.1) obtained with the players using these
policies. Then
max
t∈[0,1]
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ ‖Z(t)− z(t)‖ ≤ γ(ǫ), (7.19)
where lim
ǫ→0
γ(ǫ) = 0. Also,
lim
ǫ→ 0
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ G
i(Z(1)) = Ji(ω1,ω2), i = 1, 2. (7.20)
Proposition 16. Let ω∗(t) := (ω1∗(t),ω2∗(t)) be a Nash equilibrium of the averaged game.
Let also u∗ǫ(ω
∗) = (u1∗ǫ (ω
1∗), u2∗ǫ (ω
2∗)) be defined as above (considering ω(t) = ω∗(t)).
Then u∗ǫ(ω
∗) is an asymptotic Nash equilibrium of the hybrid game.
The proofs of Propositions 15 and 16 are given in the next section.
7.4.1 Proofs of Propositions 15 and 16
Let us first recall some results from theMDP theory that are needed for the proofs of the
main results. Let hi stand for the full micro states-actions history of the player i (that is,
hi = h⌊ǫ
−1⌋,i
0 ; see (7.2)) and let h
K,i
m be a part of this history corresponding to the interval
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[tm, tm+K],
hK,im := {sim, aim, . . . , sim+K, aim+K}.
Denote by φK,im (h
i; s, a) the frequency of appearance of themicro state-action pair (s, a) ∈
S i × Ai on the interval [tm, tm+K],
φK,im (h
i; s, a) :=
1
K+ 1
m+K
∑
j=m
1{sij=s,aij=a}, φ
K,i
m (h
i) = {φK,im (hi, s, a)}, (7.21)
where 1{sin=s,ain=a} is the indicator function. If H
i is a random realization of hi, we de-
note:
φK,im (s, a) = φ
K,i
m (H
i, s, a), φK,im = {φK,im (s, a)}. (7.22)
Lemma 4. The following relationships are valid:
lim
K→∞
sup
ζ
sup
uis∈USi
E
uis
ζ ‖φK,i0 −ωi(uis)‖ = 0, (7.23)
and also
lim
K→∞
sup
ζ
sup
ui∈Ui
E
ui
ζ d
K,i
0 = 0, (7.24)
where
dK,i0 := dist(φ
K,i
0 ,Wi) = inf
ωi∈Wi
‖φK,i0 −ωi‖.
Proof. For a proof of the lemma, see Theorem 4.1 in (Altman and Gaitsgory, 1997).
Proof of Proposition 15. Let ω(t) = (ω1(t),ω2(t)) be as in the statement of Proposition
15 and let z(t) be the corresponding solution of (7.10). Define the sequence of vectors
ξl , l = 0, . . . , ℓ(ǫ), as the solution of the following difference equation
ξl+1 = ξl + ∆(ǫ)
[
fˆ 1(z(τl),ω
1
l ) + fˆ
2(z(τl),ω
2
l )
]
, ξ0 := z0. (7.25)
By definition
z(τl+1) = z(τl) +
∫ τl+1
τl
fˆ 1(z(t),ω1(t))dt+
∫ τl+1
τl
fˆ 2(z(t),ω2(t))dt. (7.26)
Hence,
‖z(τl+1)− ξl+1‖ ≤ ‖z(τl)− ξl‖+∆(ǫ)
2
∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
fˆ i(z(t),ωi(t))dt− fˆ i(z(τl),ωil))
∥∥∥∥ .
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The function fˆ i(z,ωi) is linear in ωi and Lipschitz continuous in z. Consequently, there
exists an appropriately chosen positive constant M˜ such that
‖z(τl+1)− ξl+1‖ ≤ ‖z(τl)− ξl‖+ ∆(ǫ)2M˜,
which implies that, for any l = 1, . . . , ℓ(ǫ),
‖z(τl)− ξl‖ ≤ ℓ(ǫ)∆(ǫ)2M˜ ≤ ∆(ǫ)M˜. (7.27)
Let Zl , l = 0, 1 . . . , ℓ(ǫ), be the sequence of random vectors defined by the equation
Zl+1 = Zl +
∫ τl+1
τl
f 1(Zl ,Y
1(t))dt+
∫ τl+1
τl
f 2(Zl ,Y
2(t))dt, l = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ(ǫ)− 1. (7.28)
By subtracting the latter from (7.25) and taking the expectation over the probability
measure corresponding to the policies uǫ(ω) = (u1ǫ(ω
1), u2ǫ(ω
2)), we obtain
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ ‖ξl+1 − Zl+1‖ ≤ E
uǫ(ω)
ζ ‖ξl − Zl‖+ ∆(ǫ)
2
∑
i=1
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f i(Zl ,Y
i(t))dt− fˆ i(z(τl),ωil)
∥∥∥∥
≤ Euǫ(ω)ζ ‖ξl − Zl‖+ ∆(ǫ)
2
∑
i=1
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ
{∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f i(Zl ,Y
i(t))dt− 1
∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f i(z(τl),Y
i(t))dt
∥∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f i(z(τl),Y
i(t))dt− fˆ i(z(τl),ωil))
∥∥∥∥
}
.
(7.29)
Using the Lipschitz continuity of f i(z,ωi) in z and the estimate (7.27), one can obtain
that∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f i(Zl ,Y
i(t))dt− 1
∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f i(z(τl),Y
i(t))dt
∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
Ci‖Zl − z(τl)‖dt
≤ Ci(‖Zl − ξl‖+ ‖ξl − z(τl))‖ ≤ Ci(‖Zl − ξl‖+ M˜∆(ǫ)).
(7.30)
By substituting the latter inequality in (7.29), one obtains
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ ‖ξl+1 − Zl+1‖ ≤ E
uǫ(ω)
ζ ‖ξl − Zl‖+ (C1 + C2)M˜∆(ǫ)2 + ∆(ǫ)E
uǫ(ω)
ζ
{
2
∑
i=1
Ci‖Zl − ξl‖
+
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f i(z(τl),Y
i(t))dt− fˆ i(z(τl),ωil))
∥∥∥∥
}
.
(7.31)
Let K(ǫ) = min
l=0,1,...,l(ǫ)−1
(⌊τl+1/ǫ⌋ − ⌊τl/ǫ⌋). Note that the following estimates are valid
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(see (Shi et al., 1998))
2 ≥ ⌊τl+1/ǫ⌋ − ⌊τl/ǫ⌋ − K(ǫ),
∣∣∣∣K(ǫ)− ∆(ǫ)ǫ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1
⇒
∣∣∣∣K(ǫ)−1 − ǫ∆(ǫ)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ2∆(ǫ)2
(
1
1− ǫ/∆(ǫ)
)
. (7.32)
From (7.32) it follows that there exist positive constants Li1, L
i
2 such that, for i = 1, 2,
and l = 1, . . . , ℓ(ǫ),
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f i(z(τl),Y
i(t))dt− ǫ
∆(ǫ)
⌊τl+1/ǫ⌋+K(ǫ)
∑
n=⌊τl/ǫ⌋
f i(z(τl), g
i(Sin, A
i
n))
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ Li1
ǫ
∆(ǫ)
, (7.33)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
ǫ
∆(ǫ)
⌊τl+1/ǫ⌋+K(ǫ)
∑
n=⌊τl/ǫ⌋
f i(z(τl), g
i(Sin, A
i
n))−
1
K(ǫ) + 1
⌊τl+1/ǫ⌋+K(ǫ)
∑
n=⌊τl/ǫ⌋
f i(z(τl), g
i(Sin, A
i
n)
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ Li2
ǫ
∆(ǫ)
.
(7.34)
Let (as above) φK,im = {φK,im (s, a)} stand for the state-action frequencies of the controller
i that corresponds to a random realization of the history Hi (see (7.22). Then
1
K(ǫ) + 1
⌊τl+1/ǫ⌋+K(ǫ)
∑
n=⌊τl/ǫ⌋
f i(z(τl), g
i(Sin, A
i
n)) = ∑
(s,a)∈S i×Ai
φ
K(ǫ),i
⌊τl/ǫ⌋(s, a) f
i(z(τl), g
i(s, a)).
Note that from (7.23) (see Lemma 4) it follows that there exists a function µi : N → R,
with lim
K→∞
µi(K) = 0 (implying lim
ǫ→0
µi(K(ǫ)) = 0 ) such that
E
uis
Si⌊τl/ǫ⌋
{
max
(s,a)
|φK(ǫ),i⌊τl/ǫ⌋(s, a)−ω
i
l(s, a)|
}
≤ µi(K(ǫ)). (7.35)
Since
2
∑
i=1
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ
{∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f i(z(τl),Y
i(t))dt− fˆ i(z(τl),ωil))
∥∥∥∥
}
≤
2
∑
i=1
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ


∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f i(z(τl),Y
i(t))dt− ǫ
∆(ǫ)
⌊τl+1/ǫ⌋+K(ǫ)
∑
n=⌊τl/ǫ⌋
f i(z(τl), g
i(Sin, A
i
n))
∥∥∥∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥
ǫ
∆(ǫ)
⌊τl+1/ǫ⌋+K(ǫ)
∑
n=⌊τl/ǫ⌋
f i(z(τl), g
i(Sin, A
i
n))−
1
K(ǫ) + 1
⌊τl+1/ǫ⌋+K(ǫ)
∑
n=⌊τl/ǫ⌋
f i(z(τl), g
i(Sin, A
i
n))
∥∥∥∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥∥∥∑s,a φ
K(ǫ)
⌊τl/ǫ⌋,i(H
i; s, a) f i(z(τl), g
i(s, a))− fˆ i(z(τl),ωil)
∥∥∥∥∥
}
116
7.4. Construction of ANE Policies - Main Results
and since, by definition, fˆ i(z(τl),ω
i
l) := ∑
s,a
ωil(s, a) f
i(z(τl), g
i(s, a)), one can obtain,
using (7.35), (7.33), (7.34),
2
∑
i=1
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ
{∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f i(z(τl),Y
i(t))dt− fˆ i(z(τl),ωil)
∥∥∥∥
}
≤ (L˜1 + L˜2) ǫ
∆(ǫ)
+
2
∑
i=1
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ
{
∑
s,a
∣∣∣φK(ǫ)⌊τl/ǫ⌋,i(Hi; s, a)−ωil(s, a)
∣∣∣ ‖ f i(z(τl), gi(s, a))‖
}
≤ (L˜1 + L˜2) ǫ
∆(ǫ)
+
2
∑
i=1
MiE
uiǫ(ω)
ζ
{
∑
s,a
∣∣∣φK(ǫ)⌊τl/ǫ⌋,i(Hi; s, a)−ωil(s, a)
∣∣∣
}
≤ (L˜1 + L˜2) ǫ
∆(ǫ)
+
2
∑
i=1
MiE
uiǫ(ω)
ζ
{
E
sil
Si⌊τl/ǫ⌋
∑
s,a
∣∣∣φK(ǫ)⌊τl/ǫ⌋,i(Hi; s, a)−ωil(s, a)
∣∣∣
}
≤ (L˜1 + L˜2) ǫ
∆(ǫ)
+
2
∑
i=1
Miµi(K(ǫ))
(7.36)
where L˜i = Li1 + L
i
2 (L
i
j, j = 1, 2, being the constants from (7.33) and (7.34)) and Mi, i =
1, 2, are the constants from (7.5). The substitution of the latter into (7.31) leads to
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ [‖ξl+1 − Zl+1‖] ≤ Euǫ(ω)ζ [‖ξl − Zl‖] + M˜∆(ǫ)Euǫ(ω)ζ [‖ξl − Zl‖] + ∆(ǫ)κ(ǫ),
(7.37)
where lim
ǫ→0
κ(ǫ) = 0 and M˜ is an appropriately chosen constant. This implies (see Propo-
sition 5.1 in (Gaitsgory, 1992)) that
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ [‖ξl − Zl‖] ≤ ν(ǫ), l = 1, . . . , ℓ(ǫ), (7.38)
with lim
ǫ→0
ν(ǫ) = 0. By definition, for l = 1, . . . , ℓ(ǫ)− 1:
Z(τl+1) = Z(τl) +
∫ τl+1
τl
f 1(Z(t),Y1(t))dt+
∫ τl+1
τl
f 2(Z(t),Y2(t))dt (7.39)
By subtracting (7.28) from (7.39), one obtains
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ ‖Z(τl+1)− Zl+1‖ ≤ Euǫ(ω)ζ
[
‖Z(τl)− Zl‖+ (C1 + C2)
∫ τl+1
τl
‖Z(t)− Zl‖dt
]
.
(7.40)
Note that, due to (7.5),
‖Z(t)− Z(τl)‖ ≤ (M1 + M2)∆(ǫ) ∀t ∈ [τl , τl+1], (7.41)
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Hence,
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ ‖Z(τl+1)− Zl+1‖ ≤ E
uǫ(ω)
ζ [‖Z(τl)− Zl‖+ C∆(ǫ)‖Z(τl)− Zl‖] + C(M1 + M2)∆(ǫ)2.
(7.42)
Due to Proposition 5.1 from (Gaitsgory, 1992), the latter implies that there exists an
appropriately chosen positive constant M˜ such that
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ ‖Z(τl)− Zl‖ ≤ M˜∆(ǫ), l = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ(ǫ). (7.43)
By combining (7.27), (7.38), (7.43), we may conclude that
E
uǫ(ω)
ζ ‖z(τl)− Z(τl)‖ ≤ Euǫ(ω)ζ {‖z(τl)− ξl‖+ ‖ξl − Zl‖+ ‖Zl − Z(τl)‖}
≤ ν(ǫ) + ∆(ǫ)M˜, l = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ(ǫ).
(7.44)
This and the fact that ‖z(t)− z(τl)‖ ≤ M∆(ǫ) ∀t ∈ [τl , τl+1] imply the validity of (7.19)
with some γ(ǫ) such that lim
ǫ→0
γ(ǫ) = 0. The validity of (7.20) follows from (7.19) since
(see (7.6))
|Euǫ(ω)ζ Gi(Z(1))− Gi(z(1))| ≤ CiGEuǫ(ω)ζ ‖Z(1)− z(1)‖ ≤ CiGγ(ǫ).
Thus, the proof of the proposition is completed.
Proof of Proposition 16. Let h1 = h⌊ǫ
−1⌋,1
0 = (s
1
0, a
1
0, . . . , s
1
⌊ǫ−1⌋, a
1
⌊ǫ−1⌋) be a realization of a
state-action trajectory of player 1 and let
y1(t, h1) := g1(s1⌊t/ǫ⌋, a
1
⌊t/ǫ⌋). (7.45)
Define the projection of the vector of the state action frequencies φK(ǫ),1⌊τl/ǫ⌋(h
1) (see (7.21))
ontoW1 by the equation:
ω1l (h
1) := arg min
ω1∈W1
∥∥∥φK(ǫ),1⌊τl/ǫ⌋ (h1)−ω1
∥∥∥ . (7.46)
where K(ǫ) is as in the proof of Proposition 15. Define the function
ω1(t, h1) := {ω1l (h1) for t ∈ [τl , τl+1], l = 1, . . . , ℓ(ǫ)},
and denote by z(t, h1) the solution of the differential equation
z˙(t, h1) = fˆ1(z(t, h1),ω1(t, h1)) + fˆ2(z(t, h1),ω2∗(t)). (7.47)
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Define the piecewise constant function
ω˜2∗(t) = {ω2∗l for t ∈ [τl , τl+1], l = 1, . . . , ℓ(ǫ)},
where ω2∗l :=
1
∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
ω2∗(t)dt. Let z˜(t, h1) be the solution of the following differen-
tial equation
˙˜z(t, h1) = fˆ1(z˜(t, h1),ω1(t, h1)) + fˆ2(z˜(t, h1), ω˜2∗(t)). (7.48)
By subtracting (7.47) from (7.48) (and having in mind linearity of fˆ 2(z,ω2) in ω2)), one
obtains
‖z˜(τl+1, h1)− z(τl+1, h1)‖ ≤ ‖z˜(τl , h1)− z(τl , h1)‖+ M˜∆‖z˜(t, h1)− z(t, h1)‖+ M˜∆2(ǫ),
where M˜ is an appropriate positive constant. Due to Proposition 5.1 in (Gaitsgory,
1992), the latter implies that
‖z˜(τl , h1)− z(τl , h1)‖ ≤ M˜∆(ǫ) ∀l = 1 . . . , ℓ(ǫ), (7.49)
which, in turn, implies that
max
t∈[0,1]
‖z˜(t, h1)− z(t, h1)‖ ≤ M˜∆(ǫ), (7.50)
and, by (7.6),
‖G1(z˜(1, h1))− G1(z(1, h1))‖ ≤ C1G‖z˜(1, h1)− z(1, h1)‖ ≤ C1GM˜∆(ǫ). (7.51)
Due to the Definition 9 of the Nash equilibrium ,
G1(z(1, h1)) ≥ G1∗. (7.52)
Consequently,
G1(z˜(1, h1)) ≥ G1∗ − C1GM˜∆(ǫ). (7.53)
Let H1 be a random realization of h1. Using the fact that fˆ i(z,ωi) (i = 1, 2) are Lipschitz
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continuous in z and linear in ωi, one can obtain
z˜(τl+1,H
1) = z˜(τl ,H
1) +
∫ τl+1
τl
fˆ 1(z˜(t,H1),ω1(t,H1))dt+
∫ τl+1
τl
fˆ 2(z˜(t,H1), ω˜∗2(t))dt
= z˜(τl ,H
1) + ∆(ǫ) fˆ 1(z˜(τl ,H
1),ω1l (H
1)) + ∆(ǫ) fˆ 2(z˜(τl ,H
1),ω2∗l )) +O(∆(ǫ)
2).
(7.54)
By subtracting (7.54) from (7.39), one obtains
‖Z(τl+1)− z˜(τl+1,H1)‖ ≤ ‖Z(τl)− z˜(τl ,H1)‖
+ ∆(ǫ)
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 1(Z(t),Y1(t)dt− fˆ 1(z˜(τl ,H1),ω1l (H1))
∥∥∥∥
+ ∆(ǫ)
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 2(Z(t),Y2(t)dt− fˆ 2(z˜(τl ,H1),ω2∗l )
∥∥∥∥+O(∆(ǫ)2)
(7.55)
By (7.4),
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 1(Z(t),Y1(t))dt− fˆ 1(z˜(τl ,H1),ω1l (H1))
∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 1(Z(t),Y1(t))dt− 1
∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 1(z˜(τl ,H
1),Y1(t))
∥∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 1(z˜(τl ,H
1),Y1(t))− fˆ 1(z˜(τl ,H1),ω1l (H1))
∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 1(z˜(τl ,H
1),Y1(t))dt− fˆ 1(z˜(τl ,H1),ω1l (H1))
∥∥∥∥
+ C1∆(ǫ)
∥∥∥Z(τl)− z˜(τl ,H1)∥∥∥+O(∆(ǫ)2)
(7.56)
Analogously,
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 2(Z(t),Y2(t))dt− fˆ 2(z˜(τl ,H1),ω2∗l )
∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 2(Z(t),Y2(t))dt− 1
∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 2(z˜(τl ,H
1),Y2(t))dt
∥∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 2(z˜(τl ,H
1),Y2(t))dt− fˆ 2(z˜(τl ,H1),ω2∗l )
∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 2(z˜(τl ,H
1),Y2(t))− fˆ 2(z˜(τl ,H1),ω2∗l )
∥∥∥∥
+ C2∆(ǫ)
∥∥∥Z(τl)− z˜(τl ,H1)∥∥∥+O(∆(ǫ)2).
(7.57)
For brevity, let us re-denote ui∗ǫ (ω
i∗) as ui∗ǫ (i = 1, 2). From (7.55), (7.56) and (7.57) it
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follows that, for any u1ǫ ∈ U1,
E
u1ǫ ,u
2∗
ǫ
ζ ‖Z(τl+1)− z˜(τl+1,H1)‖ ≤ Eu
1
ǫ ,u
2∗
ǫ
ζ
{
‖Z(τl)− z˜(τl ,H1)‖(1+ (C1 + C2)∆(ǫ))
}
+ ∆(ǫ)E
u1ǫ ,u
2∗
ǫ
ζ
{∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 1(z˜(τl ,H
1),Y1(t))dt− fˆ 1(z˜(τl ,H1),ω1l (H1))
∥∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 2(z˜(τl ,H
1),Y2(t))dt− fˆ 2(z˜(τl ,H1),ω2∗l )
∥∥∥∥
}
+O(∆(ǫ)2).
(7.58)
Similarly to (7.36), one can obtain
E
u1ǫ ,u
2∗
ǫ
ζ
{∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 2(z˜(τl ,H
1),Y2(t))dt− fˆ 2(z˜(τl ,H1),ω2∗l )
∥∥∥∥
}
≤ L˜2 ǫ
∆(ǫ)
+ M2E
u2∗ǫ
ζ
{
∑
s,a
∣∣∣φK(ǫ)⌊τl/ǫ⌋,2(H2; s, a)−ω2∗l (s, a))
∣∣∣
}
≤ L˜2 ǫ
∆(ǫ)
+ M2E
u2∗ǫ
ζ
{
E
s2l
S2⌊τl/ǫ⌋
∑
s,a
∣∣∣φK(ǫ)⌊τl/ǫ⌋,2(H2; s, a)−ω2∗l (s, a))
∣∣∣
}
≤ L˜2 ǫ
∆(ǫ)
+ M2µ2(K(ǫ)),
(7.59)
where L˜2 and M2 are the same constants as in (7.36). In an analogous way,
E
u1ǫ ,u
2∗
ǫ
ζ
{∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 1(z˜(τl ,H
1),Y1(t))dt− fˆ 1(z˜(τl ,H1),ω1l (H1))
∥∥∥∥
}
≤ L˜1 ǫ
∆(ǫ)
+ M1E
u1ǫ
ζ
{
∑
s,a
∣∣∣φK(ǫ)⌊τl/ǫ⌋,1(H1; s, a)−ω1l (s, a;H1)
∣∣∣
} (7.60)
where M1 is the constant from (7.5). From the definition of ω1l (H
1) = {ω1l (s, a;H1)}
as argmin in (7.46) and from (7.24) (see Lemma 4) it follows that there exists a function
µ˜1 : N → R, with lim
K→∞
µ˜1(K) = 0 (implying lim
ǫ→0
µ˜1(K(ǫ)) = 0) such that
E
u1ǫ
ζ
{
∑
s,a
∣∣∣φK(ǫ)⌊τl/ǫ⌋,1(H1; s, a)−ω1l (s, a;H1))
∣∣∣
}
≤ µ˜1(K(ǫ)). (7.61)
Hence, by (7.60),
E
u1ǫ ,u
2∗
ǫ
ζ
{∥∥∥∥ 1∆(ǫ)
∫ τl+1
τl
f 1(z˜(τl ,H
1),Y1(t))dt− fˆ 1(z˜(τl ,H1),ω1l (H1))
∥∥∥∥
}
≤ L˜1 ǫ
∆(ǫ)
+M1µ˜1(K(ǫ)).
(7.62)
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By substituting (7.59) and (7.62) into (7.58), one obtains
E
u1ǫ ,u
2∗
ǫ
ζ ‖Z(τl+1)− z˜(τl+1,H1)‖ ≤ (1+ C∆(ǫ))Eu
1
ǫ ,u
2∗
ǫ
ζ
{
‖Z(τl)− z˜(τl ,H1)‖
}
+ ∆(ǫ)ν˜(ǫ),
(7.63)
with lim
ǫ→0
ν˜(ǫ) = 0. By virtue of Proposition 5.1 in (Gaitsgory, 1992), the latter implies
that there exists a function η(ǫ), with η(ǫ)→ 0, such that ∀l = 1, . . . , ℓ(ǫ),
E
u1ǫ ,u
2∗
ǫ
ζ ‖Z(τl)− z˜(τl ,H1)‖ ≤ η(ǫ). (7.64)
Thus,
∣∣∣Eu1ǫ ,u2∗ǫζ {G1(Z(1))} −Eu1ǫ ,u2∗ǫζ {G1(z˜(1,H1))}∣∣∣ ≤ C1Gη(ǫ) ∀u1ǫ ∈ U1. (7.65)
By (7.53),
E
u1ǫ ,u
2∗
ǫ
ζ
{
G1(z˜(1,H1))
}
≥ G1∗ +O(∆(ǫ)),
and from (7.65) it follows that
lim
ǫ→0
E
u1ǫ ,u
2∗
ǫ
ζ {G1(Z(1))} ≥ G1∗ ∀u1ǫ ∈ U1.
A similar procedure can be applied to show that
lim
ǫ→0
E
u1∗ǫ ,u2ǫ
ζ {G2(Z(1))} ≥ G2∗.
Since, by Proposition (15),
G∗i = lim
ǫ→0
E
u1∗ǫ ,u2∗ǫ
s {Gi(Z(1))}, i = 1, 2,
the proposition is proved.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented a non-zero sum dynamic game whose state is described
by a hybrid dynamical system that evolves in continuous time and that is subjected to
abrupt changes of the parameters. By supposing that the MDPs associated to the jumps
of the parameters and the macro state of the system evolve with different velocities,
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we proved that the state trajectory of the hybrid system can be approximated by the
solutions of a certain deterministic averaged control system. We showed how to con-
struct an asymptotic Nash equilibriumMarkov policy of the game obtained solving the
hybrid system, on the basis of a Nash equilibrium of the game obtained solving the
deterministic averaged system.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Perspectives
8.1 Summary of Contributions
In this dissertation we investigated different theoretical aspects of EGT, with a particu-
lar focus on the notion and the characterization of the player. We followed two major
directions: we first revisited the classical idea of individual-selfish players, defining a
model for group-players, and we then focused on games combining standard EGT and
MDP, which allows one to characterize players through an individual state evolving in
time, beside the action used. We also suggested various scenarii which provide useful
applications for our models, particularly in telecommunication networks.
More precisely, in Part I we proposed our new approach to evolutionary games to repre-
sent those situations in which individuals interact, maximizing the fitness of the group
they belong to. Therefore, the actual players of a game are not the interacting individu-
als but the groups. We studied a simple but meaningful example with two pure actions,
the Hawk-Dove game, in two cases, respectively a finite and an infinite population of
individuals, divided into a finite number N of symmetric groups of the same size. As
the number of players is finite, we considered the Nash equilibrium as solution con-
cept (rather than the ESS). Moreover, since the Nash equilibrium is a multiaction such
that no player can profit by deviating, in our group-players context, it is stable against
deviations of a share of individuals, since the player consists in a whole group of indi-
viduals. We verified that the Hawk-Dove group-players game (in both the finite and
the infinite population case) is convex, which allowed us to prove the existence and the
uniqueness of the equilibrium through Rosen’s conditions (Rosen, 1965). We then ex-
plicitly computed the symmetric mixed Nash equilibra, showing how the presence of
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groups plays an important role for the equilibrium structure. In particular, we showed
that, for the two group-players game, the level of aggressiveness at the equilibrium
is lower than in the standard Hawk-Dove game. We finally defined a gradient-based
dynamics, such that the equilibria obtained are asymptotically stable for this dynamics.
We then extended the group players model to a more general framework, where the
N groups have different sizes and dispose of a finite set of pure actions. We presented
a new solution concept, the GFESS, implying stability against local deviations within
each group. For the particular case of two pure actions games, we provided a detailed
characterization of the GFESSs and we illustrated our results studying three classical
examples considering group-players, the Hawk-Dove game, the Stag Hunt game and
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, through which we showed that the presence of groups im-
pacts the equilibrium output. We then further generalized our model by redefining the
fitness of a group, assuming that the immediate payoff associated with the pairwise
interactions among individuals in the same group differs from that of inter-group in-
teractions. We applied this model to a MAC problem, where we studied the impact of
groups on mobiles behavior.
In the second part of the dissertation, we considered a particular class of evolution-
ary games, the MDEG, where each (individual) player is characterized by a state. The
action played by an individual not only determines its immediate fitness but it also
impacts the transition probabilities to the individual’s next state. Furthermore, the fit-
ness of a player does not only depend on its action and on the distribution of actions
in the population, but also on the distribution of individual states. We proposed a new
dynamical approach to this type of games, focusing on the dynamics involved. We
defined the interdependent dynamics of the policies distribution and of the individ-
ual states, where the first is assumed to follow the well-known replicator dynamics.
For a particular game with two states and two pure actions, we proved the correspon-
dence between stable rest points of the dynamics and the equilibrium profiles of the
evolutionary game. Under the assumption that the two dynamics evolve with different
timescales, we proposed two methods to obtain the rest points. We gave a complete
characterization of these equilibrium profiles and we showed that these equilibria are
equivalent in terms of average sojourn times and expected fitnesses. Finally, we illus-
trated our model through two application scenarii in network systems.
We then defined a particular Hawk-Dove game in a MDEG type of framework, where
an individual may be in one of four possible states, representing its age and its strength.
In contrast with standardMDEG, in this particular example, we supposed that the tran-
sition probabilities of a player do not depend on its action but on the action chosen by
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its opponent. By considering stationary policies and supposing that the distribution
of the individual states is stationary, we transformed the dynamic Hawk-Dove into a
standard evolutionary game and we computed its Nash equilibria. We then further ex-
tended our dynamic Hawk-Dove game, by considering group-players as presented in
Chapter 2. We showed that, for a two groups game with fixed values of the parame-
ters, the presence of groups in the dynamic Hawk-Dove game brings important novel
features with respect to the individual-player game, as the fact that the non-aggressive
pure policy can be an equilibrium. We also compared the mixed equilibria obtained
respectively for the individual-players and group-players games and we obtained that,
also in this case, the probability of being aggressive in strong adult state is lower for
group-players.
Finally, we presented a different problem which is not directly related to evolutionary
games but which is connected to the dynamic approach adopted for MDEG problems.
In particular, we studied a non-zero sum dynamic game whose state is described by
a hybrid dynamical system that evolves in continuous time and that is subjected to
abrupt changes of the parameters. By supposing that the MDPs associated with the
jumps of the parameters and the macro state of the system evolve with different veloc-
ities, we proved that the state trajectory of the hybrid system can be approximated by
the solutions of a certain deterministic averaged control system. in particular, we show
that an asymptotic Nash equilibrium of such hybrid game can be constructed on the
basis of a Nash equilibrium of the deterministic averaged dynamic game.
8.2 Perspectives
Group-players evolutionary games leave many issues open for future studies. We have
introduced a gradient based dynamics for the Hawk-Dove group-players game. We
may define a dynamics in the general group-players framework, comparing different
possible dynamics (gradient based, replicator, etc.). Following the folk theorem ap-
proach for standard evolutionary games, we could then establish the relation between
rest points and equilibria. Wemay also unify the two lines of research presented here by
considering group-players in a MDEG framework, as we did in Chapter 6 for a partic-
ular Hawk-Dove dynamic game. The notion of the player can be further investigated.
Wemay consider the case of a population of individuals divided into groups, where the
interacting individuals maximize a fitness function which considers both an individual
and a group component. It would be interesting also to consider a population which is
composed, at the same time, by group-players and individual players, i.e. where some
127
Chapter 8. Conclusions and Future Perspectives
individuals maximize the fitness of the group they belong to, while others maximize
their own fitness, and then to define a suitable notion of equilibrium in this context.
Also the SPcD and, more generally, MDEG problems offer various possible direction
for forthcoming developments. In standard MDEG and in our dynamical model we
supposed that, respectively, transition probabilities and transition rates only depend
on the action of the player. In future works we propose to relax this assumption, letting
these functions depend on the actions of both individuals involved in an interaction.
Moreover, we may extend our results concerning SPcD to a more general framework,
characterizing the states and policies interdependent dynamics for games with more
than two states and two pure actions. A major effort should be done in unifying the
different classes of stochastic games into a comprehensive theory. As a matter of fact,
as we have already mentioned, different classes of games dealing with stochastic pro-
cesses have been defined in the literature, as stochastic (evolutionary) games (Shap-
ley, 1953) (Flesch et al., 2013), anonymous sequential games (Jovanovic and Rosenthal,
1988) , mean-field stochastic games (Weintraub et al., 2005) (Tembine, 2011), mean-field
stochastic differential games (Lasry and Lions, 2007) (Guéant et al., 2010). It would be
interesting and useful to deeper explore the relation between these types of games and
see whether they can all be thought as different subclasses of a more general class of
games.
As regards the hybrid stochastic system, in this dissertation we analyzed the open loop
information structure case, which means that the player has no information about the
state of the system, but only on its state and (eventually) its history. We are currently
working to extend this model to the feedback information structure case, where, at each
instant of time both players know exactly to which (macro) state the game has evolved
and policies are determined as functions of this information. In order to generalize our
results to the closed-loop case, we need to prove that the results in Lemma 4 still hold.
Another direction that we would like to investigate in future works is the study of a
hybrid stochastic system where the parameters evolve according to CT-MDPs, instead
of discrete time processes. This would lead to a framework very close in nature to the
one presented in Chapter 5, where we study the interdependent dynamics of individual
states and policies distributions and we assume a two timescale behavior of the system.
We may thus be able to combine hybrid stochastic dynamical system and EGT.
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